


bell hooks on education



bell hooks on education. Barry Burke assesses the contribution that bell hooks has made to thinking about education and sets this within the context of her biography and work.

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My hope emerges from those places of struggle where I witness individuals positively transforming their lives and the world around them. Educating is always a vocation rooted in hopefulness. As teachers we believe that learning is possible, that nothing can keep an open mind from seeking after knowledge and finding a way to know. (hooks 2003 p.xiv)

bell hooks (1952-) (nee Gloria Watkins) was born in Hopkinsville, Kentucky. She came from a poor working class family and worked her way up the academic ladder to become Distinguished Professor of English at City College in New York. Her early schooling she describes as 'sheer joy'. The all-black school she went to as a young girl she writes of as being 'a place of ecstasy – pleasure and danger'. She loved being a student.

She loved learning.

To be changed by ideas was pure pleasure. But to learn ideas that ran counter to values and beliefs learned at home was to place oneself at risk, to enter the danger zone. Home was the place where I was forced to conform to someone else's image of who and what I should be. School was the place where I could forget that self and, through ideas, reinvent myself. (hooks 1994 p3).

Almost all of bell hooks' teachers were black women who she feels were on a mission. They were committed to nurturing intellect so that their pupils could become scholars, thinkers or cultural workers (what she refers to as 'black folks who used our minds') (see hooks 1996a). She decided from very early on that she wanted to become a teacher and a writer.

When school integration was introduced in the 1960s, bell hooks transferred to an integrated school that was the complete opposite of her first school. Here she was confronted with an institution of all-white teachers who she judged were not interested in transforming the minds of their pupils but simply transferring irrelevant bodies of knowledge. She writes that the knowledge they were supposed to soak up bore no relation to how they lived or behaved. 'Bussed to white schools', bell hooks recalls, 'we soon learned that obedience, and not zealous will to learn, was what was expected of us'. Too much eagerness to learn she regarded as something that could easily be seen as a threat to white authority (see hooks 1996a and 1996b)

However, learn she did. bell hooks went on to gain a scholarship to Stanford University where, in 1973 she obtained her BA. From there she went to the University of Wisconsin where she was awarded an MA in 1976 and then her PhD from the University of California, Santa Cruz in 1983.

bell hooks became a teacher and a writer – writing about one book a year. Her use of a pseudonym arose from a desire to honour her grandmother (whose name she took) and her mother, and a concern to establish a 'separate voice' from the person Gloria Watson.

Her first major book (1981) *Ain't I a woman : Black women and feminism* established her as a formidable critic and intellectual and set out some of the central themes around culture, gender, race and class that have characterized her work. In this book bell hooks looked 'at the impact of sexism on the black woman during slavery, the devaluation of black womanhood, black male sexism, racism within the recent feminist movement, and the black woman's involvement with feminism' (1981: 13). She drew attention to the extent to which 'the dominant white patriarchy and black male patriarchy conveyed to black women the message that to cast a vote in favour of social equality of the sexes i.e. women's liberation, was to cast a vote against black liberation' (1981: 185). hooks remains an outspoken feminist, an anti-racist, a democrat. A central aspect of her work is that she sees discrimination and domination not in separate categories but all interconnected. She sees no hierarchy of discrimination. Gender, race and class distinctions are not viewed as one being more important than the other.

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bell hooks' first major book on education, *Teaching to Transgress*, was published in 1994. It is a collection of essays exploring her ideas. She writes in a very personal style, often anecdotal giving examples from her

own experiences. This is quite deliberate as she intended the book to be read by a diverse audience covering anyone interested in the practice of education. She argued for a progressive, holistic education – engaged pedagogy:

To educate as the practice of freedom is a way of teaching that anyone can learn. That learning process comes easiest to those of us who teach who also believe that there is an aspect of our vocation that is sacred; who believe that our work is not merely to share information but to share in the intellectual and spiritual growth of our students. To teach in a manner that respects and cares for the souls of our students is essential if we are to provide the necessary conditions where learning can most deeply and intimately begin (hooks 1994: 13)

She goes on to stress the demands this places upon educators in terms of authenticity and commitment.

Progressive, holistic education, "engaged pedagogy" is more demanding than conventional critical or feminist pedagogy. For, unlike these two teaching practices, it emphasizes well-being. That means that teachers must be actively involved committed to a process of self-actualization that promotes their own well-being if they are to teach in a manner that empowers students. (hooks 1994: 15)

Teaching to Transgress is characterized by attention to emotion and feeling (including an exploration of the place of eros and eroticism in the classroom.

Nearly ten years after the publication of *Teaching to Transgress*, hooks produced a sequel entitled *Teaching Community* with a subtitle of *A Pedagogy of Hope*. This book develops themes in the earlier book and in particular the process of building community in the classroom.

hooks and Freire

bell hooks is heavily influenced by Paulo Freire whom she met and worked with on a number of occasions. She uses a quote from him at the beginning of *Teaching Community* to illustrate its subtitle. 'It is imperative that we maintain hope even when the harshness of reality may suggest the opposite' bell hooks writes. She claims that she was like a person dying of thirst when she first encountered Freire and although she did not agree with everything he said, she maintains that 'the fact that there was some mud in my water was not important.' Freire has had a profound effect on her thinking and on bell hooks' practice, particularly around the concepts of literacy and consciousness raising.

hooks is a feminist and for her, literacy is essential to the future of the feminist movement because the lack of reading, writing and critical skills serves to exclude many women and men from feminist consciousness. Not only that, it excludes many from the political process and the labour market. She regards literacy as more than being able to read and write, however. For her, it allows people, particularly those who are marginalized and discriminated against in society to acquire a critical consciousness. Freire's concept of critical consciousness has been particularly important to her work. She also promotes a notion of praxis in a

similar way to Freire i.e. a combination of reflection and action and regards her notion of 'engaged pedagogy' as one which requires praxis on the part of not only students but also teachers. Teachers must be aware of themselves as practitioners and as human beings if they wish to teach students in a non-threatening, anti-discriminatory way. Self-actualisation should be the goal of the teacher as well as the students.

bell hook's pedagogy is one that is responsive to the specific situation of each particular group of students and she sees education as taking place not only in the classroom but also wherever people are. She refers in her new book to 'communities of resistance' as places where democratic educators can work.

Relationships, power and media

She acknowledges that within the teaching and learning relationship, more often than not, the question of power and authority raises its head. In an conversation she had with Gary Olson, she said that what she tries to do is acknowledge her authority and the limitations of it and then think of how both teacher and students can learn together in a way that no one acquires the kind of power to use the classroom as a space of domination. She also makes the point that this domination is not restricted to the teacher/student relationship but where there is diversity amongst the students particularly around the issues of race and gender and sexual practice, it is possible for everyone to engage in power struggles and, in fact, 'for certain students to have potentially the power to coerce, dominate and silence'. In order to create a learning environment within the classroom she aims to diffuse hierarchy and create a sense of community. hooks maintains that the classroom should be 'a place that is life-sustaining and mind-expanding, a place of liberating mutuality where teacher and student together work in partnership' (hooks 2003 p.xv).

Although much of her criticism of the educational world is aimed at the traditional educationalist and what Freire refers to as the banking concept of education, she is also very aware that much of the ideology of modern society arises from the mass media. She is particularly scathing about the power and the effect of television on the American public. 'No one, no matter how intelligent and skilful at critical thinking, is protected against the subliminal suggestions that imprint themselves on our unconscious brain if we are watching hours and hours of television' (hooks 2003 p11). She sees parents and students fearing alternative ways of thinking. She maintains that it is vital to challenge all the misinformation that is constantly directed at people and poses as objective unbiased knowledge. She sees this as an essential educational task. She refers in her writing to the importance of the 'decolonisation of ways of knowing' (hooks 2003 p3). She makes the point that what is needed are mass-based political movements calling on citizens to uphold democracy and the rights of everyone to be educated, to work on behalf of ending domination in all of its forms – to work for justice, changing the educational system so that schooling is not the site where students are indoctrinated to support what she refers to as 'imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy' or any ideology, but rather where they learn to open their minds, to engage in rigorous study and to think critically.

Conclusion

bell hooks concern with the interlacing dynamics of 'race', gender, culture and class and her overall orientation to the whole person and to their well-being when connected with her ability to engage with educational practice in a direct way set her apart from the vast bulk of her contemporaries. Hers is a unique voice – and a hopeful one:

The academy is not paradise. But learning is a place where paradise can be created. The classroom with all its limitations remains a location of possibility. In that field of possibility we have the opportunity to labour for freedom, to demand of ourselves and our comrades, an openness of mind and heart that allows us to face reality even as we collectively imagine ways to move beyond boundaries, to transgress. This is education as the practice of freedom.
(hooks 1994: 207)

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Links

bell hooks resources: good starting point for resources on the web.

Acknowledgement

The picture of bell hooks was sourced from Wikimedia Commons and is believed to be in the public domain (Cmongirl): <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bellhooks.jpg>

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Latino immigrant rights and has begun trying to convince local conservatives to withhold support of immigration crackdowns, citing those expensive efforts as an example of big government.

Just as the coalition in Riverside has done, the Cincinnati Interfaith Workers Center periodically sponsors church testimonials so that non-Latinos can hear undocumented immigrants talk about hardship in their home countries and their hidden lives in the U.S. "People were really touched by their stories," says Don Sherman, the center's director, "and we've had [parishioners] who have now donated funds" to the center.

Last November, 18-year-old Bernard Pastor (a recent high school graduate who came from Guatemala at age 3 and had been denied political asylum) was arrested after a minor traffic accident and held in the Butler County Jail. LULAC organized Pastor's community in the Cincinnati suburb of Reading—including dozens of white classmates and friends—to push for his release. "They never looked at Bernard as any different than themselves," says LULAC Ohio director Jason Riveiro. Because of the outpouring of support, the following month, ICE released Pastor, and he is now petitioning to stay in the U.S. legally.

Last fall, two years after Tyler Waltz met Jerry Solorio, Waltz enrolled in Bromberg's Latin American literature course at Miami University Hamilton. For extra credit, he attended a Latino soccer tournament, eventually joining an all-Latino team. Waltz was amazed by how well he meshed with his teammates, though they spoke little English and he, even less Spanish. Getting to know Solorio and his most recent teammates convinced Waltz that immigration is necessary and that federal reform should allow immigrants more options to come to the U.S. legally.

For Bromberg, the steady stream of anti-immigration students who enroll in her classes and subsequently come to a more complicated understanding of immigration and immigrants gives her hope. "A lot of times there's just nothing you can do about someone who is racist," she says. "There is something you can do

about people who lack information. I just have to keep trying to get them the information that will help them to become their own agents and figure out exactly where they stand. Most of the time, they walk away saying [immigration] is not a

bad thing: Our community is changing, but it's changing for the better." **TAP**

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The White Fight

White Americans must embrace racial justice as their own cause if we hope to achieve widespread equity.

BY MARK R. WARREN

Fifty years ago, hundreds of young white and black Americans united to desegregate buses across the South. These Freedom Riders, as they came to be known, drew vivid attention to the inhumanity of segregation, and their collective action marked a turning point in galvanizing white support for the civil-rights movement. Since the summer of 1961, many Americans have continued to fight widespread inequality and racism. Yet despite remarkable progress—including the election of an African American president—many forms of racial injustice remain deeply entrenched in American society.

Nearly 40 percent of all black and Hispanic students will fail to graduate high school this year, double the rate for white students. Economic hardship is also drawn across racial lines: More than 30 percent of blacks and Hispanics live in poverty compared to 13 percent of whites. The criminal-justice system reflects these inequities in a disturbing pattern. Of the 2 million people incarcerated in the United States, more than half are black and Hispanic. The combination of poverty and criminal-justice policies that disproportionately single out people of color has led to social and moral crises in cities like Washington, D.C., where three out of four young black men—and more still in the poorest neighborhoods—can expect to serve time in prison.

While there is no 21st-century counterpart to the Freedom Riders, there is a

vibrant movement of white activists dedicated to working alongside people of color to combat racial injustice, particularly in local communities and institutions. I recently interviewed 50 white racial activists for a study designed to understand how white Americans become aware of racism and organize against it. What I learned is that few are moved to action by statistics, however distressing they may be. Rather, directly witnessing racism struck their conscience. Such powerful moments demonstrated to white participants, many of them young, that cherished values of fairness and justice could be violated with ease. Although studies show widespread racial discrimination, these kinds of direct encounters with racism are still rare for many white Americans who live largely segregated lives; only 15 percent of Americans report having even one confidant of another race. Overcoming passivity about systemic racism may require a life-changing experience, but once aware, white activists can form strong multiracial relationships that lead to social change.

Many white Americans start this kind of activism in college. For white students who grow up in predominately white communities, college is often the first place where they meet people of color in large numbers and begin to build meaningful relationships with them. That experience, like volunteering in a low-income community, is more likely today than it was 40 years ago. In 1971, only 9 percent of entering college freshmen were nonwhite;

in 2006, that figure was up to 24 percent.

The activists emerging out of these circumstances appear less ideologically driven than in the past and more focused, for example, on how to reform schools to better serve low-income and minority children. This particular issue has interested so many younger whites that securing a Teach for America position, which is typically located in schools serving low-income communities of color, has become competitive, like landing a Wall Street job. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of white college graduates are pursuing more traditional paths to teaching in urban schools. In general, the number of college students who volunteer for community service and action projects has risen sharply in the past decade. By 2005, 3.3 million college students volunteered regularly—nearly 600,000 more than three years earlier. (A 2006 report found that the volunteer rate among white and nonwhite college students was 32 percent and 24 percent, respectively.)

Josh Kern, 37, discovered firsthand how the contrast between privilege and poverty in the education system can be a catalyst for activism. While attending Georgetown Law School in his mid-20s in 1999, Kern volunteered at Ballou High School, one of the worst high schools in Washington, D.C. He was shocked by the neglect and poor conditions that the school's black students faced. Kern went on to work with a group of law school students to found the Thurgood Marshall Academy in 2001, a civil rights-oriented charter high school in one of Washington's poorest neighborhoods; 98 percent of students in the school's graduating class now go on to four-year colleges. Kern described his contrasting experiences: "It was being at the law center and learning about how law is the means and justice is the end, and then driving two miles away and seeing a place where there's really no justice."

Many young white Americans care deeply about fairness and are outraged and inspired to act when they directly witness racism. A commitment to racial justice like Kern's grows and deepens as white people find ways to work with people of color in multiracial groups. The

volunteer teams that worked on Barack Obama's presidential campaign are one high-profile example of these partnerships, but most of the everyday work happens at the local level in schools, community-organizing groups, and other activist settings.

A growing number of outfits, such as the People's Institute for Survival and Beyond, offer training on multiracial collaboration to community organizations and nonprofits to enable and support efforts to address injustice. Among the curriculum taught by the institute are courses on developing leadership, sharing culture, maintaining accountability to a community, and identifying positive and destructive power dynamics. Such training is designed to address the many challenges of multiracial activism, including a fragile or non-existent trust between people of different backgrounds and apprehension of having frank discussions about race. Unity and a deeper common humanity comes not by avoiding the discussion of our differences

A deeper common humanity comes not by avoiding the discussion of our differences but by acknowledging them.

but by acknowledging them in the context of shared goals.

Interracial cooperation in the 1960s civil-rights movement foundered when young black activists perceived whites as dominating and insensitive; today's activists are much more attentive to how societal racial dynamics can infect multiracial efforts. Still, participants can exhibit racialized prejudices or behavior, and whites, in particular, can react defensively when challenged. Activists need to create settings where a modicum of trust has been established so that people feel comfortable enough to debate issues openly, even as they recognize that racial change is never an entirely comfortable process. Otherwise, such discussions can degener-

ate into moralistic personal attacks, thereby undermining multiracial efforts.

Christine Clark, founding vice president for Diversity and Inclusion at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, says that tough conversations about the privilege of skin color are best had in the context of developing solutions to discrimination and inequity. "Yes, confront all of these really complicated, painful things about what does it mean to be white, upper-middle-class, whatever your privileged identities are," she says. "But do that in a context that allows people to feel like they can do something about it—not to escape feeling bad ... but in a way that allows them to become a part of something that will solve the problem."

Indeed, we need to learn how to raise moral concerns, not as moralism but as identifying values that undergird caring and just communities. The activists I interviewed do more than condemn racism as a moral outrage; they articulate a moral and political vision of a just community and invite other whites into its construction. This vision seeks a decent quality of life for all—in education, jobs, housing, and health care—while it fosters true human community based on care, respect, and reconciliation.

Many whites can come to see the cause of racial justice as their own when they build meaningful relationships with people of color and when their values and interests are directly addressed. Today, many white Americans are focused on making a difference in their local communities as they try to forge new kinds of relationships across color lines and develop novel solutions to racial injustice. This is slow work and will not yield a quick resolution to racial injustice in this country. Yet these local experiments may well prove crucial to building a foundation for a new national movement for racial and social justice, one that can eventually attract broad participation and support among the nation's white population. **TAP**

Mark R. Warren is an associate professor of education at Harvard University. He is the author of Fire in the Heart: How White Americans Embrace Racial Justice.

Exploring the Depths of White Racist Socialization

Tim Wise

EVERY NOW AND THEN A lesson comes easy. Other times we learn things by accident, if at all. Inevitably it seems, the lessons that matter most often come from the least likely sources and at the most inopportune moments. Such was the case last August when my paternal grandmother died at the age of 78.

The passing of a relative may seem hardly appropriate as the jumping point for a political commentary. So first, a slight preface to what I'm trying to explain.

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In the past few years I have had the good fortune to speak before nearly 60,000 people, in 40 states, on over 150 college campuses, and to dozens of community groups, labor unions, and government agencies about racism. Some audiences respond favorably, others not so much. But the message I deliver is always the same: those persons called "white" have a particular obligation to fight racism because it is our problem, created in its modern form by us, for the purpose of commanding power over resources and opportunities at the expense of people of color. Furthermore, all whites, irrespective of their liberal attitudes, "tolerance" for others, and decent voting records, have to address the internalized beliefs about white superiority from which we all suffer. No one is innocent. No one is unaffected by the daily socialization to which we are all subjected—specifically with regard to the way we are taught to think about persons of color in this society: their behaviors, lifestyles, intelligence, beauty, and so on.

Without question, convincing white folks—particularly liberals who insist every other friend they have is black—that they too have internalized racist beliefs, even of a most vicious kind, proves the most difficult in the work I do. You can't prove the point with statistics, or poll numbers, or by pointing out the wide disparities in life chances that form the backdrop of American institutionalized racism. Convinced that they are free from the biases, stereotypes, and behaviors that characterize "real" racists, such persons inevitably seem the most resistant.

It is with this in mind that I return to my grandmother. My grandmother was one of those good liberals. In many ways she was beyond liberal. Born in the Detroit area, she and her parents moved south in the 1920s. Her father was a member of the Ku Klux Klan. A member that is, until the day in 1938 when his only daughter informed him that she had fallen in love with a Jewish man, and that in addition to

His only daughter informed him that she had fallen in love with a Jewish man, and that in addition to that, his hatred of blacks was unconscionable to her.

that, his hatred of blacks was unconscionable to her. She handed him his robes, and with her mother's approval, asked whether he was going to burn them or whether she was going to have to do it herself.

She challenged him despite what must have been the palpable fear of standing up to a man who was none too gentle and most certainly capable of violence. He would never attend another Klan meeting, and by all accounts changed his attitudes,

changed his behaviors, indeed, changed his life.

Throughout her life she would stand up to racist bigotry on a number of other occasions: threatening to commit vehicular homicide on a real estate agent who sought to enforce restrictive covenants in her family's chosen Nashville neighborhood; standing up to racist comments whenever she heard them from friends, family members, or total strangers. The fear which often paralyzes whites and makes us unwilling to challenge racism—described by James Baldwin as the fear of being “turned away from the welcome table” of white society—was something that played no part in her life. She was a woman of principle and, although not an activist, she nonetheless instilled in her children and grandchildren a sense of right and wrong which was unshakable in this regard.

A few years ago it became obvious that MawMaw, as we knew her, was developing Alzheimer's disease at a fairly rapid pace. Anyone who has watched a loved one suffer with this condition knows how difficult it is to witness the deterioration that takes place. The forgotten memories come first. Then the forgotten names. Then the unfamiliar faces. Then the terror and anger of feeling abandoned. Finally, a regression back to a virtual infant stage of development, complete with the sucking in of one's lips so typical of newborns. It renders its victims incapable of reason or comprehensible thought. It saps the conscious mind of its energy, and therein lies the point of my story.

Near the end of my grandmother's life, as her body and mind began to shut down at an ever-increasing pace, this consciousness—the soundness of mind that had led her to fight the pressures to accept racism—began to vanish. As this process unfolded, culminating in the dementia ward of a local nursing home, a disturbing thing happened.

She began to refer to her mostly black nurses by the all-too-common term, which forms the cornerstone of white America's racial thinking, the one Malcolm X said was the first word newcomers learned when they came to this country—nigger. A word she would never have uttered from conscious thought, but one that remained locked away in her subconscious despite her best intentions and lifelong commitment to standing strong against racism. A word that would have made her ill even to think it. A word that would make her violent if she heard it said. A word that,

She could not remember how to feed herself, for God's sake. She could not recognize a glass of water for what it was. But she could recognize a nigger.

for her to utter it, would have made her, well, another person altogether. But there it was, bitterly and fluently expressed as it probably ever had been by her father.

Here was a woman who no longer could recognize her own children; a woman who had no idea who her husband had been; no clue where she was, what her name was, what year it was—yet, knew what she had been taught at a very early age to call black people. Once she was no longer capable of resisting this demon, tucked away like a ticking time bomb in the far corners of her mind, it exploded with a vengeance. She could not remember how to feed herself, for God's sake. She could not go to the bathroom by herself. She could not recognize a glass of water for what it was. But she could recognize a nigger. America had seen to that—and no disease was going to

strip her of that memory. Indeed, it would be one of the last words she would say, before she finally stopped talking at all.

Given this woman's entire life, and the circumstances surrounding her slow demise, her utterance of a word even as vicious as nigger says absolutely nothing about her. But it speaks volumes about her country. It speaks volumes about the work white folks must do, individually and collectively to overcome that which is always beneath the surface; to overcome the tendency to cash in the chips which represent the perquisites of whiteness; to traffic in privileges—not the least of which is the privilege of feeling superior to others—not because of what or who they are, but rather because of what you're not: in this case, not a nigger.

In so many ways that's all whiteness ever meant, and all it needed to mean for those of European descent. To be white meant at least you were above them. If you had not a pot to piss in, at least you had that. To call another man or woman a nigger and to treat them the way one is instructed to treat such an untouchable is to assert nothing less than a property right. When my grandmother was strong and vibrant she had no need to take advantage of these wages, and indeed, often tried hard to resist them. But in weakness and confusion it became all that her increasingly diseased mind had left.

Maybe all this is why I'm so tired of other white folks trying to sell bullshit like: “I don't have a racist bone in my body,” or “I never notice color.”

Fact is “nigger” is still the first word on most white people's minds when they see a black man being taken off to jail on the evening news. The first thing we think when we see Mike Tyson, Louis Farrakhan, or O.J. Simpson (as in “that murdering nigger”). Think I'm exaggerating? Then come have a drink with me a any bar the next time an African American other than Oprah, Michael Jordan, or Colin Powell makes the news. Take a

cab ride with me anywhere in this country, and if the driver is white (or really anything but black), and the trip takes more than 15 minutes, see how long it takes for the word or its modern-day coded equivalents to spew forth from their mouth, once they find out what I do. Ask me what white folks yelled at black students who occupied the basketball court during a Rutgers/University or Massachusetts game a few years back to protest racist comments by Rutgers' president. Fans who seconds before had been wildly cheering black basketball players, could and did turn on a dime as soon as they were reminded of the racial battle lines which trump the NCAA-inspired brotherhood every time. Let's go to Roxbury tonight, or East LA, or to the Desire housing projects

in New Orleans, or to any MLK Boulevard in any city in America and then let's see how hard it is to spot melanin. Colorblind my ass.

Then once we're all through feeling bad for having been sucker-

humanity. What those women at my grandmother's nursing home need and deserve—much more than a sniveling apology from embarrassed family members—is to end this vicious system of racial caste. For us

Then once we're all through feeling bad for having been sucker-punched by racist conditioning just like everyone else, let's learn to forgive ourselves.

punched by racist conditioning just like everyone else, let's learn to forgive ourselves. Our guilt is worthless, although far from meaningless. It has plenty of meaning: it means we aren't likely to do a damned thing constructive to end the system which took us in, conned us, and stole part of our

to spend every day resisting the temptations of advantage, which ultimately weaken the communities on which we all depend.

Those nurses knew and so do I why my grandmother could no longer fight. For the rest of us, there is no similar excuse available. □

White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack

Peggy McIntosh

THROUGH WORK TO BRING materials from Women's Studies into the rest of the curriculum, I have often noticed men's unwillingness to grant that they are over-privileged, even though they may grant that women are disadvantaged. They may say they will work to improve women's status, in the society, the university, or the curriculum, but

Peggy McIntosh is Associate Director of the Wellesley College Center for Research on Women. This essay is excerpted from her working paper, "White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies," copyright © 1988 by Peggy McIntosh. Available for \$4.00 from the address below. The paper includes a longer list of privileges. Permission to excerpt or reprint must be obtained from Peggy McIntosh, Wellesley College Center for Research on Women, Wellesley, MA 02181; (617) 283-2520; Fax (617) 283-2504.

I was taught to see racism only in individual acts of meanness, not in invisible systems conferring dominance on my group.

they can't or won't support the idea of lessening men's. Denials which amount to taboos surround the subject of advantages which men gain from women's disadvantages. These denials protect male privilege from being fully acknowledged, lessened or ended.

Thinking through unacknowledged male privilege as a phenomenon, I realized that since hierarchies in our society are interlocking, there was most likely a phenomenon of white privilege which was similarly denied and protected. As a white person, I realized I had been taught about racism as something which puts others at a disadvantage, but had been taught not to see one of its corollary aspects, white privilege,

which puts me at an advantage.

I think whites are carefully taught not to recognize white privilege, as males are taught not to recognize male privilege. So I have begun in an untutored way to ask what it is like to have white privilege. I have come to see white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets which I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was "meant" to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and blank checks.

Describing white privilege makes one newly accountable. As we in Women's Studies work to reveal male privilege and ask men to give up

some of their power, so one who writes about having white privilege must ask, "Having described it, what will I do to lessen or end it?"

After I realized the extent to which men work from a base of unacknowledged privilege, I understood that much of their oppressiveness was unconscious. Then I remembered the frequent charges from women of color that white women whom they encounter are oppressive. I began to understand why we are justly seen as oppressive, even when we don't see ourselves that way. I began to count the ways in which I enjoy unearned skin privilege and have been conditioned into oblivion about its existence.

My schooling gave me no training in seeing myself as an oppressor, as

my African American co-workers, friends and acquaintances with whom I come into daily or frequent contact in this particular time, place, and line of work cannot count on most of these conditions.

I was taught to see racism only in individual acts of meanness, not in invisible systems conferring dominance on my group.

1. I can if I wish arrange to be in the company of people of my race most of the time.
2. If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing housing in an area which I can afford and in which I would want to live.

8. If I want to, I can be pretty sure of finding a publisher for this piece on white privilege.

9. I can go into a music shop and count on finding the music of my race represented, into a supermarket and find the staple foods which fit with my cultural traditions, into a hairdresser's shop and find someone who can cut my hair.

10. Whether I use checks, credit cards, or cash, I can count on my skin color not to work against the appearance of financial reliability.

11. I can arrange to protect my children most of the time from people who might not like them.

12. I can swear, or dress in second hand clothes, or not answer letters, without having people attribute these choices to the bad morals, the poverty, or the illiteracy of my race.

13. I can speak in public to a powerful male group without putting my race on trial.

14. I can do well in a challenging situation without being called a credit to my race.

15. I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group.

16. I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of persons of color who constitute the world's majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion.

17. I can criticize our government and talk about how much I fear its policies and behavior without being seen as a cultural outsider.

18. I can be pretty sure that if I ask to talk to "the person in charge," I will be facing a person of my race.

My schooling gave me no training in seeing myself as an oppressor, as an unfairly advantaged person, or as a participant in a damaged culture.

an unfairly advantaged person, or as a participant in a damaged culture. I was taught to see myself as an individual whose moral state depended on her individual moral will. My schooling followed the pattern my colleague Elizabeth Minnich has pointed out: whites are taught to think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, and average, and also ideal, so that when we work to benefit others, this is seen as work which will allow "them" to be more like "us."

I decided to try to work on myself at least by identifying some of the daily effects of white privilege in my life. I have chosen those conditions which I think in my case *attach somewhat more to skin-color privilege* than to class, religion, ethnic status, or geographical location, though of course all these other factors are intricately intertwined. As far as I can see,

3. I can be pretty sure that my neighbors in such a location will be neutral or pleasant to me.

4. I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured that I will not be followed or harassed.

5. I can turn on the television or open to the front page of the paper and see people of my race widely represented.

6. When I am told about our national heritage or about "civilization," I am shown that people of my color made it what it is.

7. I can be sure that my children will be given curricular materials that testify to the existence of their race.

19. If a traffic cop pulls me over or if the IRS audits my tax return, I can be sure I haven't been singled out because of my race.
20. I can easily buy posters, postcards, picture books, greeting cards, dolls, toys, and children's magazines featuring people of my race.
21. I can go home from most meetings of organizations I belong to feeling somewhat tied in, rather than isolated, out-of-place, out-numbered, unheard, held at a distance, or feared.
22. I can take a job with an affirmative action employer without having coworkers on the job suspect that I got it because of race.
23. I can choose public accommodation without fearing that people of my race cannot get in or will be mistreated in the places I have chosen.
24. I can be sure that if I need legal or medical help, my race will not work against me.
25. If my day, week, or year is going badly, I need not ask of each negative episode or situation whether it has racial overtones.
26. I can choose blemish cover or bandages in "flesh" color and have them more or less match my skin.

I repeatedly forgot each of the realizations on this list until I wrote it down. For me white privilege has turned out to be an elusive and fugitive subject. The pressure to avoid it is great, for in facing it I must give up the myth of meritocracy. If these things are true, this is not such a free country; one's life is not what one makes it; many doors open for certain people through no virtues of their own.

In unpacking this invisible knapsack of white privilege, I have listed conditions of daily experience which I once took for granted. Nor did I think of any of these perquisites as bad for the holder. I now think that we need a more finely differentiated taxonomy of privilege, for some of these varieties are only what one would want for everyone in a just society, and others give licence to be ignorant, oblivious, arrogant and destructive.

I see a pattern running through the matrix of white privilege, a pattern of assumptions which were passed on to me as a white person. There was one main piece of cultural

***The questions is:
"Having described white
privilege, what will I do
to end it?"***

turf; it was my own turf, and I was among those who could control the turf. *My skin color was an asset for any move I was educated to want to make.* I could think of myself as belonging in major ways, and of making social systems work for me. I could freely disparage, fear, neglect, or be oblivious to anything outside of the dominant cultural forms. Being of the main culture, I could also criticize it fairly freely.

In proportion as my racial group was being made confident, comfortable, and oblivious, other groups were likely being made inconfident, uncomfortable, and alienated. Whiteness protected me from many kinds of hostility, distress, and violence, which I was being subtly trained to visit in turn upon people of color.

For this reason, the word "privi-

lege" now seems to me misleading. We usually think of privilege as being a favored state, whether earned or conferred by birth or luck. Yet some of the conditions I have described here work to systematically overempower certain groups. Such privilege simply *confers dominance* because of one's race or sex.

I want, then, to distinguish between earned strength and unearned power conferred systematically. Power from unearned privilege can look like strength when it is in fact permission to escape or to dominate. But not all of the privileges on my list are inevitably damaging. Some, like the expectation that neighbors will be decent to you, or that your race will not count against you in court, should be the norm in a just society. Others, like the privilege to ignore less powerful people, distort the humanity of the holders as well as the ignored groups.

We might at least start by distinguishing between positive advantages which we can work to spread, and negative types of advantages which unless rejected will always reinforce our present hierarchies. For example, the feeling that one belongs within the human circle, as Native Americans say, should not be seen as privilege for a few. Ideally it is an *unearned entitlement*. At present, since only a few have it, it is an *unearned advantage* for them. This paper results from a process of coming to see that some of the power which I originally saw as attendant on being a human being in the U.S. consisted in *unearned advantage* and *conferred dominance*.

I have met very few men who are truly distressed about systemic, unearned male advantage and conferred dominance. And so one question for me and others like me is whether we will be like them, or whether we will get truly distressed, even outraged, about unearned race advantage and conferred dominance and if so, what we will do to lessen them. In any case, we need to do

more work in identifying how they actually affect our daily lives. Many, perhaps most, of our white students in the U.S. think that racism doesn't affect them because they are not people of color; they do not see "whiteness" as a racial identity. In addition, since race and sex are not the only advantaging systems at work, we need similarly to examine the daily experience of having age advantage, or ethnic advantage, or physical ability, or advantage related to nationality, religion, or sexual orientation.

Difficulties and dangers surrounding the task of finding parallels are many. Since racism, sexism, and heterosexism are not the same, the advantaging associated with them should not be seen as the same. In addition, it is hard to disentangle aspects of unearned advantage which rest more on social class, economic class, race, religion, sex and ethnic identity than on other factors. Still, all of the oppressions are interlocking, as the Combahee River Collective Statement of 1977 continues to remind us eloquently.

One factor seems clear about all of the interlocking oppressions. They take both active forms which we can

see and embedded forms which as a member of the dominant group one is taught not to see. In my class and place, I did not see myself as a racist because I was taught to recognize racism only in individual acts of meanness by members of my group, never in invisible systems conferring unsought racial dominance on my group from birth.

Disapproving of the systems won't be enough to change them. I was taught to think that racism could end if white individuals changed their attitudes. [But] a "white" skin in the United States opens many doors for whites whether or not we approve of the way dominance has been conferred on us. Individual acts can palliate, but cannot end, these problems.

To redesign social systems we need first to acknowledge their colossal unseen dimensions. The silences and denials surrounding privilege are the key political tool here. They keep the thinking about equality or equity incomplete, protecting unearned advantage and conferred dominance by making these taboo subjects. Most talk by whites about equal opportunity seems to me now to be about equal opportunity to try

to get into a position of dominance while denying that systems of dominance exist.

It seems to me that obliviousness about white advantage, like obliviousness about male advantage, is kept strongly inculturated in the United States so as to maintain the myth of meritocracy, the myth that democratic choice is equally available to all. Keeping most people unaware that freedom of confident action is there for just a small number of people props up those in power, and serves to keep power in the hands of the same groups that have most of it already.

Though systemic change takes many decades, there are pressing questions for me and I imagine for some others like me if we raise our daily consciousness on the perquisites of being light-skinned. What will we do with such knowledge? As we know from watching men, it is an open question whether we will choose to use unearned advantage to weaken hidden systems of advantage, and whether we will use any of our arbitrarily-awarded power to try to reconstruct power systems on a broader base. □

Improving American Police Ethics Training: Focusing on Social Contract Theory and Constitutional Principles

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Abstract

Americans have good reason to fear the awesome power granted to police officers and to demand that these government officials adhere to the strictest of ethical standards in carrying out their duties. No other government official has such direct power and immediate access to regularly deprive the average citizen of their liberties. Other scholars (Cohen and Feldberg, 1991; Fitzpatrick, 2006) have articulated a clear set of ethical standards that should be used to guide the police in America, yet they are not being taught to most American police cadets. These standards are based on social contract theory and principles found in the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, its Bill of Rights and the Federalist Papers. Are these principles too complicated for the average police recruit to internalize? One would think an officer that takes an oath to uphold the U.S. Constitution would at least understand the basic principles found within it.

This paper is partly an extension of an earlier work by FitzPatrick (2006). It will explain why a change in current police ethics training focusing on outcome-based codes of ethics and oaths of honor is necessary. The paper reviews Cohen and Feldberg's (1991) five moral standards for police and argues that they should form the basis of police ethics training in the U.S. It explores the reasons that these standards are rarely taught to cadets in police academies across the nation. Suggestions for maneuvering around these barriers and incorporating the five moral standards for police into all levels of police training will be presented.

Introduction

Ethics in government seems like an oxymoron to many American citizens. They are becoming increasingly cynical in their view of politicians, appointed officials and other public servants at all levels of government. Scandals and abuses of power are reported in the local and national news on a weekly basis, further eroding trust in government. At no level does this lack of trust have more serious implications than on the front-lines of American government – the local police.

Each nation strikes a different balance between order and liberty. The purpose of police in every society is social control. The police are called upon to maintain the balance between freedom and security that the government has established. The United States of America has historically placed more weight on the side of freedom and has been described as an experiment in ordered liberty. Delattre points out that the police play a central role in the success of this experiment, and therefore, "America's government is also an experiment in law enforcement and peacekeeping" (Delattre 2006, 18).

Police represent the arm of American government that is authorized to use non-negotiable coercive force on its citizens (Bittner 1985, 23). The police in the United States are entrusted with enormous power. No other government official legally holds and regularly uses the power to detain citizens, search their personal belongings, use physical force against them or otherwise

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deprive them of their normal liberties. As a result, people of all demographic backgrounds fear the police, but rarely does the average citizen express fear of the President of the United States or of their representative in Congress. With this awesome power comes the responsibility to use it for the public good in accordance with the democratic principles our republic was founded on. How can American citizens ensure that police officers take this responsibility seriously?

Before delving into the main topic of this paper regarding ethics training for police officers, it must be noted that ethics training alone will not increase the level of trust in the police or end abuses of police power and authority across the nation. Improving ethics training for American police officers is one crucial component of a series of changes that need to be implemented within the profession. A popular debate within police ethics literature centers around the question of whether corruption and misconduct are the result of rotten apples or a rotten barrel. The author's experience has revealed that departments with widespread problems usually suffer from both. Improved ethics training may begin to repair the rotten barrel over time, but rotten apples can be avoided if police agencies devote a great deal of effort on the front end by carefully selecting individuals of good character. A selection process that incorporates thorough background checks, polygraph examinations, psychological tests, personal interviews and assessment scenarios should be used to find the best available candidates for the position of police officer.

As Delattre notes, it may be difficult to find people in their early twenties that have had their character tested through experience and who have developed habits of excellence as a result (Delattre 2006, 86). At the very least, police departments must hire people who *want* to do the right thing and have shown that they have attempted to do so up to that point in their lives. Successful candidates should be those who view the opportunity to become a public servant as a privilege rather than those who are attracted to the power that comes with the position. They must understand and accept the fact that they will be held to the higher standards that apply to all public servants. No amount of ethics training will change the behavior of a person who is attracted to the occupation for the wrong reasons, who is not particularly concerned with what is morally right and who does not seem very concerned about his/her character. Taking short cuts during a selection process to meet staffing needs will cost an agency more dearly than operating with a shortage in personnel.

Current State of Ethics Training

Once an agency has hired new officers of good moral character who want to do the right thing, these individuals must be taught what is right and what is wrong. Leaving them to rely on their own personal moral values, common sense or religious principles will fail them in the complex and often contradictory world of policing. Current ethics training seems to recognize this, but relies too heavily on an outcome-based system of vague oaths and codes, coupled with specific lists of things that are prohibited by laws and departmental policies. For example, the International Association of Chiefs of Police has developed a code of ethics (IACP-1) and an oath of honor (IACP-2) that have been widely adopted as part of the ethics training in basic police training academies across the United States. Both documents are helpful descriptions of desired outcomes, but they do little to assist an officer or a police administrator in making tough decisions when faced with an ethical dilemma in every day circumstances. Most officers who want to do the right thing realize that they should not engage in serious criminal conduct. But what about the more subtle questions that erode the level of trust that citizens have in the police?

Officers and police administrators grapple daily with questions that have ethical implications. What if different factions in the community make opposing demands on police? What if the mayor says she wants more traffic tickets written to increase funds coming into the city? What if the mayor requests that city residents only receive warnings? When should an officer arrest an offender rather than give a warning? Why can't officers accept half price meals? What is the public trust? When is it permissible to lie to a suspect? What should an officer do if he/she pulls over an off-duty officer? Is it wrong for an officer to run personal errands within his/her jurisdiction while working? Can officers go home for lunch? What if a rookie's training officer or supervisor asks him/her to do something that he/she thinks is wrong? What is expected of an officer that observes a co-worker doing something wrong? What should an officer do if he/she sees an officer from another department do something wrong? Does an officer have to wear a seatbelt in the cruiser if he/she never gives seatbelt tickets to citizens? Are officers permitted to let a person's circumstances influence whether or not the person gets charged with a crime, or must every citizen be treated exactly the same? Is it permissible for officers to give "courtesy cards" to their friends? If an officer is off duty and gets pulled over, is it wrong for him/her to show his/her badge to the officer? Can police officers overlook some crimes that are committed in their presence? How should an officer decide which offense to

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charge a person with when several offenses fit the crime? Can officers take a quick nap on midnight shift if their dispatchers know where they are and can wake them up if there is a call for service? What should a supervisor do if he/she knows a subordinate has used excessive force or has otherwise violated someone's rights, but the citizen has not complained about it? Can police executives make an effort to keep certain reported crimes a secret so as not to panic the public? What weapons are police administrators obligated to provide the officers to ensure they have everything they need to use the appropriate levels of force? These are just a few of the more common dilemmas that officers and police administrators face.

Officers could choose the wrong course of action in many of these scenarios and yet not violate any law or department policy. No list of prohibited acts or set of policies will be exhaustive. There is no way to write a policy for each dilemma an officer will face. Kleinig calls these situations "the murky middle." He observes, "Yet morally responsible decision-making is more than a matter of 'following the rules', or even of resort to established procedures. The rules may not be sufficiently nuanced or entirely compatible. Judgment is required." (Kleinig 2002, 287). What should guide an officer's judgment?

Officers have to be given a set of clear and inarguable principles that are process oriented and can help them weigh their options when faced with an ethical dilemma. A good amount of literature exists that addresses the need for an increased amount of ethics training in policing, but very few scholars and practitioners have stated clearly which ethical principles should be taught and integrated into the profession. Department policies, codes of ethics, codes of conduct and oaths of honor are useful, but they should be based on universal standards and should be used to make those standards more precise.

To be able to reason through ethical dilemmas, an officer has to first understand the basic democratic principles that our government was founded on and the role of police in our society. All police officers take an oath to uphold the Constitution, yet a great number of them have never read it. When the author occasionally has an opportunity to ask officers where they think their power and authority are derived from, most answer that they get it from a specific law, or from the state government, or from their chief. Few officers state that their power comes from the very citizens they serve.

In most states, the curriculum for the basic police academy that new recruits attend does include the topics of police ethics and of the role of police in American society. However, the

amount of classroom hours spent on each topic is minimal. For example, in police academies in Ohio three hours is devoted to ethics and three hours to the role of police. Social contract theory is mentioned, but little or no time is devoted specifically to the study of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, its Bill of Rights or the Federalist Papers.

Once the new recruit has graduated from the police academy, further ethics training is rare. Some police departments incorporate ethics into their field training program where new officers are trained by a more senior colleague for a few months. Some agencies send their management and supervisors to training programs that address ethics. Unfortunately, officers could go a decade between these phases of their career without any additional ethics training.

Social Contract Theory, Constitutional Principles and Policing

The Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution are based on John Locke's concept of the social contract (Locke 1690/1986). Officers need to be familiar with social contract theory because it gives legitimacy to the American system of government and the role of police in society. The authority of police is derived from the people through the social contract. Briefly, social contract theory holds that the purpose of government is to better protect the rights that people already naturally possess: those of life, liberty and property. Citizens enter a bargain in which they agree to give up their power to enforce their own rights to the government and trust that the government will use this power to benefit the public. If a government proves to be ineffective at securing the basic rights of life, liberty and property, then the people owe no allegiance to it. As an agent of the government, the police are also bound by this social contract. Their power is held as a public trust. This informs police on the general attitude they should have about their occupation and towards the public.

Using principles from the Constitution, its Bill of Rights and the Federalist Papers as the basis for police ethics training is far superior to the common practice of using state ethics laws and the IACP code of ethics and oath of honor. Ethical standards based on Constitutional principles are inarguable because police officers take an oath to uphold them. If cops disagree with these principles they should find another occupation. As Kooken explained fifty years ago, police are given "the duty of upholding and defending the principles of the American way of life" (Kooken 1947, 172). Unless and until our Constitution and resulting system of government

& Feldberg (1991) and adopts four of their five moral standards as the basis for this unified theory (FitzPatrick 2006, online). Because all police officers across the nation take an oath to uphold the same Constitution, a unified theory of ethics based on the democratic principles our government was founded on will apply equally well to police officers in every jurisdiction in America. What universal ethical standards for American policing can be drawn from these principles?

Cohen and Feldberg's Five Moral Standards for Police

Howard S. Cohen and Michael Feldberg (1991) created an excellent ethical guide for policing in a book titled *Power and Restraint: The Moral Dimension of Police Work*. This is the only applied ethics source the author has found that clearly articulates standards derived from social contract theory and Constitutional principles and can be used to make value judgments about police work. Cohen and Feldberg's five moral standards for police can be viewed as both ideals to strive for and minimum requirements. They are standards of responsibility that apply generally to all government officials, and police in particular. Those who accept the power and authority that comes with the position of police officer must also accept these standards of responsibility (Cohen & Feldberg 1991, xv). The following is a brief summary of Cohen and Feldberg's five standards of ethical policing taken from chapter 3 (pp. 39-66) of their book:

1. Fair Access

Policing is a shared social resource. As such, police must provide fair access to their services based on relative need. Social contract theory and the principle of justice informs police in this area by reminding officers that *all* citizens have agreed to transfer to government their own power to enforce their basic rights. Therefore, all citizens have a right to the services of the police. This standard cautions officers against the two extremes of favoritism and neglect.

2. Public Trust

Through the social contract, the public has given police the authority to act on their behalf and the power to take actions that are no longer permitted to private citizens. The public has also given up their right to resist the lawful commands of a police officer. They trust that the police will use this power with restraint, doing the

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minimum amount of harm necessary to accomplish their tasks, while respecting the protections the Constitution affords every citizen. The public also trusts that the police will use this awesome power for the public good, and not for personal gain.

3. *Safety and Security*

Police must undertake enforcement activities within the framework of maintaining safety and security and should avoid unreflective enforcement of the law. The purpose of living under the social contract is increased security, not the desire to live under rules for their own sake. Safety and security is the end to which government is the means. Laws should be enforced when officers reasonably believe that doing so will have some impact on the safety and security of citizens. Overzealous enforcement has the potential to make society less safe and secure.

4. *Teamwork*

Police are an extension of one branch (executive) of government and represent only one part of the criminal justice system. The behavior of police officers must meet the tests of teamwork – coordination, communication and cooperation. Police officers need to understand their role within the government, the criminal justice system, and their own agency and should be careful not to overstep the mandate given to them. It is not their role to make laws, interpret laws, decide guilt or innocence or to exact punishment, but they must cooperate with the other facets of government that are responsible for these functions. The three functions of government delineated in Locke's social contract theory and the Constitutional principles and protections of due process, the right to a speedy trial, separation of powers, and checks and balances form the basis for this standard.

5. *Objectivity*

Police work is a social role that requires officers to demonstrate objectivity while serving as society's referees. They must maintain a non-partisan attitude in carrying out their duties. This ethical standard cautions the officer against using personal feelings as the basis for official police action and against the two extremes of becoming over-involved or cynical. Police act as agents for all people, and not for one faction over another. This standard is based on social contract theory and the

principles of justice and equal protection of the law.

Taken together, these five ethical standards provide a decision-making framework for the every day dilemmas that police face. They can be used to guide the broad discretion that officers are given. Cohen and Feldberg are careful to point out that more than one morally sound outcome may exist for each dilemma, and in other situations, there may be no available option that will satisfy each of the five standards (p. 43). The authors also acknowledge that efforts at fulfilling one standard completely will often result in diminishing the officer's capacity to fulfill another standard (p. 65). At times tradeoffs must be made because the standards are interrelated. The situation will dictate which standard is most important in resolving the dilemma.

Integrating the Five Moral Standards into Police Ethics Training

In his discussion of applied ethics for democratic policing, Pagon (2003) observed the following:

“It has become obvious that only properly educated and trained police officers are able to respond adequately to moral and ethical dilemmas of their profession. Only a police officer who is able to solve these dilemmas appropriately can perform his duties professionally and to the benefit of the community. In doing so, he cannot rely solely on his intuition and experience. Not only he has to be well acquainted with the principles of police ethics and trained in moral reasoning and ethical decision-making, he also needs clear standards of ethical conduct in his profession.”

Pagon (2003) goes on to list the three directions that police ethics needs to develop in:

“(a) applying the principles of applied ethics to the police profession; (b) establishing standards of ethical conduct in policing; and (c) defining the means and content of education and training in police ethics.”

Sixteen years ago Cohen and Feldberg (1991) satisfied the first two points for American police by using the principles of applied ethics to establish five standards of ethical conduct, and their book provides police trainers with several ideas for defining the content of police training.

So why have directors of police training in each state neglected to incorporate these standards into the police ethics training curriculum? Some may simply not be aware of this source. Perhaps the first step for practitioners in improving police ethics training is to lobby the International Association of Chiefs of Police, requesting that they endorse Cohen and Feldberg's

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five moral standards for American police. Directors of state training commissions, advanced training programs and police chiefs look to the IACP for guidance on best practices. This is evidenced in the widespread use of the IACP code of ethics and oath of honor. The five moral standards should be integrated into the IACP ethics tool kit (IACP-3) that is available online to assist police agencies with ethics training and the development of related policies. The ethics tool kit is too heavily focused on the IACP oath of honor.

Practitioners who are aware of Cohen and Feldberg's (1991) book should lobby the association of chiefs of police and the commission on peace officer standards and training in their state to encourage them to endorse and adopt the five moral standards for police as the basis of the block of ethics training in the basic academy curriculum. The typical training regarding causes of corruption, instruction on laws and department policies, codes of ethics and oaths of honor should not be eliminated. These too are helpful and can be used to make the five moral standards more precise.

Many academies use real life scenarios that officers have faced on the job to generate discussion and assist cadets in working through their options in an ethical dilemma. Using case studies as training tools is an essential component of police ethics training. Cohen and Feldberg's five moral standards should be the primary source that cadets use to determine the best outcome. The second half of the book contains several cases. Cohen and Feldberg work through each one, explaining how the five moral standards can be applied to them. This book should be required reading for all police cadets, along with the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights. A significant expansion in the number of hours devoted to ethics will be required to adequately cover these topics. The International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST) should take the lead in encouraging the adoption of these standards nationwide. (This association can be found online at <http://www.iadlest.org/>)

Providing police cadets the training they will need to reason through ethical dilemmas is a good start, but the five moral standards need to be reinforced and applied to new situations once the rookie hits the street. Field training programs should incorporate these ethical standards into every training topic covered. In addition to this, individual agencies need to have periodic ethics in-service training for all officers. All other in-service training should refer to the five

moral standards as a guide. Certainly a short discussion of ethics is relevant to defensive tactics training, firearms training, legal updates, etc.

First line supervisor training, management training and leadership training within the profession also have a duty to include instruction on the five moral standards for police. At each step of an officer's career he/she will be faced with new ethical dilemmas. As officers progress through the ranks, their level of responsibility increases. Police executives need to keep in mind that the five moral standards apply equally well to the decisions they make. One cannot hold subordinates accountable for street level decisions that violate these standards and yet fail to hold his/her own management decisions to the same standards. Fortunately, some prominent police leadership training programs have already made Cohen and Feldberg's (1991) book required reading. Police executives should be taught how to reinforce these standards by using them as the basis for rewards, disciplinary action, promotions, strategic planning, etc. within their agency. Hanging the five moral standards in a frame on the wall and then talking about it once a year in refresher training will be about as effective at protecting against a rotten barrel as hanging up the law enforcement code of ethics has been. The standards have to be integrated into every aspect of the officer's career. The community that an agency serves must also know that these standards guide the provision of police services.

The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), the largest police professional organization in the country, could play a significant role in reinforcing these ethical standards by addressing the widespread misuse of FOP license plate emblems and "courtesy cards." An officer that places an FOP emblem on his/her license plate or gives FOP courtesy cards to his/her friends and family to decrease the chances that they will be pulled over, cited or arrested is clearly violating the standard relating to the public trust. (Several other large police professional associations in America provide similar items to member officers.) Why would professional organizations want to encourage this practice?

The Role of Institutions of Higher Education in Police Ethics Training

Do average high school graduates understand the principles that our constitutional republic was founded on? Are they familiar with social contract theory and do they know the ultimate purpose of government? Do they understand these things well enough to become agents of the government? If the answer to any of these questions is "no," then the basic police training

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academies across America have a responsibility to make sure cadets are educated in these matters.

While an increasing number of police agencies in the nation are requiring some amount of college education as a condition of employment, the minimum education requirement for police officers in most states remains a high school diploma or general equivalency degree (GED). (See Jagiello [1971] for a critique of this minimum requirement.) This means the majority of police cadets will have no exposure to these concepts beyond what they were taught in high school. Certainly there is no guarantee that a college graduate will know and understand these principles, but the chances of being exposed to the concepts surely increase as the level of education increases. In addition, college education serves other purposes that uniquely prepare an individual for a career in policing.

Buerger (2004), a police practitioner-turned academician, explains:

“Education and training are fundamentally different tasks, though in an ideal world, they should complement each other.....A college education is designed to build within each student the ability to critically assess new situations, undertake new learning as needed, and even to question the ‘facts’ and underlying assumptions of existing canons of knowledge when necessary.....By comparison, training systematically builds particular skills to achieve certain ends.....in a well-developed system, the collegiate process would feed well prepared individuals into a police training process that capitalizes on their education, thus creating a complimentary approach to improving police services.”

Until this ideal state is achieved, police training academies need to work toward incorporating more training hours into the curriculum to adequately address democratic principles of government and the role and authority of police in a democratic society. Academy commanders should solicit professors of criminal justice, political science and public administration from local universities to assist in teaching these components to cadets. Likewise, colleges and universities need to add an applied ethics course to the criminal justice curriculum that teaches students to apply their critical thinking skills to situations they will experience on the job.

As Kooken (1947) noted regarding police education and training:

“The full liberality of education must be preserved, and the police profession should in no way seek to dominate the field of police training.....The full facilities of our universities and colleges should be used both in preparatory and in-service police training.”

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With the recent increase in the number of police basic training academies that operate out of accredited universities, perhaps policing will see more cooperation between academicians and practitioners.

Conclusion

Cohen and Feldberg (1991) have done a great service for policing in America by using applied ethics to provide a clear set of standards by which police work can be judged. Their five standards of ethical policing are inarguable because they are rooted in the democratic principles and political theory our government was founded on. They are far superior to codes of ethics, codes of conduct and oaths of honor as a guide for police discretion. They do not, however, provide easy answers to the ethical dilemmas that cops face daily on the job. Instead they encourage police officers to use moral reasoning based on Constitutional principles to weigh their options and choose the best solution. These standards represent a “unified theory of ethics” (FitzPatrick 2006, online) in that they are applicable to policing in every jurisdiction in the United States. The local tradition of policing in this nation dictates that state ethics laws and local department policies should be used to make these standards more precise and to tailor them to the needs of communities. Every police officer in the nation should be able to say that they have read the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, its Bill of Rights and Cohen and Feldberg’s (1991) *Power and Restraint*. It is the duty of police practitioners and the leaders of the major police professional organizations to improve police ethics training to that end.

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Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy

By Twila L. Perry¹

I. Introduction

In recent years, the term "family values" has become a rallying cry against the increase in nontraditional families in this country. Much of the recent public discourse about women who bear children outside of marriage seems to reflect an underlying assumption that appropriate values are something these women simply do not have. An alleged decline in values, often represented in the media by families headed by single mothers, and especially black single mothers, has been blamed for a myriad of social problems, including unemployment, poor health, school drop-out rates and an increase in juvenile crime.² Since the blame for these problems has been placed on "the breakdown of the traditional family," it is not surprising that many people have concluded that the logical solution to the problem is the reunification of the traditional family structure.³ It is assumed that this will return the country to an earlier era, the "good old days," in which values were presumably different and better. Consistent with such thinking, recent years have seen an increase in governmental programs and policy proposals at both the local and national levels aimed at bolstering the traditional family structure, or otherwise encouraging what are presumed to be "family values."⁴

As part of this symposium on "Ethics, Public Policy and the Future of the Family," this article will explore the role of race in the current family values rhetoric. The premise of this article is that attitudes toward the structure, value and function of families do not exist in a vacuum but are a reflection of context, perspective, and power. Race plays a role in each of these factors. Because the role of black mothers is central to any discussion of public policy and the black family, this article also analyzes the intersection of racism and sexism in the current rhetoric.

This article begins with an exploration of the way in which values about family as well as the value of families themselves have often, in this country, been affected by the factor of race.⁵ Then, the discussion goes behind the rhetoric of "family values" to expose some of the specific ways in which this discourse is influenced by both racism and sexism.⁶ The next part of this article, comprised of three sections, provides a specific critique of the family values rhetoric. The first section explores some of the problems with focusing on private family values as a solution to public problems.⁷ The second section illustrates the subjective nature of the values touted in the family values rhetoric by showing how one of the prime issues in that rhetoric -- the value of work -- is constructed in accordance with racial and gender hierarchies.⁸ The last section of this part discusses the way in which blacks as a subordinate group must often use independent judgment about majoritarian values, and create and pass on to their children values that are alternatives to, or even in opposition to, those of the larger society.⁹

In building on the themes of family, race, gender and values, the final part of this article discusses some of the challenges for feminists who seek a larger role for women in shaping public policy towards the family.¹⁰ These challenges include clarifying the relationship between family and patriarchy, deciding what values about family structure they wish to pass on to the next generation, and thinking more about the intersection of patriarchy, class and race.

The discussion in this article offers neither a specific theory nor a blueprint for a solution to the challenges of public policy this country must confront as the demographics of family life undergo rapid change. The goal is a more limited one -- to expose some of the

hypocrisy behind the current family values rhetoric and to stimulate thinking about ways to reconstruct our attitude toward family structure.

II. Public Policy, Black Families and Family Structures

Although traditional formal marriage and the ideal of the nuclear family is promoted in the rhetoric of family values, historically, the extent to which this society has valued formal marriage has not been governed by some consistent standard that has equally supported the nuclear family structure throughout society. In the history of this country, formal public policies and institutionalized racism have acted in tandem to force many black families to develop alternatives to the traditional nuclear family structure. During slavery, the government condoned and/or promoted a system in which marriage and family among slaves had no legal status.¹¹ Slave parents had no recognized authority over the children to whom they gave birth; slave children were subject to sale by their owners.¹² Indeed, as Professor Orlando Patterson has noted, all slavery involves what he calls "natal alienation," the deprivation of rights or claims of birth, of claims on or obligations to parents, and of connection to living blood relations, ancestors or descendants.¹³

As one judge in North Carolina in 1853 described the legal status of marriage between slaves:

[O]ur law requires no solemnity or form in regard to the marriage of slaves, and whether they "take up" with each other by express permission of their owners, or from a mere impulse of nature, in obedience to the command "multiply and replenish the earth" cannot, in the contemplation of the law, make any sort of difference. . . .¹⁴

During slavery, the idea of what constitutes a family was manipulated through race to serve the slavemasters' economic interests. Thus, the legal principle was developed that the status of a slave child followed that of the mother. By such a rule, slaveowners owned as slaves their own children whom they had conceived through black slave women.¹⁵

The choice of whether to accord any respect to a slave marriage was a matter of individual discretion for the slaveowner. Ironically, some slaveowners did encourage marriage among their slaves and chose to respect the integrity of those marriages. However, when this was done it was often not a question of morality, but one of practicality. Respecting the marriages of slaves by not separating husbands from wives or parents from children often functioned effectively as a method of social control. The threat of sale of a spouse or children could be used to discourage a slave from running away or engaging in other rebellious behavior.¹⁶

The institution of slavery had a profound effect on the structure of black families. One consequence was the development of the single mother family.¹⁷ The origin of such families was in white male sexual exploitation of female slaves, and the breakup of slave families by the sale of the husband and father.¹⁸ During the decades after slavery, single mother families continued to be formed as a result of a variety of factors, including hard economic times, husbands who died or were killed, and men and women moving from place to place in search of work.¹⁹ Between 1880 and 1915, between twenty-five and thirty percent of urban black families were headed by females.²⁰

Specific government policies during different periods encouraged the breakup of black families. For example, until the late 1960's, "man-in-the-house" welfare rules denied aid to a mother who was associating with a man, especially if the man lived in her home.²¹ Although today black families have the same formal status under the law as other families, the persistence of racism often leaves black families subject to many of the

same pressures they were forced to cope with in slavery. Race-based economic injustice, as well as changes in the marketplace and technological developments, have had a widespread effect on employment opportunities and a disproportionate effect on black men²², preventing many of them from being able to earn a living sufficient to support a family.²³ Sociological research has demonstrated the relationship between male employment and family formation.²⁴ The bleak employment situation of black males has been compounded by a higher number of women than men in every age group over fifteen, and the fact that the number of black men that would have otherwise been available for marriage has been decimated by drugs, violent crime, and incarceration.²⁵ The result has been a decline in the rate of marriage between black men and women. Thus, black families are continuing to adapt through the structure of female-headed families.²⁶ Through the years, in the eyes of the larger society, this adaptation has often been construed as a failure of values and morality. Thus, the black family has been described as a "tangle of pathology"²⁷ and black women have been described as matriarchs²⁸, a term generally not used to describe white single mothers or white wives who earn more than their husbands.

Rather than the country considering it an ethical and moral imperative to develop public policies to address the systemic societal conditions responsible for the circumstances of black families, black families have been blamed for their own condition and have been made the scapegoat for problems plaguing the black community. Indeed, programs which have the potential to increase black economic empowerment, such as affirmative action, and programs providing educational opportunity or job training are being slashed rather than enhanced. In light of current economic and political realities, the possibility that the black family will return in large number to the traditional structure seems increasingly remote.

III. Racism and Sexism in the Family Values Controversy

One of the main reasons for the current attack on single mother families is the belief that these families are responsible for dramatic increases in the costs of welfare, and in particular, the costs of the AFDC Program.²⁹ There also seems to be a growing belief that when people resort to AFDC it is not a temporary status, but instead leads to generations of welfare dependency, crime, and low academic achievement.³⁰ In other words, there is a view currently in vogue that families on AFDC, by their very structure, are a drain on society and are incapable of passing on good family values.

Some of these perceptions can be addressed briefly because they are based on clear factual misconceptions. Contrary to a common perception, the AFDC program represents only a tiny percentage of the federal budget.³¹ Similarly, the link of AFDC to nonmarital mothers is overstated. Divorced mothers constitute nearly half of those on welfare.³² Most mothers receiving welfare are not teenagers, and the average family on welfare has two children or fewer.³³ Also ignored in the attack on mothers on welfare are the extensive governmental subsidies given to middle-class families such as tax benefits, mortgage interest deductions, and educational loan assistance programs.³⁴ The alleged loss of family values, of which the single mother family has become a symbol, is posed as an issue of ethics and to some extent, economics. However, it is clear that the current rhetoric also has strong roots in two major structures of subordination in this society -- racism and sexism.

Racism is implicated in a number of ways in the family values debate. Although the phrase "family values" is often used to decry an alleged loss of values in society generally, the phrase also has a lurking racial subtext. The term "family values," linked

as it often is with welfare and single motherhood, easily becomes a code word for race just as "welfare dependency," "inner city," and "the urban underclass," have.³⁵ There is an implication that black families, especially those headed by single mothers, do not share the values of the rest of society and do not pass on to their children the kinds of values that most Americans believe are important.

Racism is implicated in the family values rhetoric in other ways. One frequent phenomenon in American society is that a situation is often redefined as a problem or given more attention as a problem when it affects white people. This has been true in areas ranging from drug abuse to the problems faced by working mothers. One of the reasons for the recent intense focus on black people on welfare is that it is becoming clear that many of the consequences of poverty often associated with single mother families can no longer be internalized within the black community.

Although welfare is clearly a necessity for some people in order to ensure their very survival, it is clearly a system upon which most people, including those who are on it, would prefer not to be dependent. Welfare provides subsistence, but it does not empower people to maximize and be rewarded for their potential. When fewer persons were on welfare, there was little concern in the larger society that these clearly disempowered individuals were not fulfilling their potential, and were not participating in many of the opportunities and benefits society has to offer.

But the issue of welfare has now taken center stage. Although there has been long-standing resentment against black women dependent upon public assistance,³⁶ the hostility has clearly reached a new level. Many in society now fear for their pocketbooks, not in the usual sense of fear that they may be snatched in the street, but in the sense of fear that their hard-earned tax dollars will be snatched by the Government in order to support welfare recipients.³⁷ The factor of race adds another dimension and intensity to this perception. There is concern about an increasing birth rate among blacks, with children being born who are not likely to become well-educated members of society. Some proponents of family values rhetoric may see the potential for a situation they would deem entirely unacceptable: working every day, at jobs that are increasingly stressful and insecure, to support a black "underclass" of able-bodied people who do not work. This is a very bizarre and ironic twist in a nation with a history of black slavery.³⁸ There is also increased concern about welfare and single mothers because the phenomenon of single motherhood has spread beyond the black community. More and more white women are now engaging in a behavior that this society typically associates with black women. The well-known conservative Charles Murray is explicit about the concern that so many white women are now having children outside of marriage. He said, "[T]he brutal truth is that American society as a whole could survive when illegitimacy became epidemic within a comparatively small ethnic minority. It cannot survive the same epidemic among whites."³⁹

There are other aspects of the "family values" rhetoric that implicate both gender and race. The formation of single mother families challenges the notion of the centrality of men to the family. The male has historically been considered the head of the family, a status which was, until recently, affirmed in the law through a whole host of legal rules.⁴⁰ Moreover, the idea of the male as the head of the family is not simply a function of the law -- it is also deeply ingrained in our culture. It is a part of the pervasive nature of patriarchy that both men and women have been socialized to think of men as indispensable to the definition of family.

In challenging the centrality of men to the family, single motherhood challenges a fundamental and long-standing social pattern: the control of men over women. This

challenge is presented across the class spectrum. A single mother on welfare may not have a great deal of power over her life, but in a sense she has more power than a woman who has no access to any money other than through a husband. Thus, one consequence of the availability of public assistance is that poor women can obtain at least a small measure of economic independence from men. This can enable them to decide to have children without husbands or to leave husbands who are physically or emotionally abusive.?

The Murphy Brown controversy provides an illustration of the issues of centrality and control at the middle and upper-middle class level.⁴¹ Murphy, a fictional television sitcom character who was obviously well-educated, professional and economically self-sufficient, decided to bear a child outside of marriage. Obviously, she was unlikely to become an AFDC recipient. Why did her decision become the subject of national attention and the focus of remarks by the Vice President of the United States?

The answer seems clear. Murphy Brown's decision to have a child outside of marriage represented a threat to remove middle-class men from centrality and control in the family. Murphy Brown was essentially saying, "I can support a child financially, and I can nurture a child without dependence on a man." She became a dangerous symbol because she posed the possibility that an attractive, affluent woman could choose to reject a powerful societal norm, decide to have a child without a man, and suffer no apparent adverse consequences.

The specific concern about the displacement of men from the center of the family implicit in the family values cry has implications for all men, but also has a specific racial dimension. The black single mother family has a long history in this country.⁴² While out-of-wedlock births have been traditionally associated with blacks, the fact today is that the fastest growing group of single mothers is among white women.⁴³ As a result, a different group of men is now being affected by the growth in the number of single mothers. While black female-headed families have long been condemned as matriarchies, little was done to address the structures that prevented black men from playing the traditional role of breadwinner. The possible psychological impact on black men of the inability to play the traditional role was obviously not considered a problem. However, now that it is white men who are threatened with displacement from their expected roles in the family, there is a different level of concern. This is another illustration of the way in which the family values rhetoric is both racist and hypocritical. It also illustrates once again the way in which issues are redefined or given a different priority when they are no longer limited to the black community.

IV. The Fallacies in Family Values

A. Problems With the Focus on Private Values

In part, the family values rhetoric represents feelings of frustration about the many problems that exist in this society. It reflects a conclusion that these problems can only be solved through acts of individual will: if you change the way people think, you will change the way they act, and thereby change society. But focusing on private values as a solution to public concerns is extremely problematic.

The family values rallying cry rests on a number of assumptions about the idea of values. First, there is an assumption that there is some consensus as to what the family values are that are deemed to be threatened. The reality is that we live in an era of change and controversy with respect to many kinds of values, including values about family life. Many people, for example, would probably agree that the values of honesty, hard work and respect for others are desirable, but there would likely be strong

disagreement about issues such as the appropriate role of religion in childrearing, or the effectiveness or morality of corporal punishment of children. The very assumption that marriage is a prerequisite to bearing children has been challenged. Adoption, surrogate motherhood and the increase in stepfamilies have challenged assumptions about biology and the nuclear family. Moreover, there is no obvious consensus in this country as to whether the proper role of the state is to maintain norms that are commonly shared or whether it is to protect the right of individuals to choose their own values about family.⁴⁴ Clearly the Dan Quayle-Murphy Brown flap suggests that at least for some people, the term "family values" is a euphemism for the two-parent family.⁴⁵ This view may be combined with a belief that children are more likely to learn certain values such as honesty and good citizenship in that context. The notion that the two-parent family is a prerequisite to passing on good values, as well as the assumption that there is a consensus with respect to which values are important, was a central focus in the 1992 Republican Party Platform. Recent research, however, casts doubt on whether most Americans agree with this formulation. In a recent survey, only two percent of the women and one percent of the men questioned defined family values as being about the traditional nuclear family. Five percent of the women and one percent of the men defined family values as being connected to religion or the Bible. Nine out of ten women defined family values as loving, taking care of and supporting each other, knowing right from wrong and having good values, and nine out of ten said that society should value all kinds of families.⁴⁶

Even assuming that there are some values that most people in the society agree are desirable, there is no clear evidence that these values cannot be effectively transmitted in a family that is headed by a woman. Although research purports to show that it is children raised without fathers who are disproportionately represented in statistics concerning failure in school, involvement with the criminal justice system and other problems,⁴⁷ there has been no proof that it is the presence of fathers that makes the difference between a child's success or failure. A distinction must be drawn between a correlation and causation. Critical variables such as the impact of poverty and family disruption (where that is a factor) have not been fully accounted for in empirical studies. Finally, there is a growing body of research that challenges the assumption that children in one-parent households inevitably suffer.⁴⁸

Also often overlooked in the family values rhetoric is the obvious fact that the traditional family can also be a site in which negative values can be transmitted. In the current rush to enshrine the nuclear family, it can be forgotten that traditional nuclear families have also been the place where children have seen, learned about, and been the victims of behavior such as domestic violence, sexual abuse and incest. One would think from the focus in the rhetoric and the media on crack addicted single mothers that alcoholism and drug abuse simply do not occur in traditional families.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the assumption that the solution to the problems confronting society today are to be found in the private rather than the public realm is not only unrealistic, it is dangerous. It is an approach to societal problems that lets the government off of the hook, permitting it to escape responsibility for developing policies to protect and improve the lives of its most vulnerable citizens. An approach that focuses on the family rather than the society as the source of responsibility to address social issues can also have the effect of sanctioning or even promoting racism by encouraging people to feel little compassion or commitment toward those who can be easily regarded as "the other." As Stephanie Coontz has noted:

The language of private relationships and family values . . . leads not only to a contraction but also to a deformation of the public realm. Where family relations become "our only model for defining what emotionally real relationships are like," we can empathize and interact only with the people whom we can imagine as potential lovers or family members. The choice becomes either a personal relationship or none, a familial intimacy or complete alienation. . . . Using family as a model for public life produces an unrealistic, even destructive definition of community.⁴⁹

B. Family Values and the Value of Work

It would appear, at least from the recent obsession with forcing welfare mothers to work, that one value assumed to be passed on to children in the traditional family but not in a single mother family is the work ethic.⁵⁰

However, the family values rhetoric on the issue of work is flawed in many ways. First of all, that rhetoric assumes that those who do not have jobs are unemployed because they simply lack the desire to work. The reality is that there are simply not enough jobs for all of the people who want to work. This of course is not accidental -- many scholars have noted that the stability of our capitalist society requires the existence of a certain amount of unemployment.⁵¹ Because of racism, the pool of the unemployed remains disproportionately black.

Many marginalized people in this society work at the only kinds of jobs that are available to them: jobs that are temporary, low-paying, off-the-books or illegal. Regina Austin has described the strength and persistence of the work ethic among some of the most dispossessed members of the society:

Consider the youngsters employed in the urban crack trade. They are hardly shiftless and lazy leisure seekers. Many of them are as much Ronald Reagan's children, as much "yuppies," as the young urban professionals with whom the term is usually associated. Their commitment to the work ethic is incredible; they endure miserable working conditions, including long hours, exposure to the elements, beatings and shootings, mandatory abstinence from drugs and low pay relative to their superiors. . . "They spurn the injunctions of parents, police, teachers and other authorities, but they embrace the entrepreneurial and consumption cultures of mainstream America."⁵²

Because of child care responsibilities, many single mothers on AFDC do not work. However, many do, earning unreported income in a variety of marginal jobs, often in the underground economy. They and their children survive by their ability to find ways to supplement the minimal money they receive from welfare.⁵³ However, the society sees these women not as plucky, resourceful survivors of adversity, but rather as welfare cheats.

It must not be forgotten that the value we attribute to work is not, in any sense, an absolute. It is, instead, like the question of what constitutes a family, a value that is contingent upon perspective or standpoint. Work is valued in accordance with who does it and who it is done for. In a patriarchal system, the value of work is construed in accordance with what is valued under patriarchy. Thus, we have the obvious fact that in this society, market work is valued more highly than domestic labor in the home; a fact that becomes very clear when married couples divorce and women who have played the traditional role of homemaker often find themselves newly impoverished.⁵⁴

The question of hierarchies with respect to the value of work is more complex than a mere comparison between market and domestic labor. Attitudes toward what domestic women do in their homes are also profoundly affected by both sexism and racism. Let us take the example of two women, neither of whom has held a job in her adult life.⁵⁵ The first woman was married right out of college to a young man with a promising career.

The other woman never married but ended up having three children and being on public assistance. Both women have been out of the workforce caring for their children for the past several years. In one case, the husband has now decided to leave the marriage. In the other case, the government has decided to take severe measures against women on public assistance to force them into workfare programs.⁵⁶

It is likely that people would be sympathetic to the privileged woman. They would see it as a noble thing for an educated middle-class woman to forego career opportunities in order to stay home and care for her children. They would be concerned about the likely precipitous decline in her economic circumstances, about her loss of status, and about possible resulting psychological harm. They would feel that she should be retrained for a job that has long term potential for financial and personal growth. On the other hand, many people would feel that the mother on public assistance is lazy and should take any job.⁵⁷ Because we live in a patriarchal society, it is considered acceptable for women to be economically dependent, as long as that dependency is on a man.

Race also impacts upon the way in which we choose to value or not to value work. I have argued elsewhere that the work of parenting by black mothers is devalued in the controversy over transracial adoption. In that context, the complexity of the childrearing work performed by black parents is underappreciated. Indeed, there is frequently an underlying assumption that black parents are inadequate to raise black children, while whites are assumed competent to parent both white and black children.⁵⁸ Dorothy Roberts has described the relationship between the devaluation of the work black mothers perform in their own homes for their own children and the national obsession with forcing welfare mothers to work, observing that "[u]nderlying the consensus that welfare mothers should work is often the conviction that their children are socially worthless, lacking any potential to contribute to society. . . ."⁵⁹ Also, unfortunately, even feminists often fail to see the link between patriarchy and racism in thinking about the value of women's domestic labor. It continues to be troubling that all too often upper-middle-class feminists devote substantial effort to developing the argument that housework should be highly valued in the context of the divorce of an upper-middle-class woman, without addressing the troubling fact that successful professional women often pay low wages to the women, often women of color, who perform similar domestic labor for them in their homes.⁶⁰

C. Black Families, Black Mothers and Oppositional Values

As discussed earlier, the family values rhetoric conveniently ignores the fact that the family can also be the site for learning negative values. One negative value that can be learned in a family, whether there is one parent there or two, is racism.⁶¹ Racism complicates the work of black parents in teaching values to their children.

While most black parents in this country would probably agree that it is important that families teach children values such as honesty, hard work, and respect for others, black parents also understand that black children must learn much more than the values of the white majority. In raising their children, black parents generally employ and pass on a "double consciousness,"⁶² in which the values that seem to be promoted in the larger society must be evaluated at two levels -- first a general level, and then a second level which takes into account the reality of racism and minority status. An uncritical and unreflective acceptance of traditional values can affect black families differently than white families: because of racism, blacks have less of an opportunity to live their lives in accordance with the mainstream ideal. Historian Elizabeth Pleck has argued, for example, that in northern cities in the nineteenth century, the adoption of mainstream

values by blacks often promoted marital dissolution because racial discrimination against black men made traditional values, such as the male as the economically powerful breadwinner, unrealistic guides to family life.⁶³ This continues to be true. A recent study indicated that the black men most likely to leave their families when faced with unemployment were those who subscribed most firmly to the idea of the male as breadwinner⁶⁴.

During slavery, when black people created families that were neither acknowledged nor protected by the law,⁶⁵ black families had to create their own family values.⁶⁶ In a world in which they and their children were treated as subhumans, these families had to create lives with independent moral meaning.⁶⁷ In socializing their children, they had to create values that were both consistent with and in opposition to those of the larger society. Perhaps most importantly, they had to teach their children to value themselves in a society whose message was that they were not valued and had no values.⁶⁸

The acceptance of single motherhood is one example of the ways in which black families and communities sometimes created independent moral meaning. Thus, while the nonmarital mother has long been the object of intense stigma in the larger society, many scholars have noted that black unwed mothers have never suffered the same outcast status in black communities as white women have in white communities.⁶⁹ Sociologist Joyce Ladner described the acceptance of single motherhood as reflecting a belief that a child born outside of marriage was a child who had a right to be cared for and reared in the community of his parents without stigmatization.⁷⁰ Through the years, many blacks have understood that society's judgment that the nuclear family is the only moral context in which to have a child was premised on a system that often did not reflect the realities and limitations that shape black people's lives.

The challenge of life in a racist society still requires that black people create and pass on to their children oppositional values. Angela Harris and Patricia Hill Collins have written eloquently of the way in which black women have to create a positive self in the midst of a white world in which they are consistently devalued.⁷¹ Although some have minimized the relevance of race in the work of parenting,⁷² many blacks agree that preparation of a black child for life in a racist society is a major task in parenting black children and often requires teaching values that are different from those of the larger society.⁷³ Thus, while the family values rhetoric demonizes black mothers, it ignores the challenges these mothers meet on a daily basis to instill values of pride and self-esteem that are as important to their children's survival as any other values assumed to enjoy widespread acceptance.

A powerful example of the challenge confronting black parents can be found in Suzanne Carothers' study of the transmission of values between mothers and daughters in a southern black community. One woman in the study thus describes her political socialization in a racially segregated society:

My sister and I were somewhat awed of white people because when we were growing up, we did not have to deal with them in our little environment. I mean you just didn't have to because we went to an all-black school, an all-black church, and lived in an all-black neighborhood. We just didn't deal with them. If you did, it was a clerk in a store. Grandmother was dealing with them. And little by little she showed us how. First, [she taught us that] you do not fear them. I'll always remember that. Just because their color may be different and they may think differently, they are just people. The way she did it was by taking us back and forth downtown with her. Here she is, a lady who cleans up peoples' kitchens. She comes into a store to spend her money. She could cause complete havoc if she felt she wasn't being treated properly. She'd say things like, "If you

don't have it in the store, order it." It was like she had \$500,000 to spend. We'd just be standing there and watching. But what she was trying to say [to us] was, they will ignore you if you let them. If you walk in there to spend your 15 cents, and you're not getting proper service, raise hell, carry on, call the manager, but don't let them ignore you.⁷⁴ Although this excerpt deals with the simple, everyday family experience of shopping, it provides a powerful example of the way in which black women teach their children a crucial value -- to value themselves. It is also significant that this lesson is being taught by a person of little formal education or financial means, demonstrating that affluence and education are not prerequisites for good parenting -- lessons about values and about life can be taught in many ways. Finally, in this example, the person teaching the lesson is the grandmother -- a woman. This serves to remind us that the values that need to be taught can be taught regardless of the gender of the teacher, or of the learner.

V. Family Values, Feminism and Public Policy

The discussion in the preceding section argues that with respect to some issues, black mothers have to socialize their children to have values that are in opposition to those of the larger society. Black mothers understand, for example, that the enemy is racism and that their children have to be taught to struggle against it. Similarly, with respect to issues of public policy, most blacks clearly define the problem as racism. However, when feminists consider what kind of influence they would like to have in the arena of family policy, it is not always clear what it is they perceive to be the subordinating factor against which they must struggle.

It is not difficult to observe that in most of the public discussion about family values, the voices are male and not female. Obviously, this can be partly attributed to the fact that those who are in power have the power to decide which voices and perspectives they will include, and which they will ignore. But attention must also be paid to the role of feminists in this silence. To what extent have feminists sought to be heard in this debate? Do most middle- and upper-middle-class feminists really oppose the current efforts to curtail public assistance for poor women?⁷⁵ Even if there is agreement that the immediate task is to prevent the dismantling of AFDC, questions concerning the relationship between middle-class feminists and women on welfare demands consideration of larger issues. For example, in terms of women's economic well-being over the long run, to what extent is it appropriate for women to rely on the family (their husbands), the market (their jobs), the state, or some combination of these?

Clearly, if feminists wish to make permanent long-term changes with respect to the position of women in this society they face the challenge of creating new values with respect to gender and passing these values on to their children -- both male and female. But it is not so clear what the values are that feminists would wish to pass on to their children. An easy answer would be to say general ideas of gender equality. But the deeper we probe, the more complex this issue becomes. What are the specific values that feminists wish to pass on to their children about the structure of the family? Are feminists willing to say that the enemy is patriarchy? And if so, what exactly does this mean, both as a theoretical and a practical matter?

A. The Question of Patriarchy

Martha Fineman has noted the reluctance of feminist legal theorists to explore and truly critique the role of patriarchy in family law.⁷⁶ Although most feminists would probably agree that the cry of "family values" is at least in part a response to a perceived threat to patriarchy, feminist theory seems to be reluctant to confront the issue of patriarchy head on.⁷⁷ One question is, why is this so? It may be that at a subliminal level, many women

accept the idea that male dominance is prevalent in nature and so it is natural for men to be dominant in the family. It may be that some scholars fear that challenges to patriarchy may focus attention on their own lives and they may be thought of as lonely, unhappy women who denounce patriarchy only because they lack satisfying male companionship. Clearly, some women have an affirmative personal stake in the continuation of patriarchy. This will continue to be true as long as men are economically dominant in the society, and attachment to affluent men provides women with a route to economic privilege.⁷⁸ For the woman who is the beneficiary of male privilege, yet wishes to critique patriarchy, there is a troubling dilemma of dual loyalty.

A reluctance to challenge patriarchy in the family is an issue that has consequences in the family values controversy. For example, feminists may argue that families headed by single mothers should not be stigmatized, but we should question whether single mothers will ever be on the same plane as married mothers in a patriarchal society. As long as women are validated by their attachments to men,⁷⁹ and women accept the resulting hierarchies, single mothers are unlikely to be accorded the same respect as mothers who are married. Are feminists really ready to put single mother families on the same plane as traditional families?⁸⁰ Also, what does it mean, in a practical sense, to be anti-patriarchy? This question seems more easily answered with respect to relationships outside of the home, such as employment relationships. But relationships inside of the home pose more difficult questions. Obviously, opposing patriarchy within the family must mean more than a less gendered division of domestic responsibilities.⁸¹

Developing an analysis of patriarchy in the family is a challenge not only for those women who have benefited from it, but also for those women who have not. Thus, patriarchy is a complex issue for black feminists. Black women are painfully aware that, for many blacks, the nuclear family with its patriarchal pattern has never been an option because of the racism that has limited the economic opportunities of black men. Challenging the desirability of patriarchy in the family can be difficult for black women because it may be hard to give up what the larger society seems to value, especially if you have never been permitted to have it.

It is not surprising that much of the discourse about the black family by notable black male scholars, such as William Julius Wilson, supports the notion of shoring up the black family as a patriarchal institution.⁸² Improving economic conditions for black men would presumably permit them to better play the traditional male role in the family. But, as numerous feminists scholars have already argued, the solution to the problems confronting black families is not simply to "put black men in charge."⁸³ Clearly, black men must be afforded better economic opportunities, but those same opportunities must also be available to black women. The task of simultaneously addressing racism and patriarchy is undoubtedly complex,⁸⁴ but the work must begin by accepting new forms of family for families of all races.

B. Race, Class and Single Motherhood

Statistics clearly have shown that many people no longer live in the traditional nuclear family and the number of births to unmarried women has risen among all races.⁸⁵ Despite these statistics, the fact remains that in the minds of much of white America, the face of single motherhood and of mothers on welfare, like the face of crime, is black. It is the image of the "lazy welfare mother who breeds children at the expense of the taxpayers in order to increase the amount of her welfare check"⁸⁶ that is used to sell programs to the public that will adversely affect women.⁸⁷ The message is that black women are immoral, unfeminine and undesirable and that white women should not be

like them. Indeed, as Patricia Hill Collins has noted, the way society treats black women serves as a warning to white women. She points out that the negative stereotype of the black matriarch is "a powerful symbol of what can go wrong if the white patriarchal power is challenged. Aggressive, assertive women are penalized; they are abandoned by their men, and end up impoverished and stigmatized as being unfeminine."⁸⁸ The negative image of black single mothers, especially nonmarital mothers, poses a dilemma for middle- and upper-middle-class white women who, in increasing numbers, are choosing to have children outside of marriage.

In their desire to defend the choices of upper-middle-class women to become single mothers, some feminists have argued, and indeed are seeking to demonstrate empirically, that well-educated, mature, middle-class women are successfully raising children without men. Although a challenge to the stereotype of single women as inadequate parental role models is crucial, a challenge limited to asserting the adequacy of upper-middle-class women poses a danger that these women will distance themselves from the circumstances of younger, poorer, less educated single mothers. Should this occur, it would have troubling symbolic and practical implications. It would suggest that these women are seeking to distance themselves from the negative images associated with black single mothers, and perhaps the negative images associated with black women in general. Second, it would have troubling implications for the role feminists might play, and the positions they might take regarding issues of critical importance to a wider range of single mothers such as welfare and other social programs that benefit the children of the poor.

It is important that those middle-class women whose voices are more likely to be heard in the debate over redefinition of the family not create a new hegemonic narrative of motherhood in which there are good nonmarital mothers who are middle-class, white and well-educated, and bad nonmarital mothers, who are poor, black, uneducated and possibly drug addicted or HIV-positive. Such divisions along lines of class and race would be disastrous. What must happen instead is that women must seek commonalities that will support the development of coalitions between women of different races and classes.

The question of whether middle-class women would be willing to work in support of the interests of poor women and their children raises the question of how middle- and upper-middle-class women really feel about poor women having children outside of marriage. The extent that the law supports the right of women to bear children outside of marriage is not yet clear,⁸⁹ but middle-class feminists need to think about how they feel about this issue as a matter of policy. Feminist scholars have explored the question of choice in the context of decisions women make regarding whether to give priority to their families or to their careers.⁹⁰ There has been less analysis of the choices women make about bearing children outside of marriage,⁹¹ especially the choices of poor women.

The reasons women might choose to have children outside of marriage vary. It may be in part, as Martha Fineman suggests, a resistance to patriarchal ideology.⁹² For women who see themselves as facing limited prospects in terms of education and employment, motherhood may be viewed as the sole way to gain status. Single motherhood may be chosen where there are few potential marriage partners.⁹³ It has been noted that some women may remain unmarried not because of a shortage of available or willing men, but rather as a response to the sexism of marriage.⁹⁴ As a number of scholars have noted, it is still not clear, especially in the case of poor women, whether becoming a single mother is a matter of liberation, desperation, or carelessness.⁹⁵

What are the implications for feminist theory of the issue of choice? Certainly one question it raises is whether women in a position to shape feminist thinking believe that all women have an equal right to choose to become mothers regardless of their economic circumstances. Certainly women have chosen to become mothers with the knowledge that their children might have a handicapping physical condition. Their decisions have generally been regarded as a matter of personal choice. Are feminists willing to take the same position with respect to women whose children are likely to be severely economically disadvantaged? Some middle- or upper-middle-class women probably feel that they make decisions about how many children they will bear in part as a response to their financial circumstances, and poor women should be expected to do the same. However, for upper-middle-class women, the choice with respect to the number of children they will bear is often dependent upon the presence and amount of a husband's income. Once again, this raises the issue of patriarchy and the need for further analysis of the implications of that institution for the family and for relationships between women.

The need for middle-class women to become active with respect to issues that appear to disproportionately affect poor women is not simply an ethical issue -- it is an issue of practical importance. The assault on economic support provided to poor women raising children alone presages an assault on middle-class financial entitlements such as social security and educational loans. Similarly, the attack on the reproductive decisions of poor women cannot be separated from the current assault on the reproductive decisions of women at all levels in the society.⁹⁶

VI. Conclusion

The government needs to abandon its quest to restore the primacy of the traditional family in the hope that it will restore the "good old days." The "good old days" were not so good for some groups in society, including black people and women. For many blacks the majoritarian values of earlier days meant lynchings, riding in the back of the bus and being subject to any number of other acts of violence and indignity. For women it meant being subject to domestic violence and the denial of educational and employment opportunities. The world is clearly better now for blacks and women, but the world is also becoming increasingly complex. Effective public policy must be developed in order to meet the challenges of changing demographics and values. These policies must address the problems of racism, poverty, and patriarchy.

Certainly the immediate goal must be to improve the conditions that confront children growing up in the poorest of families. This means, of course, preventing so-called "welfare reform" from taking away from poor families the economic means that ensures their day-to-day survival. In addition to providing some guaranteed income, policies must be developed and implemented to improve the health and education of poor children. In seeking to address racism, there must be vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination laws as well as a reinvigoration of affirmative action. Women must be afforded opportunities to make choices about employment, about children, and about other aspects of their lives.

Rather than longing for the "good old days," romanticizing the idea of family, and seeking to impose one set of values on everyone, the focus of the government should be on trying to develop policies that will create a just society where people can make their own choices about the most personal aspects of their lives.

Footnotes

¹Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law --Newark; J.D. 1976, New York University; M.S. 1973, Columbia University; B.A. 1970, Mount Holyoke College. Another version of this paper was presented at a Conference on the Future of the Family sponsored by the Sixth International Congress of the Professors World Peace Academy in Seoul, Korea, on August 24, 1995. An abbreviated and different version will be published in a book of the proceedings of that conference.

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²See, e.g., Joan Beck, Nation Must Stem the Tide of Births Out of Wedlock, Times Picayune, Mar. 6, 1993, at B7 (blaming childbearing by unmarried women for crime, poor health and poor educational achievement among children); Andrew Rosenthal, After the Riots, Quayle Says Riots Sprang from a Lack of Family Values, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1992, at A1; Charles Murray, No Point Fiddling with Welfare at the Margin, Sunday Times (London), July 11, 1993, ¶ 1, at 13 (citing an argument that blames births to single mothers for a rise in crime and unemployment, and a decline in the "overall civility of social interaction").

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³See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 Duke L.J. 274, 289-93 (1991) [hereinafter Images of Mothers] (discussing poverty discourses as centering around the image of the missing male).

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⁴See, e.g., H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. ¶ 104 (1994) (amending Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, the Work Responsibility Act would place a 24 month limit on AFDC benefits to some households). The New Jersey legislature recently eliminated the increase in AFDC benefits as a result of the birth of additional children. N.J. Stat. Ann. ¶ 44:10-3.5 (West 1994). In addition to this kind of family cap provision, a number of states have proposed or enacted "bridefare" provisions, and/or incentives for women on welfare to use Norplant. See generally, Lucy Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 Yale L.J. 719 (1992) (discussing learnfare, bridefare and family cap provisions). Under the Federal Personal Responsibility Act, states would be forbidden by the Federal Government from providing welfare payments to any child born to an unmarried woman under eighteen-years-old. The preamble to the Act states that the purpose of the Act is to "restore the American family, reduce illegitimacy, control welfare spending and reduce welfare dependence." Personal Responsibility Act, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. ¶ 105 (1994).

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⁵See infra part II.

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⁶See infra part III.

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⁷See infra part IV.A.

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⁸See infra part IV.B.

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⁹See infra part IV.C.

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¹⁰See infra part V.

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¹¹Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death 189-90* (1982); Anita Allen, *Surrogacy, Slavery and the Ownership of Life*, 13 *Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y* 139, 140-44 (1990).

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¹²Allen, *supra* note 10, at 5.

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¹³*Id.*

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¹⁴Herbert G. Gutman, *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom* 52 (1976).

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¹⁵See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, *Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia*, 77 *Geo. L.J.* 1967, 1971 (1989).

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¹⁶See, e.g., John Blassingame, *The Slave Community 170-77* (1979); Barra Omolade, *The Unbroken Circle: A Historical and Contemporary Study of Black Single Mothers and Their Families*, 3 *Wisc. Women's L.J.* 239, 247 (1987).

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¹⁷See generally Andrew Billingsley, *Climbing Jacob's Ladder: The Enduring Legacy of African American Families 101-11* (1992) (discussing the interaction of slavery and African tradition in the development of the role of the mother in black families); Omolade, *supra* note 15.

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¹⁸See generally Omolade, *supra* note 15, at 247, 250.

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¹⁹*Id.* at 250-54.

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²⁰Jacqueline Jones, *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work and the Family from Slavery to the Present* 113 (1985).

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²¹Frances F. Piven & Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* 127 (1971).

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²²William J. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (1987); James H. Johnson & Melvin L. Oliver, *Economic Restructuring and Black Male Joblessness in U.S. Metropolitan Areas*, 12 *Urb. Geography* 542, 542, 559 (1991) (discussing impact of the restructuring of the U.S economy on black male unemployment).

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²³Rates of black male unemployment consistently exceed those of white males. When black men are employed they earn much less money than white men. For example, in 1990, the median income for white men was \$21,170 per year, while for black men it was only \$12,868. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, *Current Population Rep., The Black Population of the United States* 453 (1992). See generally Young, *Black and Male in America: An Endangered Species* (Jewelle Taylor Gibbs ed., 1988) (examining the social, historical and economic conditions that contribute to the employment, educational, health status, and involvement with the criminal justice system of young black males); Dionne J. Jones & George Harrison, *Fast Facts: Comparative Views of African-American Status and Progress*, in *The National Urban League: The State of Black America* 213 (1994) (comparing white and black males with respect to

levels of education, participation in the labor force, income, poverty and rates of death).

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²⁴See, e.g., Mark Testa & Marilyn Krogh, *The Effect of Employment on Marriage Among Black Males in Inner City Chicago*, in *The Decline in Marriage Among African-Americans: Causes, Consequences and Policy Implications* 59 (M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia Mitchel-Kernan eds., 1995) (demonstrating that black male employment is positively related to marriage rates and black males with stable employment are twice as likely to marry as black men who are not in school, in the military, or otherwise employed.) William Julius Wilson has observed that "[p]erhaps the most important factor in the rise of black female headed families [is] the extraordinary rise in black male joblessness. . . . [B]lack women nationally, especially young black women, are facing a shrinking pool of 'marriageable' (i.e. employed) black men." Wilson, *supra* note 21, at 104-05.

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²⁵William A. Darity, Jr. & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., *Family Structure and the Marginalization of Black Men: Policy Implications*, in *The Decline in Marriage Among African-Americans: Causes, Consequences and Policy Implications* 263, 263, 265 (M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia Mitchel-Kernan eds., 1995).

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²⁶See, e.g., Omolade, *supra* note 15, at 239 (tracing the history of black woman headed families from slavery through the present); See also Billingsley, *supra* note 16.

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²⁷Daniel P. Moynihan, *Office of Pol'y Planning & Research, U.S. Dep't of Labor, the Negro Family: The Case for National Action* 29 (1965).

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²⁸*Id.* at 29-31.

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²⁹For statistics detailing the costs of AFDC between 1970 and 1990, see Staff of House Committee on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess., *Overview of Entitlement Programs* 325 (Comm. Print 1994).

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³⁰Statistics have shown that after the time of first enrollment, 30% of the individuals on AFDC are on it for less than three years, and 20% are on it for three to four years. See David E. Rosenbaum, *Welfare: Who Gets It? How Much Does It Cost?*, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1995, at A23. Some conservatives have begun to argue that there is a genetic component to the likelihood of certain people becoming welfare recipients. See Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in Family Life* (1994) (arguing that higher fertility rates of groups with lower average intelligence helps to perpetuate welfare dependency).

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³¹The federal share of the costs of the AFDC program is only about 1% of the federal budget. Staff of House Committee on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., *Overview of Entitlement Programs* 679, 1749 (Comm. Print 1993).

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³²Staff of House Committee on Ways and Means, 103d Congress, 1st Sess., *Overview of Entitlement Programs* 725 (Comm. Print 1993). Joel Handler, *Two Years and You're Out*, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 857, 861 (1994).

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³³Joel Handler, Two Years and You're Out, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 857, 861 (1994).

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³⁴See Martha A. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 191 (1995) [hereinafter *The Neutered Mother*]. See generally Robert E. Goodin & Julia Le Grand, *Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes and the Welfare State* (1987) (describing the ways in which the middle class has benefitted from the welfare state).

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³⁵See generally Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens and State Minstrels: Ideological War by Narrative Means, in *Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power: Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the Construction of Social Reality*, at 332, 330 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (arguing that references to women on welfare imply a whole range of words and concepts that imply racial degeneracy).

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³⁶See generally Rickie Solinger, Wake Up Little Susie 187-204 (1992) (discussing taxpayer resentment toward welfare mothers since the post-war years and the restrictive, punitive programs that resulted).

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³⁷See Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 235, 295 (discussing public perceptions of unfairness in confiscating money earned through work for the purpose of providing support to able-bodied individuals who do not work).

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³⁸Contrary to what may be a common perception, the majority of recipients of AFDC are not black. According to 1994 statistics, 38.9% of recipients were white, 37.2% were black. It is true that recipients of AFDC are disproportionately black. Rosenbaum, *supra* note 29, at A23.

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³⁹Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, *Wall St. J.*, October 29, 1993, at A14. See also Daniel P. Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 *Am. Scholar* 17 (1993) (expressing the concern that the birth patterns of white Americans are starting to approximate those of black families thirty years ago).

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⁴⁰See, e.g., *Kirschberg v. Feenstra*, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (striking down as violative of equal protection the right of husbands to control and manage community property); *Warren v. State*, 336 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985) (abolishing the marital rape exemption).

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⁴¹See, e.g., John E. Yang & Ann Devroy, Quayle: 'Hollywood Doesn't Get It,' *Administration Struggles to Explain Attack on TV's Murphy Brown*, *Wash. Post*, May 21, 1992, at A1.

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⁴²See generally Omolade, *supra* note 15.

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⁴³See, e.g., Murray, *supra* note 38, at A14.

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⁴⁴Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 *Harv. L. Rev.* 1348 (1994).

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⁴⁵Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1993, at 47 ("The social arrangement that has proven most successful in ensuring the physical survival and promoting the social development of the child is the family unit of the biological mother and father.").

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⁴⁶Tamar Lewin, Women Are Becoming Equal Providers, *N.Y. Times*, May 11, 1995, at A27.

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⁴⁷See Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 *Harv. Women's L.J.* 19, 35-42 (1995) (discussing and critiquing research purporting to demonstrate that children inevitably suffer in one-parent families).

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⁴⁸See, e.g., Ronald Angel & Jacqueline Angel, *Painful Inheritance: Health and the New Generation of Fatherless Families* (1993) (stating that studies of children of divorce do not tell much about the consequences for children who never had a father in the home). See also, Barbara Bilge & Gladis Kaufman, Children of Divorce and One Parent Families: Cross Cultural Perspectives, 32 *Fam. Rel.* 59, 68-69 (1983) (stating that "no single family form produces an optimal environment for a growing child").

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⁴⁹Stephanie Coontz, *The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap* 113, 115 (1992).

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⁵⁰See Mickey Kaus, *The Work Ethic State: The Only Way to Break the Culture of Poverty*, *New Republic*, July 7, 1986, at 26. "If we could rely on volunteers to end the culture of poverty by working themselves out of it, we probably wouldn't have a culture of poverty in the first place. The point is to enforce the work ethic." *Id.* at 33. Another writer put it differently, stating that "[t]he link between female headship and welfare dependency in the urban underclass is also well established, leading to legitimate concerns about the intergenerational transfer of poverty. At the root of this concern is the paucity of employment among welfare mothers and how this affects attitudes of their children toward work." John D. Kasarda, *Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass*, 501 *Annals* 26, 44 (1989).

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⁵¹Christopher Jencks, *Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty and the Underclass* 128 (1992).

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⁵²Regina Austin, "The Black Community," *Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification*, 65 *S. Cal. L. Rev.* 1769, 1786 (1992) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jefferson Morley, *Contradictions of Cocaine Capitalism*, *Nation*, Oct. 2, 1989, at 341, 344).

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⁵³See Jencks, *supra* note 50, at 204-21.

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⁵⁴See generally Twila L. Perry, *No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault*, 52 *Ohio St. L.J.* 55 (1991); Joan Williams, *Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony*, 82 *Geo. L.J.* 2227 (1994).

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⁵⁵I explore this hypothetical in a recent article. See Twila L. Perry, *Alimony: Race, Privilege and Dependency in the Search for Theory*, 83 *Geo. L.J.* 2481, 2500-03 (1994)

[hereinafter Alimony].

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⁵⁶Id.

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⁵⁷Id.

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⁵⁸See Twila L. Perry, *The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination*, 21 *N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change* 33 (1993-1994) [hereinafter *Transracial Adoption*] (arguing that positions in favor of transracial adoption are often premised on the assumption that whites provide superior parenting skills).

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⁵⁹Dorothy E. Roberts, *The Value of Black Mothers' Work*, 26 *Conn. L. Rev.* 871, 876 (1994).

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⁶⁰See Alimony, *supra* note 54. See generally Angela Y. Davis, *Women, Race & Class* 96-97 (criticizing middle class feminists for failing to put the exploitation of domestic workers on their agenda).

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⁶¹See generally Barry Troyna & Richard Hatcher, *Racism in Children's Lives: A Study of Mainly White Primary Schools* 131-46 (1992) (discussing the role of family, school, community and television as sources of white children's ideas about race). See also Frances Aboud, *Children and Prejudice* 88-92 (1988) (discussing actions and attitudes of parents that are associated with racial prejudice in children).

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⁶²This phenomenon of "double consciousness" was long ago described by W.E.B. DuBois. W.E.B. Dubois, *The Souls of Black Folk* 6 (1903).

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⁶³Elizabeth Pleck, *Black Migration and Poverty: Boston, 1865-1900* 198, 200 (1979), cited in Coontz, *supra* note 48, at 250.

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⁶⁴Coontz, *supra* note 48, at 250.

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⁶⁵Davis, *supra* note 59, at 1364.

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⁶⁶See Omolade, *supra* note 15, at 240 ("Black resistance to social death took the form of creating viable families, whether patriarchal or female-headed, and of developing extended kinship networks along with political and protest strategies.").

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⁶⁷Patterson, *supra* note 10, at 6.

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⁶⁸See Blassingame, *supra* note 15, at 181-91 (describing ways in which slave parents attempted to inculcate self-esteem in their children).

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⁶⁹Solinger, *supra* note 35, at 199-203 (describing, in the era before *Roe v. Wade*, the decisions of black women to keep their nonmarital children rather than to place them for adoption and the support this decision had from families and the community); Regina Austin, *Sapphire Bound!*, 1989 *Wis. L. Rev.* 558, 558-61 (1989) (arguing that blacks and whites view teenage pregnancy differently because of cultural differences); Billingsley, *supra* note 16, at 111 (describing how even children without identifiable fathers were

accepted into slave communities); Omolade, *supra* note 15, at 255 (noting that if black single mothers worked hard to provide for their families, they were generally accepted into working-class communities, although there was less acceptance in middle-class communities).

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⁷⁰Joyce Ladner, *Tomorrow's Tomorrow: The Black Woman* 2, 8 (1971).

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⁷¹See Angela Harris, *Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory*, 42 *Stan. L. Rev.* 581, 595-601 (1990) (discussing the effect of white standards of beauty on black women). See also Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment* 91-113 (1991) (describing the importance of self-definition for black women).

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⁷²This debate often occurs in the context of the controversy surrounding transracial adoption, where advocates of the practice dispute the argument that black parents are in the best position to teach black children the skills to survive in a racist society. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, *Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Transracial Adoption*, 139 *U. Pa. L. Rev.* 1163, 1219-21 (1991) (arguing that the survival skills argument has little merit). *Contra* *Transracial Adoption*, *supra* note 57, at 61-65 (supporting the survival skills argument).

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⁷³*Transracial Adoption*, *supra* note 57, at 61-65; James S. Bowen, *Cultural Convergence and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child*, 26 *J. Fam. L.* 487, 510 (1988).

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⁷⁴Suzanne C. Carothers, *Catching Sense: Learning from Our Mothers to be Black and Female*, in *Uncertain Terms: Negotiating Gender in American Culture* 232, 339-340 (Faye Ginsburg & Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing eds., 1990).

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⁷⁵See generally Lucie E. White, *On the Consensus to End Welfare: Where Are the Women's Voices?*, 26 *Conn. L. Rev.* 843-844 (1994) (noting the absence of women's voices in the welfare reform debate and that "[p]ublic conversation about ending welfare has reported a growing silent resentment among middle-class women toward poor single mother who reputedly 'live off the dole.'").

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⁷⁶*The Neutered Mother*, *supra* note 33, at 26-28, 31-33. "[N]otably what is left out tends to be a discussion of the family as a foundational patriarchal structure Some feminists accept traditional configurations of family but criticize historic role divisions." *Id.* at 27.

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⁷⁷There have been some discussions of alternatives to the traditional nuclear family. See generally Mary P. Trenthart, *Adopting a More Realistic Definition of Family*, 26 *Gonzaga L. Rev.* 91, 97 (1991) (arguing that the average person has a broader definition of family than does the courts or the legislature); Note, *A Family Like Any Other Family: Alternative Methods of Defining Family Law*, 18 *N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change* 1027, 1062-64 (1991) (arguing that the legal definition of the family should reflect the social realities of different kinds of families); Note, *Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family*, 104 *Harv. L. Rev.* 1640, 1640 (1991) (arguing that "[t]he traditional nuclear family is rapidly becoming an

American anachronism").

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⁷⁸Alimony, supra note 54.

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⁷⁹Images of Mothers, supra note 2, at 275-89 (discussing hierarchies of mothers based on the nature of their attachments to men); Alimony, supra note 54, at 2500-03 (discussing hierarchies among women based on the wealth of the men they are or have been attached to).

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⁸⁰See The Neutered Mother, supra note 33 (arguing for the abolition of marriage as a legal status and for the recentering of family policy around dependency and caregiving rather than the sexual tie between men and women).

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⁸¹The Neutered Mother, supra note 33, at 27; Alimony, supra note 54, at 2507.

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⁸²Wilson, supra note 21.

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⁸³See, e.g., Austin, supra note 51 (arguing that stressing the need to improve only the economic status of black males perpetuates patriarchy); Maxine Baca Zinn, Family Race and Poverty in the Eighties, 14 Signs 856, 868-69 (1989) (criticizing Wilson's implied advocacy of black patriarchy).

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⁸⁴Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 25 (1993).

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⁸⁵Steven A. Holmes, Out-of-Wedlock Births Up Since 1983, Report Indicates, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1994, at A1.

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⁸⁶Roberts, supra note 83, at 25.

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⁸⁷See Collins, supra note 70, at 77 (discussing stereotypes of the black welfare mother); see generally Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 879, 891-92 (1994).

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⁸⁸Collins, supra note 70, at 78.

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⁸⁹There are cases from which it can be argued that this right is implied. In *Carey v. Population Services*, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court noted that the decision to bear children is "at the heart" of constitutionally protected choices. *Id.* at 685. The Supreme Court in *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and *Eisenstadt v. Baird*, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), held that the state cannot prohibit married or unmarried couples from using contraceptives based on the right of marital privacy and the equal protection clause. The Court's holdings in the above cases seems to support the argument that the right not to have children and the right to have children is protected. However, it would probably be going too far to argue that these cases place the right to decide to procreate as a single person on the same status as the right to decide not to procreate as a single person. Scholars have noted the limitations of both the privacy doctrine and the Free Exercise Clause in this context. See Martha Fineman, *Intimacy Outside the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy*, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 955, 958 (1991); Martha Minow, *The Free Exercise*

of Families, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 925, 943 (1991).

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⁹⁰See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, *Ideology and Women's Choices*, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 761 (1990); Joan Williams, *Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice*, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1559 (1991). See generally, Kathleen Gerson, *Hard Choices: How Women Decide About Work, Career and Motherhood* (1985).

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⁹¹Lynn Smith, *Births to Unmarried Women are Increasing So Much and the Stigmas Falling So Fast that Sociologists Don't Yet Know the Consequences*, L.A. Times, July 22, 1993, at E1.

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⁹²The Neutered Mother, *supra* note 33, at 125.

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⁹³This may be true not only for poor women of color, but also for professional or middle-class women. A recent article in the New York Times reported that according to statistics of the U.S. Department of Education, there were more female than male undergraduates in American universities in the academic year 1992-1993. However, among black students there were 785,000 women and only 495,000 men enrolled that year. These disparities persist at the most elite levels. At Yale University, for example, among the undergraduates during the academic year 1994-1995, there were 250 black women and 186 black men. Emily Wilson, *Dreading Another Saturday Night*, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1995, at 4A, 24.

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⁹⁴See, e.g., Omolade, *supra* note 15, at 273 (noting that some black women remain unmarried because of sexism in marriage).

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⁹⁵Collins, *supra* note 70, at 116 (discussing young men encouraging their teenage girlfriends to bear children); Roberts, *supra* note 83, at 28-29; Austin, *supra* note 51, at 555 (arguing to "consider the possibility that young, black, sexually active, fertile, nurturing, black women are being viewed ominously because they have the temerity to break out of the rigid economic, social and political categories that a racist, sexist, and class stratified society would impose upon them").

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⁹⁶See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, *Fatherless America* 233 (1995) (arguing that the law should prohibit sperm banks from providing sperm to single women for the purpose of artificial insemination).

rhetoric, the Republicans were always open to criticism for playing dirty with race. Willie Horton may have helped win an election, but at least liberals cried foul and kept the cost of racial demagoguery high. Not so today, when conservatives have adopted the parry and punch of reactionary colorblindness.

Witness how Horne gets away with targeting a Hispanic studies program that is helping Tucson's Mexican American students overcome the odds (students in the program went on to college at triple the rate of their peers outside it). Many of the program's proponents regard Horne's campaign as an effort to deny those students a meaningful education—that is, as the latest episode in the long-running serial of segregated and subpar schooling for nonwhites. But Horne has a ready retort. Asked by *The New York Times* whether he might be likened to bigoted state officials from the days of Jim Crow segregation, Horne lashed out: "They are the 'Bull Connors.' They are the ones resegregating."

Today's colorblind warriors anoint themselves the guardians of our civil-rights ideals—and then announce that race-consciousness is the new Jim Crow. This is how it becomes possible to see racism in efforts to talk (and teach) about discrimination against Mexican Americans. Meanwhile, by recognizing discrimination only when animus is directly proved, today's colorblind partisans blind themselves to enduring racial disparities—and also defend their own race-baiting. Horne stands among a number of Arizona politicians fanning the flames of racial discontent, and in turn, he and his cohort are participating in a long tradition of mobilizing voters through coded racial appeals. Yet, unlike many of their predecessors, today's racial demagogues occupy the moral high ground courtesy of reactionary colorblindness. Under that version, remember, only express references to race—meaning invocations of biology or the use of racial epithets—count as racism. In contrast, alarmism about the cultural or behavioral deficiencies of nonwhites is not racist; it's hard-nosed realism, or so we're repeatedly

told. This is the new, well-honed jujitsu of reactionary colorblindness in action: Exploit race (use coded terms to stir up racial animosity); parry (brush aside charges of racism by demanding proof that you used an old-fashioned slur); punch (accuse your critics of constantly playing the race card). The colorblind ideal of a society free of racial oppression demands continued attention to

race; reactionary colorblindness instead attempts to retard racial progress and foment new racial divisions. **TAP**

Ian Haney-López is the John H. Boalt professor of law, University of California, Berkeley, and author of White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race and Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice.

Revisiting Race-Neutral Politics

The sociologist and scholar William Julius Wilson revises his stance on whether Democrats should put race on the agenda.

In 1990, sociologist William Julius Wilson wrote a provocative article for this magazine, "Race-Neutral Politics and the Democratic Coalition," arguing that Democrats should de-emphasize race-specific policies like affirmative action in favor of race-neutral policies that disproportionately serve minorities (who are disproportionately poor) as a strategy of expanding the Democratic base. The article was a flash point in a then-roiling debate not only about identity politics within the Democratic Party but about the country's willingness to continue activist policies to achieve racial equity. Twenty-one years later, the *Prospect* has invited Wilson, currently a professor of sociology and social policy at Harvard University, to reflect on how his views—and the country—have evolved.

How would you describe President Barack Obama's approach to addressing the country's racial disparities from within a multiracial political coalition?

Except for his Promise Neighborhoods initiative, which is patterned after the Harlem Children's Zone, President Obama has not addressed the country's racial disparities with a focus on race-specific policies (although there has been a return to traditional civil-rights priorities and enforcement efforts under

Attorney General Eric Holder). Yet he has indirectly addressed the problem of racial disparities with ostensibly race-neutral policies that are designed to combat the problems of disadvantaged groups, including his stimulus package, the health-care legislation, and his Race to the Top [education] initiative.

Obama inherited a national debt of more than 10 trillion dollars and a national deficit approaching a trillion, an economy in the tank, and two budget-busting wars. No other president since Franklin Delano Roosevelt faced such overwhelming economic challenges. Yet [Obama] has, in just a little more than two years in office, done more for poor people than any president since Lyndon Johnson, and the last time I looked, a disproportionate number of black people are poor.

I have listened with some irritation to critiques by black intellectuals that [Obama's] stimulus package does not address issues that affect the poor, including poor blacks. Such critiques show how ill-informed these critics are. Robert Greenstein, the director of the liberal Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, told me that the Obama administration asked him to help it develop the component of the stimulus plan focused on low-income programs, and he was surprised when they accepted nearly everything he

proposed. He said that he had been working with Democratic administrations for years, and he had never seen such a willingness to fund improvements in programs for low-income households.

Given the severe spending constraints, Obama risked his presidency passing the \$940 billion historic health-care legislation. Blacks will benefit disproportionately from this legislation. The percentage of blacks without health insurance is twice that of whites (and now exceeds 20 percent); also, African Americans spend a higher percentage of their income on health-care costs than do whites (16.5 percent versus 12.2). I do not think that Tea Party members and

other white conservatives are unaware that blacks will benefit disproportionately by the passage of this legislation.

Your 1990 article was published in a period when many felt that there was too much talk about racism and inequality. Now, many would argue that we are in an era of reactionary colorblindness (in which conservatives attack the use or evocation of race in any policy-making). Has this changed your thinking?

That article was written when we had had spent nearly a decade with a Republican in the White House, and I was concerned about effective strategies to help Democrats regain control.

In my previous writings, I have called for the framing of issues designed to appeal to broad segments of the population. Key to this framing, I argued, would be an emphasis on policies that would directly benefit all groups, not just people of color. My thinking was that, given American views about poverty and race, a colorblind agenda would be the most realistic way to generate the broad political support that would be necessary to enact the required legislation. I no longer hold this position.

I now strongly feel that *both* race-specific and race-neutral programs—including those that are class-based—must be strongly emphasized and pursued by the Democrats to combat racial inequality.

Let me talk about the race-specific policies first. Research reveals that the white backlash against racial entitlements such as affirmative action contributed to the government's retreat from anti-discrimination policies during the 1980s, a retreat that may have influenced hiring and promotion decisions in the corporate sector as well. It should come as no surprise that waning support for affirmative-action programs would have an adverse effect on blacks, especially more-advantaged blacks. A number of empirical studies have revealed significant differences in the family and neighborhood environments of blacks and whites that are understated when standard measures of socioeconomic status are employed.

Take, for example, the question of family background. Even when white parents and black parents report the same average income, white parents have substantially more assets than black parents. Whites with the same amount of schooling as blacks usually attend better high schools and colleges. ... For all these reasons, the success of younger educated blacks remains heavily dependent on affirmative-action programs, whereby more flexible criteria of evaluation are used to gauge potential to succeed.

The policy implications are obvious. Race-specific policies like affirmative action will be required for the foreseeable future to ensure the continued

NEXT GENERATION

Immigrant Youth Activists Dare to DREAM

Ecuadorian-born Gaby Pacheco was brought to the U.S. by her parents in 1993, when she was 7. By the time Pacheco was 18 and a student at Miami Dade College in Florida, she had started advocating for education rights for undocumented youth like her. She co-founded an activist group for immigrant youth called Students Working for Equal Rights.

"SWER became everybody's second family," Pacheco says. "We would help each other with information, from how to get books for college, to how to get a library card, to how to get from one place to another if one of us had a driver's license."

Pacheco and her friends were not alone. Across the country, dozens of similar groups began emerging on college campuses and became the connective tissue for the United We Dream Network, a national outfit linking 20,000 undocumented youth to resources for local, state, and national political organizing.

The network's crowning achievement so far has been mobilizing thousands of undocumented youth in support of the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act, or DREAM Act. The legislation would have given nearly 2 million youth who were moved to the U.S. as minors a path to citizenship if they met requirements such as attend-

ing college or joining the military for two years. Pacheco was one of four immigrant students last year who walked the "Trail of Dreams," a 1,500-mile trek from Miami to Washington, D.C., in an effort to draw attention to the plight of undocumented youth.

Though the DREAM Act failed to pass the Senate by five votes, Pacheco and her fellow immigrant activists are promoting piecemeal local and statewide legislation that would give them more rights, including a California DREAM Act, which would allow undocumented college students to receive state financial aid at public colleges and universities. They also plan on lobbying the Obama administration to temporarily halt deportations of DREAM Act-eligible youth.

"Coming into the light and empowering ourselves, that has been the single most key and important point that has been able to move us forward," Pacheco says about the thousands of undocumented youth who have gone public in recent years. "There's a lot of work that needs to be done, but we've come a long way in the movement just by sharing our stories." —MOMO CHANG

Momo Chang is the features editor at Hyphen.

mobility of educated blacks and Hispanics. But affirmative-action programs are not really designed to address the problems of poor people of color. This is a major challenge.

The question is not whether the policy should be race-neutral or universal; the question is whether the policy is framed to facilitate a frank discussion of the problems that ought to be addressed and to generate broad political support to alleviate them. In framing public policy, I not only feel that it would be a mistake to shy away from an explicit discussion of the specific issues of race and poverty but also that we should highlight them in our attempt to convince Americans that there is an urgent need to address them. The issues of race and poverty should be framed in such a way to not only generate a sense of fairness and justice to combat inequality but also to make people aware that our country would be better off if these problems were seriously addressed and eradicated.

In 1990, almost seven in 10 white Americans opposed quotas to admit black students in colleges and universities and more than eight in 10 objected to the idea of preferential hiring and promotion of blacks. However, as the Harvard sociologist Lawrence Bobo has pointed out, the view that white opposition to affirmative action is monolithic is distorted. Programs like race-targeted scholarships or special job outreach and training efforts tend to be quite popular. In the 1990 General Social Survey, 68 percent of all whites favored spending more money on the schools in black neighborhoods, especially for early-education programs. And 70 percent favored granting special college scholarships to black children who maintain good grades. In their large survey of households in the Boston metropolitan area, Barry Bluestone and Mary Huff Stevenson found that, whereas only 18 percent of the white male and 13 percent of the white female respondents favored or strongly favored job preferences for blacks, 59 percent of the white males and 70 percent of the white females favored or strongly favored special job training and education for blacks.

Accordingly, programs that enable

blacks to take advantage of opportunities are less likely to be seen as challenging the work ethic and the American values of individualism. The implications for political framing are obvious—opportunity-enhancing affirmative-action programs are supported because they reinforce the belief that the allocation of jobs and economic rewards should be based on individual effort, training, and talent.

When President Obama gets around to making a strong case for his Promise Neighborhoods initiative, it would be good for him to discuss the successes of the Harlem Children's Zone. For example, here we have kids from some of the most impoverished backgrounds, mostly from poor single-parent families,

Both race- and class-based solutions are necessary to improve the life chances for people of color.

whose scores on the cognitive tests far exceed those of kids in the public schools of New York. The math scores are especially dramatic and match those of kids who live in Manhattan's affluent Upper East Side. So, Obama could highlight the results of an effective program that creates opportunity for people of color to help themselves. ...

Continuous struggle is needed to address the problems of racial inequality—[with some advocates] calling for race-based solutions, like affirmative action, others calling for class-based solutions, such as programs to increase employment in areas with the highest rates of joblessness. Accordingly, if I were writing "Race-Neutral Politics and the Democratic Coalition" today, I would provide more balance in my policy recommendations by placing much greater emphasis on the need to *strongly* and *continuously* embrace as well as advance both race- and class-based solutions to improve the life chances for people of color.

Do you believe that racial distrust erodes some potential white support for even race-neutral government solutions to economic inequality, particularly under Obama?

In my 1991 follow-up article to "Race-Neutral Politics," I argued that the white working and middle classes will more likely respond to political messages concerning inequality in society if those messages are perceived as relevant to their own immediate concerns and anxieties. I still maintain that position. What I also now believe is that Americans will support the idea of a level playing field that enables groups to take advantage of opportunities to help themselves.

It is true that despite the fact that there is more shared economic pain, conservatives are still able to use race in open and subtle ways to undermine broad-based support for goals of economic justice. Moreover, I agree that that racial distrust diminishes white support for robust government solutions. Furthermore, I agree that despite the fact that half of the nation's uninsured are people of color, President Obama and Democratic leaders rarely, if ever, discuss the benefits of the health bill for racial minorities. However, I very strongly disagree that progressives should avoid discussing racial inequities because of the conservative takeover of the racial discourse.

I have been frustrated with the attacks of some progressives on President Obama, given his incredible accomplishments during these very difficult times. But I must say that I am extremely disappointed with the way he and officials in his administration, as well as many progressive Democratic leaders, have responded to the right-wing hysteria and lies about the health-care bill, the stimulus package, and other important programs to address inequities.

The reason that conservatives have been so effective in using race in explicit and implicit ways, including fostering racial distrust, to undermine progressive programs is because of the incredibly weak efforts of Democratic leaders and the Obama administration to mount a counterattack against the right-wing

political pundits. It is false to assume that conservative attacks cannot be counteracted with the right messages. Accordingly, I think it is a severe mistake for the White House to resist talking about issues of race because of fears that it would provide fodder to right-wing propaganda. The significant question is how to frame these issues in a counter-attack. On the one hand, it is important to discuss the fact that all disadvantaged groups are suffering and that during this economic crisis, blacks, whites, Hispanics, Asians, and other ethnic groups share many common problems.

On the other hand, it is also important to emphasize the need to address unique inequities in communities of color. And you do this with careful framing.

So, as you can see, my position has significantly changed since I wrote "Race-Neutral Politics and the Democratic Coalition." To repeat, I now see the need, in this atmosphere of "reactionary colorblindness," as you put it, to strongly emphasize both class-based and race-based programs, couched in a very strong and consistent message featuring a political framing that captures basic American values. TAP

END

The Right Messengers

*Can the media responsibly cover race?
Only with the guidance of a more diverse audience.*

BY CORD JEFFERSON

In July 2010, the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism released *Media, Race and Obama's First Year*. The white paper detailed what many already knew: The American media often does a terrible job of covering racial issues—and having a president of color has done little to change that fact.

The report listed several problems, the most glaring of which is that mainstream media gives little substantive attention to issues of concern for or about African Americans. Furthermore, when mainstream outlets do cover black news, it is ad hoc, typically when an unusual incident captures the public's attention. Of the 67,000 mainstream television, Internet, newspaper, and radio news stories scrutinized for the report, only 643—less than 2 percent—were "significant" to the African American community. (Significant is defined as a story in which one-quarter of the content is specifically about a demographic group and its race/ethnicity.)

The same holds true for coverage of the country's Hispanic population, accord-

ing to Pew. In a 2009 report, researchers found that press coverage of Hispanics was overwhelmingly "event driven." Of more than 34,000 news stories, only 1.8 percent dealt with issues of importance to the Hispanic community or reflected those concerns to a larger audience.

There is less quantitative data about media coverage of Asians, South Asians, and Arabs, but consider the Cordoba House controversy of late 2010, in which a proposed Muslim community center near ground zero in Manhattan became the subject of breathless reporting and commentary. In an analysis by the news website *Salon*, writer Justin Elliot noted that *The New York Times* credited the Cordoba House's "public relations missteps" for the ensuing debate. "But this isn't accurate," Elliot wrote. "To a remarkable extent ... the controversy was kicked up and driven by Pamela Geller, a right-wing, viciously anti-Muslim, conspiracy-mongering blogger, whose sinister portrayal of the project was embraced by Rupert Murdoch's *New York Post*."

In essence, a small-time political blog-

ger with an obsession was able to hijack the news cycle for months. Meanwhile, stories about the DREAM Act, a piece of immigration policy with major implications for Hispanic and Arab immigrants, received far less notice during the same time period. The disproportionate attention paid to the Cordoba House, particularly by cable television and blogs, is one example of how the media often craves controversy over substance and deprives the public of meaningful conversations about race.

Tom Rosenstiel, director of the Pew Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism, says that dynamic is linked to a larger breakdown in the way the American public thinks about race. "Editors have stopped considering the idea that civil rights and race relations are problems that need to be addressed in society," Rosenstiel says. "So when the subjects of race or poverty or social inequity come up, they come up in the context of another issue. It might be health care, it might be Internet policy, it might be immigration, it might be joblessness. But the categories of race and poverty are not major subjects in the news anymore."

Both Rosenstiel and the Pew study note that pundits of color or outlets directly targeting people of color often provide the best coverage of race in America. Of African American newspapers' coverage of the 2009 arrest of black Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates, the study concluded: "The discussion and columns offered here took a starkly different angle than the commentary in the mainstream press. While the mainstream media largely assessed political implications for President Obama, the commentary in the black press considered the broader question of race relations in the U.S." Black papers also offered a "less 'us' versus 'them' perspective" than the mainstream, focusing instead on how all parties can advance race relations.

Of course, not all media outlets can be geared toward minorities. But a new world of technology now allows media consumers, as Rosenstiel says, to "broaden the conversation." This, of course, cuts both ways. On the one hand, provocateurs like Sarah Palin have access to such

POLITICAL RESISTANCE AGAINST STATE VIOLENCE

By Crystallee Crain

The American tradition has been whitewashed in many history books to make the original settlers seem wholly Puritan and peace-loving, as though there were not countless massacres against the indigenous peoples who originally settled the land. There is not much in textbooks about the sheer numbers of slaves who were kidnapped, killed, tortured, and considered less-than-human in order to meet plantation production quotas. It is impossible to ignore that part of the American tradition has included taking advantage of people and using violence as an exploitation tool.

Despite what the American discourse has been, there is little way to deny that, if a white, wealthy, often older male is involved, there will be egregious abuses of power, abuse which commonly has historical links to human exploitation and suffering. The body is a sacred vessel. All people have inalienable rights of self-determination to honor, preserve and protect their own bodies. When even these simple rights have no real value and can be completely battered in a country that prides itself on being fair to all people, there is something fundamentally wrong with the system.

This history of violence against citizens has made it difficult for many changes to be made in America because there is the constant threat that, if anyone tries to upset the status quo, there will be prices to pay. There are various dialogues about institutional violence perpetrated either through bending laws that were initially put in place to protect American citizens or completely ignoring them. Change is impossible if people are fearful that, by putting action behind their words, they will be putting themselves in danger for demanding what is supposedly a Constitutional right. The right to freedom of speech and the press has been a thorn in the government's side since they were originally written into the Constitution. It is as if the ruling classes thought the Founding Fathers wrote these laws in theory only.

The real danger of American government-sanctioned violence against its own citizens is that it is not limited to bodily harm. While this is the most obvious, there are methods by which people can be tortured that do not leave bruises and lacerations and, therefore, do not heal nearly as easily. There are the various ways that the government is allowed to use surveillance and intimidation to scare people into silence; more recently, a favorite has been to use the threat of deportation and imprisonment for small infractions to keep people quiet. While American media is busy criticizing Russia's oppressive tactics and how overtly they censor their citizens, American methods can be significantly more dangerous because people are unaware of them. Or if there is awareness, they have been downgraded to conspiracy theories. The idea that the NSA has the ability to casually monitor a citizen's daily activities does not seem problematic, until an innocent person is arrested for contacting someone who happens to know someone who knows someone suspected of terrorism. The American love affair with "national security" has

made it possible to enforce bigotry and xenophobia through abuse of power, distorting laws for personal and political gain, and covert intimidation.

However, there has also been a history of political resistance being a strong catalyst for change. Throughout history, the brave few who were willing to put themselves in danger for the greater good have been able to make change possible. One example would be how the Civil Rights movement was fought through mostly nonviolent political resistance with sit-ins, protests, marches, and student organizing. More recently, in 2009, the local uprising that took place when Oscar Grant was shot and killed by BART police officer, Johannes Mehserle, demonstrated how to maintain a nonviolent and strong voice in the face of incompetence. Although the demands from the Occupy movement were unclear because they were so numerous and so the movement was shorter lived than hoped for, what it lacked in duration, it made up for in strength and resonance. The ultimate goal was to expose the 1% by putting a spotlight on how Wall Street both caused and benefited from the devastating 2008 recession, as well as previous corporate and government abuses of power. The key to any successful political resistance is making sure that those in power become aware that the people are paying attention by demanding that changes be made to the flawed system. No matter how long, short, loud, or quiet a movement is, it is the people's responsibility to hold the government and corporations accountable for the exploitation that affects them. If the people don't do it, no one else will.

This chapter explores various methodologies and philosophies behind political resistance, what causes a movement to arise and gain traction, and how starting in the community to change local government is beneficial in changing national problems.

CONDITIONS THAT INSPIRE RESISTANCE

The United States of America is admittedly capitalistic and arguably democratic. With the passage of *Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission*, the people of the United States had their votes trumped by corporate power. Advocacy groups, like the NRA, have spent millions of dollars to prevent gun restrictions (Stone, 2010). Some argue this contributes to the high levels of gun violence in this country. Citizens United allowed corporations like the NRA to use their funds through PACs to purchase TV, radio, and newspaper ads (Stone, 2010) to legitimize their claims of corporate personhood. With this reality in mind, our economic and political systems require a critical examination of capitalism and its role in violence.

Leiman (2010) states:

Capitalism simultaneously represents a set of class relations and institutional needs, either continually shaped, or influenced by class struggle. To a significant extent these needs condition the form that the class struggle takes at any given moment (p. 175).

These sets of associations allow corporations, such as those who profit from gun advocacy, to actively participate in the political process with more political power than the individual. This is the American machine of capitalism. The machine metaphor points to the systemic and coordinated nature of the U.S. system that creates inequality and perpetuates violence. It is widely accepted that the slavery system built the early economic success of this nation and allowed for the country to rise as an economic power prior to the 20th Century (Zinn, 2003). Boyd (1998) writes:


At no point during the Atlantic slave trade was there an absence of resistance, despite the millions of African captives who succumbed to the relentless European firepower and brutality and found themselves packed in the hold of slave ships bound for the Americas (p. 43).

From the Underground Railroad to slave revolts to the abolition of slavery, African Americans have resisted the status quo of institutional and social oppression. African American women in the United States developed a culture of resistance through centuries of brutalization and humiliation in the private and public spheres of society (Ross, 1992). "The ability of slaves to construct a viable subculture of their own (based on family, community and religion) undoubtedly enabled them to withstand some of the psychological debilitation caused by the harsh conditions of American slavery" (Leiman, 2010, p. 20). Light (2009) wrote, "within the antebellum South the ultimate form of resistance in the quest for recognition was the acknowledgement that one was not property, both rhetorically and through escape" (p. 2). Furthermore, the law does not function as a social mediator of relations between all people; instead, it is a tool that merely functions to protect the more privileged. For women, this refers to those who meet the requirements of hegemonic femininity, i.e. white, middle-class, heterosexual, and able bodied (p. 138).

The long-standing relationship between violence within and directed at the black community is reflected in the ongoing debate (Davis, 1998; Lyon, 2010; Schlosser, 1998) on the oppressive structure of the U.S. prison-industrial complex in which more than half of all prisoners are people of color (Figure 3). "Almost ten percent of our population is locked up, and the percentage is worse among young Black men" (Lyon, 2010, para 2). Advocates see abolishment of the prison system and reform as potential strategies to resist institutional punishment (Davis, 2001).

ADDRESSING COMMUNITY & STATE VIOLENCE

State violence is the abuse of power by the government that ignores or deliberately acts in ways that prevent the ability of individuals and groups to thrive. The figure below shows the disproportionate rate of incarceration for Latino, White, and Black males in the U.S. in comparison to their percentage of the population. The numbers are dismal. At first glance, you will notice that although Caucasian (white) people make up a sizable portion of the population, they do not make up the majority of those incarcerated. People of color, both men and woman, are the highest incarcerated group in this country.



Incarceration rates for U.S. males by race.

Author's image, Adapted from Guerino, P., Harrison, P., & Sabol, W. (2011). Prisoners in 2010. Bureau of Justice Statistics. U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. National Archive of Criminal Justice Data website at <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/index.jsp>

Conant (2010) quotes Santos de La Carillo, a delegate to Mexico's National Indigenous Congress, who asked:

What does resistance mean? Resistance means to defend what belongs to us as indigenous people: territory, resources, culture. If among our peoples, we didn't have resistance, we would no longer exist as peoples. Thanks to our resistance, we have maintained our cultures (p. 36).

Resisting violence does not only mean resisting violent individuals and shunning them from society; it also means resisting the oppressive structures that have created the conditions for urban destruction. Rosa Parks did this when she asked the NAACP in Alabama to find legal support for Recy Taylor, who was brutally raped by a white mob in the mid-1940s (McGuire, 2010; Spratling, 2010). Tharps (2001) asserts that "African Americans have been staging various forms of resistance since pre-revolutionary days, and at the center of these movements is the struggle for existence and for cultural power" (p. 129).

Because personal experiences are innately political (Mills, 1959), when a person gains a sense of agency and ability to change their situation, I believe that regardless of the type of violation they experience, they are nonetheless resisting oppression and state violence.

White (2005) states that, "of course, Black women enter and depart the anti-violence movement at different historical moments" (p. 12). Many African American women demonstrated creative means of political resistance to lynching through education and the written word, such as Ida B. Wells (1862–1931).

Wells wrote for many years about the need to end slavery in order to bring about a larger sense of equity for all human beings. During the same time period, African American Josephine St. Pierre Ruffin (1842–1924) used her voice to influence women's leadership. "Ruffin and others in the public arena demonstrated keenly developed notions of self and a firm belief in the unprecedented role of Black women at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century" (Hohl, 2010, p. x).

A BRIEF HISTORY OF BLACK RESISTANCE IN OAKLAND

The role of political resistance is deeply rooted in Oakland's past and present. This section presents a synopsis of Oakland political resistance to community and state violence from 1960, focusing mainly on the Black Panther Party and the effects of the crack epidemic, and examples of community action and transformation that is leading today.

Resistance in the Black community has come through a number of channels: communities of faith, various forms of creative expression (music, dance, performing arts, and theater), political activism, care giving in the community, and methods of escape from oppressive institutions (Leiman, 2010; Light, 2009, Davis, 2001).

The Black Panther Party for Self Defense (BPP) was founded in Oakland in the late 1960s with its primary goal to sustain and protect the Black community. J. Edgar Hoover, first director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), named the group "the greatest single threat" (Lee & Smith, 2002) to the internal security of the United States. Over-policing in communities of color became a common practice in Oakland (and other urban cities across the country) after the economic rise of African Americans during the changing post-World War II job market, from which women and people of color benefited (Nosotro, 2004).

In the late 1960s and 1970s we saw the Black Panther Party (BPP) act as guardians and caregivers in the community. Their mission was to promote self-determination and demand safety from state violence and state interference in community life (Ginwright, 2010). The group was discredited as "radical" and "left wing," when in reality they were feeding children before and after school, walking people to and from work to, ironically, protect them from the police, and demanding equal protection under the law.

In the middle of the 20th century, one sign of state sponsored intervention presented itself in the 1954 Supreme Court case *Brown v. Board of Education*. The integration of schools was one of the loudest forms of state intervention against racism and bigotry within public institutions. Still, state interventions alone were not effective in creating long lasting change for "although the Brown decision was a great victory, its aftermath makes clear how insufficient an agreement between elites can be in changing a social order" (Higham, 1997, p. 4).

The BPP empathized with this perspective and took community change as a human right and a righteous responsibility. The Party took survival into their own hands. The aims and beliefs put forth by the Black Panther Party in 1967 (Figure 4) are one example of the strength and partnership within Oakland's Black community. The organization's work was in direct resistance to social and political conditions for African Americans across the country, to alleviate the impact of racism and classism on every aspect of Black life in the United States (Seale, 1974).

WHAT WE WANT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY TEN POINT PLAN
1) We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black and oppressed communities.
2) We want full employment for our people.
3) We want an end to the robbery by the capitalists of our Black and oppressed communities.
4) We want decent housing, fit for the shelter of human beings.
5) We want decent education for our people that expose the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.
6) We want completely free health care for all Black and oppressed people.
7) We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of Black people, other people of color, all oppressed people inside the united states.
8) We want an immediate end to all wars of aggression.
9) We want freedom for all Black and oppressed people now held in u. s. federal, state, county, city and military prisons and jails. We want trials by a jury of peers for all persons charged with so-called crimes under the laws of this country.
10) We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice, peace and people's community control of modern technology.

Aims of the Black Panther Party.

Author's image. Data taken from "What We Want"—Black Panther Party Newspaper, November 23, 1967, p. 3.

There were many aspects of the Black Panther Party that augmented the quality of life for the Oakland community. One of the most notable efforts was the Free Breakfast Program for children before school. This form of organizing and resistance is the type of cultural care necessary when the state will not distribute resources to all citizens equally. Although there were

efforts to eliminate the oppression of black people based on race and class, the role of women in the Party was contentious at times

Brown (1996) considers black women to be essential to the success of local community programs. Along this vein, Matthews (1998) argues that women experienced violence within the Party, and that gendered and sexualized politics played a role in the development of the political party.

In the 1970s, the Black Panthers saw their activities disrupted because of the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), a program by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that worked closely with the Oakland Police to discredit the BPP because of their revolutionary ideas and implementation of their 10-Point Plan.

By 1972, FBI operatives had infiltrated the organization, creating an atmosphere of mistrust amongst members and breaking down the foundational relationships and connections that had contributed to the organization's strength and success. By this time, a majority of the organization's leaders had been imprisoned or killed (Wolf, 1976). Between 1970 and 1980, the Black Panther Party saw its activities come to an end, with blue collar jobs leaving Oakland, and an influx and spread of crack cocaine (Lang, 2000).

By 1980, the crack epidemic had taken hold in Oakland's civic and social life, mostly in East and West Oakland. Because crack was easy to produce, most drug dealers prepared the drug in their own residences. From the arrival of crack until 2000, Oakland remained in the top 10 cities hardest hit by the drug epidemic (Johnson, 2011). Due to unequally distributed "mandatory sentences" many black men and women were incarcerated due to unfair drug laws (Alexander, 2010).

Payton (2010) writes:

Between 1981 and 1986, Oakland lost 2,051 private-sector jobs. In Alameda County, where Oakland is located, more than 14,000 jobs were lost between 1980 and 1983. The trend was happening all over the country, fueled by mergers, leveraged buyouts and national tax policies that provided incentives for corporations to move overseas. (para. 4)

The crack epidemic, unemployment, and the destruction of the radical infrastructure created by the Black Panther Party not only removed tangible and physical benefits, but also killed hope and the political identity of Oakland communities (Ogbar, 2004). Sharpe (2005) writes about the impact that the crack epidemic had on black women. Although her work focused on poor black women in Atlanta, the social parallels offer relevance to this study. Some of the consequences of crack cocaine use among black women in Atlanta included sex-for-crack pregnancies; crack induced paranoia, and constant desperation and urgency. Sharpe argues that the crack epidemic is reminiscent of Jim Crow and she also "questions the social and political structures that created a climate that effectively shuts down access to viable life chances for poor black

women" (West, 2007, p 181). In addition to destroying individual lives, the crack epidemic changed family relations, the political structure of Oakland, and the local economic development.

In the 1990s, Oakland suffered from a \$34 million budget deficit, a rise in homicides and imprisonment among young black men, and a mass exodus of the employers who provided wealth for the city in terms of tax revenue. The budget deficit not only affected city politics but also economic conditions for people of color throughout the city. "By 1990, 18.5% of Oakland residents, many of them African American, were struggling under the federal poverty level, versus only 10% poverty in neighboring communities in Alameda County" (Clark & Lin, 2009, p. 19).

In the early 2000s, Oakland saw a further rise in violence. Rand (2007) reported that, "in response to rising crime and violence in the early 2000s, Oakland, California, voters passed the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act of 2004" (para 1). These funds are used to help alleviate some of the social consequences to violence through a multi-pronged approach. The nearly \$19 million is used for Fire Services, Police Officers and Youth Violence Prevention program. This program is also known as Measure Y (described above).

The Alameda County Domestic Violence Report (2003) stated that "there were a total of 122 deaths related to domestic violence in Alameda County from 1996 to 2000, an average of 24 deaths each year. A child was present in over half the incidents (55%) that included reports of who was at the scene" (p. 9). Additionally it was reported that "one of Oakland's greatest challenges is the crisis of street violence gripping it and many of America's under-invested inner cities, exacting a high toll on residents and communities" (Clark & Lin, 2009, p. 1). Spiker et. al. (2009) reported that within one year, from 2006 -2007, African Americans totaled nearly 70% of all homicides in the city of Oakland. "In 2008, Oakland lost 125 people from the community to murder, down by 1.6 percent from the 2007 total of 127" (p. 2).

Violence creates a culture of isolation among youth and adults; experiences of violation break down community ties and destroy chances towards commonalities being recognized. The violence also lends itself to PTSD among youth of color in Oakland, affecting their academic achievement, and creating a cycle wherein they must join, and become victim to, the violence in order to survive. Collectively, Oakland residents experience all social problems together.

West Oakland has historically been a black neighborhood (Pearman, 2012). West Oakland "once had the largest population in the city" (Ginwright, 2010, p. 27). This region has seen a lot of economic violence that has negatively impacted people's lives in that region, and the city at large. In economically strapped areas like West Oakland, city officials worked with developers to create new housing and to bring new business to Oakland. The only catch was that those who were currently living in West Oakland would not be able to afford the rent or mortgage in these new housing structures which ended up displacing low-income black residents. "From 1997 to 2004 the average sale price of homes in West Oakland rose from \$53,317 to \$315,000. Nearly 80% of West Oakland residents are renters. More than 2/3 of renters are very low or low

income" (Letz, 2007, para. 10). This form of economic violence provides an example of living in the nuances of unequal protection under the law. The social factors that promote the literal and figurative displacement of African Americans and other people of color in Oakland have created a system in which the conditions that a person lives in can be the strongest factor in the perpetuation of violence.

This is one of the reasons why advocates and residents are concerned about gentrification and environmental degradation as social and state levels of violence being perpetrated against low-income communities.

In 2007, Just Cause of Oakland [known today and Causa Justa: Just Cause] organized a *Gentrification Tour* in West Oakland where they took leaders, residents, and other interested community members around the neighborhood to see the impact of this economic strategy to remove blight from economically disadvantaged areas. One of the consequences of gentrification has been a decrease in the African American population citywide. Allen-Taylor (2011) reported: "Oakland's African American population plummeted from 142,000 (38 percent) in 2000 to 109,000 (28 percent) in 2010" (para. 2).

proposed. He said that he had been working with Democratic administrations for years, and he had never seen such a willingness to fund improvements in programs for low-income households.

Given the severe spending constraints, Obama risked his presidency passing the \$940 billion historic health-care legislation. Blacks will benefit disproportionately from this legislation. The percentage of blacks without health insurance is twice that of whites (and now exceeds 20 percent); also, African Americans spend a higher percentage of their income on health-care costs than do whites (16.5 percent versus 12.2). I do not think that Tea Party members and

other white conservatives are unaware that blacks will benefit disproportionately by the passage of this legislation.

Your 1990 article was published in a period when many felt that there was too much talk about racism and inequality. Now, many would argue that we are in an era of reactionary colorblindness (in which conservatives attack the use or evocation of race in any policy-making). Has this changed your thinking?

That article was written when we had had spent nearly a decade with a Republican in the White House, and I was concerned about effective strategies to help Democrats regain control.

In my previous writings, I have called for the framing of issues designed to appeal to broad segments of the population. Key to this framing, I argued, would be an emphasis on policies that would directly benefit all groups, not just people of color. My thinking was that, given American views about poverty and race, a colorblind agenda would be the most realistic way to generate the broad political support that would be necessary to enact the required legislation. I no longer hold this position.

I now strongly feel that *both* race-specific and race-neutral programs—including those that are class-based—must be strongly emphasized and pursued by the Democrats to combat racial inequality.

Let me talk about the race-specific policies first. Research reveals that the white backlash against racial entitlements such as affirmative action contributed to the government's retreat from anti-discrimination policies during the 1980s, a retreat that may have influenced hiring and promotion decisions in the corporate sector as well. It should come as no surprise that waning support for affirmative-action programs would have an adverse effect on blacks, especially more-advantaged blacks. A number of empirical studies have revealed significant differences in the family and neighborhood environments of blacks and whites that are understated when standard measures of socioeconomic status are employed.

Take, for example, the question of family background. Even when white parents and black parents report the same average income, white parents have substantially more assets than black parents. Whites with the same amount of schooling as blacks usually attend better high schools and colleges. ... For all these reasons, the success of younger educated blacks remains heavily dependent on affirmative-action programs, whereby more flexible criteria of evaluation are used to gauge potential to succeed.

The policy implications are obvious. Race-specific policies like affirmative action will be required for the foreseeable future to ensure the continued

NEXT GENERATION

Immigrant Youth Activists Dare to DREAM

Ecuatorian-born Gaby Pacheco was brought to the U.S. by her parents in 1993, when she was 7. By the time Pacheco was 18 and a student at Miami Dade College in Florida, she had started advocating for education rights for undocumented youth like her. She co-founded an activist group for immigrant youth called Students Working for Equal Rights.

"SWER became everybody's second family," Pacheco says. "We would help each other with information, from how to get books for college, to how to get a library card, to how to get from one place to another if one of us had a driver's license."

Pacheco and her friends were not alone. Across the country, dozens of similar groups began emerging on college campuses and became the connective tissue for the United We Dream Network, a national outfit linking 20,000 undocumented youth to resources for local, state, and national political organizing.

The network's crowning achievement so far has been mobilizing thousands of undocumented youth in support of the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act, or DREAM Act. The legislation would have given nearly 2 million youth who were moved to the U.S. as minors a path to citizenship if they met requirements such as attend-

ing college or joining the military for two years. Pacheco was one of four immigrant students last year who walked the "Trail of Dreams," a 1,500-mile trek from Miami to Washington, D.C., in an effort to draw attention to the plight of undocumented youth.

Though the DREAM Act failed to pass the Senate by five votes, Pacheco and her fellow immigrant activists are promoting piecemeal local and statewide legislation that would give them more rights, including a California DREAM Act, which would allow undocumented-college students to receive state financial aid at public colleges and universities. They also plan on lobbying the Obama administration to temporarily halt deportations of DREAM Act-eligible youth.

"Coming into the light and empowering ourselves, that has been the single most key and important point that has been able to move us forward," Pacheco says about the thousands of undocumented youth who have gone public in recent years. "There's a lot of work that needs to be done, but we've come a long way in the movement just by sharing our stories." —MOMO CHANG


Momo Chang is the features editor at Hyphen.



Words From Prison: Drug Policy, Race and Women's Incarceration

June 12, 2006

Yvonne worked as a hair stylist in an upscale unisex salon in Harlem. Although the salon attracted an clientele with means, Yvonne barely earned enough with tips to support her two little girls and her extended family. Yvonne lived with her grandmother, her brother, and her sister in a small apartment in a housing project near the salon. She was the only one in the home who was regularly employed. Although she worked long hours to support everyone, it was difficult to make ends meet.



Despite the financial challenges she faced, Yvonne enjoyed her job, particularly the interesting people she met. She had a regular customer, John Williams, who was one of the few white guys who seemed to spend a lot of time in Harlem. He came in every other week for a wash and cut, and in passing, Yvonne often shared with John some of the challenges she faced as the sole supporter for her family. John always seemed sympathetic and indicated that he would be willing to help her out if she performed a small job for him. Yvonne initially declined; she wasn't sure what this small job entailed, but she suspected John was involved in drugs and she wanted no part of it.

Yvonne also wanted no part of her boss's designs and routinely resisted his repeated demands for a date. Derrick, the owner of the salon, fancied himself a ladies man who could win the attention of any woman he set his sights on, but Yvonne's persistent rejection angered him and made him obsess over her even more. One day while stacking supplies in the ready room, Derrick came up behind her and pinned her against the wall. He groped under her skirt and struggled to remove her panties but Yvonne broke free and attempted to knee him in the groin. She reached for the door but Derrick pushed her aside and blocked her exit. Catching his breath, he told Yvonne that the games were over. Either she would give him what he wanted or she would be fired. Convinced that she needed the job too badly to walk away, Derrick was stunned when Yvonne quit. She'd be back, he declared as she slammed the door behind her.

Yvonne's decision proved costly for her family. Her salary was meager, but it did provide the low cost health care that her asthmatic son desperately needed. Because she had quit her job, she was ineligible for unemployment and it would take months before her son would be covered under a plan for needy children. Within weeks after quitting her job, Yvonne faced the possibility of having to choose between buying the medicine her son needed, or buying food for the family. She decided as a last ditch effort to reach out to her former regulars to work free-lance on an on-call basis. The first call she received in response to her flyers was from John. However, rather than seeking a hair cut, he had another job in mind for Yvonne: he would pay her \$3,000 to carry a small package to Albany. Although he only said that he was delivering "product" to a buyer in Albany, Yvonne was led to believe that she would be carrying a small amount of cocaine upstate. Yvonne had been around drugs her whole life, but she had never used them more than once or twice, nor had she ever sold drugs or worked as a "mule" although she knew plenty of others who did. Yvonne didn't think she'd get into too much trouble for carrying 5 ounces of cocaine for John just once.

Women generally play very minor roles in drug crimes, serving as small-scale carriers, sellers, or couriers (also known as "mules").

On a cold Thursday morning, Yvonne shoved a small, brown paper package in the front of her jeans and walked out of her apartment to catch a train to Albany, where John would meet her. During the whole two and a half hour train ride, Yvonne was nervous, knowing she was taking a huge risk carrying the cocaine on her body. But her family desperately needed the cash and her son might not survive without the medication he needed.

John met her at the train station and took her to a room at a local motel, where two more men were waiting. Yvonne dropped the bag into John's hand. To Yvonne's surprise, the package contained five ounces of crack rather than powder cocaine. Someone placed the bag on the scale, and the three men agreed to a price. The buyer left the room and came back with several stacks of cash. Seconds later, a group of armed police officers stormed the room.

Yvonne was arrested and charged with conspiracy to sell drugs.

In 1988, Congress added conspiracy to commit a drug offense to the list of crimes receiving a federal mandatory minimum sentence. New York state has a similar conspiracy provision in its Rockefeller drug laws. Conspiracy provisions have expanded the range of people ensnared by drug laws and have contributed to the explosion of women's drug convictions. Once a "conspiracy" is established, every participant can be held liable for the actions of every other member, even if the participant did not have any knowledge of the actions or existence of other participants. So, even though women often play minimal or peripheral roles in drug sales, they are held accountable for the amount of drugs attributed to the entire conspiracy.

At her arraignment, Yvonne's first thought when she was taken into the courtroom was that she was the only black person there: her lawyer, the prosecutor, and the judge were all white. That automatically made her nervous. She had previously met with her public defender for a few minutes in her jail cell, and he had advised her to take the deal the prosecutor offered: plead guilty, work as an informant, and get five years to life in prison. He warned her of the long sentence she'd get if she lost at trial. But Yvonne couldn't imagine working with the police, wearing a recording device, and setting up people she knew in the neighborhood. She decided to go to trial, trusting that if she just told the jury how she'd been set up and the small part she played, they'd see it from her point of view.

Although women of all races use drugs at approximately the same rate, women of color are arrested and imprisoned for drug use at much higher rates. In New York, women of color are 91% of those women sentenced to prison for drug crimes although they make up just 32% of the state's female population. Although incarceration rates for all women are skyrocketing, since 1986, the rate of increase for African-American women has been 800%, compared to an increase of 400% for women of all races.

At her trial, Yvonne learned that John was an informant, helping the cops arrest new people and testifying in court, and earning money and avoiding prison in exchange. She learned that the "buyer" was a state police officer. What Yvonne couldn't have imagined is that in the state's "war on drugs" the cops and prosecutors commonly lured people from New York City to Albany because of its tough-on-drugs judges and juries. And Yvonne had never heard of the state's "Rockefeller drug laws," which mandate long, harsh mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes.

New York's drug laws, enacted in 1973 under then-Governor Nelson Rockefeller, are among the country's harshest mandatory sentencing schemes. They impose long prison terms for the possession, sale or conspiracy to sell even small amounts of drugs. For instance, the statute requires a judge to impose a prison term of 8 to 20 years for anyone convicted of selling 2 ounces or possessing 8 ounces of a narcotic substance. The penalties apply without regard to the offender's background, character, role in the offense, or threat to society.

After a two-day trial, the jury found Yvonne guilty of first-degree sale, a felony, and the judge sentenced her to the maximum – 20 years in prison in New York's largest women's prison, hundreds of miles from New York City and her two children. Most of the women she met in prison were also there for drug crimes.

More than eight times as many women are incarcerated in the United States today than were incarcerated in 1980, primarily as the result of an increase in enforcement of and sentencing under draconian drug laws. Between 1986 and 1999, the number of women incarcerated in state facilities for drug-related offenses increased almost 900 percent.

IMAGINE A WORLD WITH FAIR SENTENCING POLICIES

- Support the New York state legislative bill A-8098. The bill seeks to expand drug treatment for nonviolent offenders and increase judicial discretion in sentencing first and second-time drug offenders to treatment and probation instead of prison. Go to www.drugpolicy.org for more information.
- Join the campaign to repeal the Rockefeller drug laws in New York State. Visit www.nyclu.org/rockefeller to become a campaign member and take action. You can also learn more about these efforts at the www.realreformny.org.
- Learn more about the racial implications of the "war on drugs" and the ways in which low-income communities of color are targeted by law enforcement and harmed by current drug policies. Read *Caught in the Net: The Impact of Drug Policies on Women and Families*, which you can find at www.aclu.org/womensrights and www.fairlaws4families.org.

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Poor People's Movements and the Structuring of Protest

Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward

COMMON SENSE AND HISTORICAL experience combine to suggest a simple but compelling view of the roots of power in any society. Crudely but clearly stated, those who control the means of physical coercion, and those who control the means of producing wealth, have power over those who do not. This much is true whether the means of coercion consists in the primitive force of a warrior caste or the technological force of a modern army. And it is true whether the control of production consists in control by priests of the mysteries of the calendar on which agriculture depends, or control by financiers of the large-scale capital on which industrial production depends. Since coercive force can be used to gain control of the means of producing wealth, and since control of wealth can be used to gain coercive force, these two sources of power tend over time to be drawn together within one ruling class.

Common sense and historical experience also combine to suggest

Chapter 1, pp. 1-37 POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL. Copyright © 1977 by Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward. Reprinted by permission of the authors.

Power is rooted in the control of coercive force and in the control of the means of production. However, in capitalist societies this reality is not legitimated by rendering the powerful divine, but by obscuring their existence.

that these sources of power are protected and enlarged by the use of that power not only to control the actions of men and women, but also to control their beliefs. What some call superstructure, and what others call culture, includes an elaborate system of beliefs and ritual behaviors which defines for people what is right and what is wrong and why; what is possible and what is impossible; and the behavioral imperatives that follow from these beliefs. Because this superstructure of beliefs and rituals is evolved in the context of unequal power, it is inevitable that beliefs and rituals reinforce inequality, by rendering the powerful divine and the challengers evil. Thus the class struggles that might otherwise be inevitable in sharply unequal societies ordinarily do not seem either possible or right from the perspective of those who live within the structure of belief and ritual fash-

ioned by those societies. People whose only possible recourse in struggle is to defy the beliefs and rituals laid down by their rules, ordinarily do not.

What common sense and historical experience suggest has been true of many societies is no less true of modern capitalist societies, the United States among them. Power is rooted in the control of coercive force and in the control of the means of production. However, in capitalist societies this reality is not legitimated by rendering the powerful divine, but by obscuring their existence. Thus electoral representative arrangements proclaim the franchise, [the power to vote,] not force and wealth, as the basis for the accumulation and use of power. Wealth is, to be sure, unequally distributed, but the franchise is widely and nearly equally distributed, and by exercising the franchise men and women

presumably determine who their rulers will be, and therefore what their rulers presumably must do if they are to remain rulers.

In the 1960s the dominant pluralist tradition was discredited, at least among those on the ideological left who were prodded by outbreaks of defiance among minorities and students to question this perspective. In the critique that emerged it was argued that there were not two systems of power, but that the power rooted in wealth and force overwhelmed the power of the franchise. The pluralists had erred, the critics said, by failing to recognize the manifold ways in which wealth and its concomitants engulfed electoral-representative procedures, effectively barring many people from participation while deluding and entrapping others into predetermined electoral "choices." The pluralists had also erred by ignoring the consistent bias toward the interests of elites inherent in presumably neutral governing structures, no matter what the mandate of the electorate.

We do not wish to summarize the critique, which was by no means simple, or all of a piece. We wish only to make the point that the challenge rested in large part on the insight that modes of participation and non-participation in electoral-representative procedures were not, as the pluralists had implied by their narrow empirical structures, the freely made political choices of free men and women. Rather, modes of participation, and the degree of influence that resulted, were consistently determined by location in the class structure. It was an important insight, and once it had been achieved the conclusion followed not far behind that so long as lower-class groups abided by the norms governing the electoral-representative system, they would have little influence. It therefore became clear, at least to some of us, that protest tactics which defied political norms were not simply the recourse of troublemakers and fools. For the

poor, they were the only recourse.

But having come this far, we have gone no further. The insights that illuminated the critiques of electoral-representative processes have been entirely overlooked in the few studies that have been done of the nature of protest itself. From an intellectual perspective, it is a startling oversight; from a political perspective, it is all too easily explained by the overwhelming biases of our traditions. Briefly stated, the main argument of this [article] is that protest is also not

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a matter of free choice; it is not freely available to all groups at all times, and much of the time it is not available to lower-class groups at all. *The occasions when protest is possible among the poor, the forms that it must take, and the impact it can have are all delimited by the social structure in ways which usually diminish its extent and diminish its force.* Before we go on to explain these points, we need to define what we mean by a protest movement; for customary definitions have led both analysts and activists to ignore or discredit much protest that does occur.

The emergence of a protest movement entails a transformation both of consciousness and of behavior. The change in consciousness has at least three distinct aspects. First, "the system"—or those aspects of the system that people experience and perceive—loses legitimacy. Large numbers of men and women who

ordinarily accept the authority of their rulers and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements come to believe in some measure that these rulers and these arrangements are unjust and wrong. Second, people who are ordinarily fatalistic, who believe that existing arrangements are inevitable, begin to assert "rights" that imply demands for change. Third, there is a new sense of efficacy; people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot.

The change in behavior is equally striking, and usually more easily recognized, at least when it takes the form of mass strikes or marches or riots. Such behavior seems to us to involve two distinguishing elements. First, masses of people become defiant; they violate the traditions and laws to which they ordinarily acquiesce, and they flout the authorities to whom they ordinarily defer. And second, their defiance is acted out collectively, as members of a group, and not as isolated individuals. Strikes and riots are clearly forms of collective action, but even some forms of defiance which appear to be individual acts, such as crime or school truancy or incendiarism, while more ambiguous, may have a collective dimension, for those who engage in these acts may consider themselves to be part of a larger movement. Such apparently atomized acts of defiance can be considered movement events when those involved perceive themselves to be acting as members of a group, and when they share a common set of protest beliefs. . . .

INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE INCIDENCE OF MASS INSURGENCY

Aristotle believed that the chief cause of internal warfare was inequality, that the lesser rebel in order to be equal. But human experience has proved him wrong, most of the time.

Sharp inequality has been constant, but rebellion infrequent. Aris-

tole underestimated the controlling force of the social structure on political life. However hard their lot may be, people usually remain acquiescent, conforming to the accustomed patterns of daily life in their community, and believing those patterns to be both inevitable and just. Men and women till the fields each day, or stoke the furnaces, or tend the looms, obeying the rules and rhythms of earning a livelihood; they mate and bear children hopefully, and mutely watch them die; they abide by the laws of church and community and defer to their rulers, striving to earn a little grace and esteem. In other words most of the time people conform to the institutional arrangements which enmesh them, which regulate the rewards and penalties of daily life, and which appear to be the only possible reality.

Those for whom the rewards are most meager, who are the most oppressed by inequality, are also acquiescent. Sometimes they are the most acquiescent, for they have little defense against the penalties that can be imposed for defiance. Moreover, at most times and in most places, and especially in the United States, the poor are led to believe that their destitution is deserved, and that the riches and power that others command are also deserved. In more traditional societies sharp inequalities are thought to be divinely ordained, or to be a part of the natural order of things. In more modern societies, such as the United States, riches and power are ascribed to personal qualities of industry or talent; it follows that those who have little or nothing have only what they deserve. . . .

Ordinarily, in short, the lower classes accept their lot, and that acceptance can be taken for granted; it need not be bargained for by their rulers. This capacity of the institutions of a society to enforce political docility is the most obvious way in which protest is socially structured, in the sense that it is structurally precluded most of the time. Some-

times, however, the poor do become defiant. They challenge traditional authorities, and the rules laid down by those authorities. They demand redress for their grievances. American history is punctuated by such events, from the first uprisings by freeholders, tenants, and slaves in colonial America, to the post-revolutionary debtor rebellions, through the periodic eruptions of strikes and riots by industrial workers, to the ghetto riots of the twentieth century. In each instance, masses of the poor

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were somehow able, if only briefly, to overcome the shame bred by a culture which blames them for their plight; somehow they were able to break the bonds of conformity enforced by work, by family, by community, by every strand of institutional life; somehow they were able to overcome the fears induced by police, by militia, by company guards.

When protest does arise, when masses of those who are ordinarily docile become defiant, a major transformation has occurred. Most of the literature on popular insurgency has been devoted to identifying the preconditions of this transformation (often out of a concern for preventing or curbing the resulting political disturbances). Whatever the disagreements among different schools of

thought, and they are substantial, there is general agreement that the emergence of popular uprisings reflects profound changes in the larger society. This area of agreement is itself important, for it is another way of stating our proposition that protest is usually structurally precluded. The agreement is that only under exceptional conditions will the lower classes become defiant—and thus, in our terms, *only under exceptional conditions are the lower classes afforded the socially determined opportunity to press for their own class interests. . . .*

It not only requires a major social dislocation before protest can emerge, but a sequence or combination of dislocations probably must occur before the anger that underlies protest builds to a high pitch, and before that anger can find expression in collective defiance.

Our main point is that whatever position one takes on the "causes" of mass unrest, there is general agreement that extraordinary disturbances in the larger society are required to transform the poor from apathy to hope, from quiescence to indignation. On this point, if no other, theorists of the most diverse persuasions agree: Moreover, there is reason to think that a sense of concurrent dislocations underlay the mass protests of the 1930s and 1960s. And with that said, the implication for an understanding of the potential for political influence among the poor becomes virtually self-evident: *since periods of profound social dislocations are infrequent, so too are opportunities for protest among the lower classes.*

THE PATTERNING OF INSURGENCY

Just as quiescence is enforced by institutional life, and just as the eruption of discontent is determined by changes in institutional life, the forms of political protest are also determined by the institutional context in which people live and

work. This point seems self-evident to us, but it is usually ignored, in part because the pluralist tradition defines political action as essentially a matter of choice. Political actors, whoever they may be, are treated as if they are not constricted by a social environment in deciding upon one political strategy or another; it is as if the strategies employed by different groups were freely elected, rather than the result of constraints imposed by their location in the social structure. In this section, we turn, in the most preliminary way, to a discussion of the ways in which the expression of defiance is patterned by features of institutional life.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AS A STRUCTURING INSTITUTION

In the United States the principal structuring institution, at least in the early phases of protest, is the electoral-representative system. The significance of this assertion is not that the electoral system provides an avenue of influence under normal circumstances. To the contrary, we shall demonstrate that it is usually when unrest among the lower classes breaks out of the confines of electoral procedures that the poor may have some influence, for the instability and polarization they then threaten to create by their actions in the factories or in the streets may force some response from electoral leaders. But whether action emerges in the factories or the streets may depend on the course of the early phase of protest at the polls.

Ordinarily defiance is first expressed in the voting booth simply because, whether defiant or not, people have been socialized within a political culture that defines voting as the mechanism through which political change can and should properly occur. The vitality of this political culture, the controlling force of the norms that guide political discontent into electoral channels, is not understood merely by asserting the perva-

siveness of liberal political ideology in the United States and the absence of competing ideologies, for that is precisely what has to be explained. Some illumination is provided by certain features of the electoral system itself, by its rituals and celebra-

Blacks, who had voted Democratic in successively larger proportions since the election of 1936, began to defect to Republican columns or to stay away from the polls

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tions and rewards, for these practices help to ensure the persistence of confidence in electoral procedures. Thus, it is significant that the franchise was extended to white working-class men at a very early period in the history of the United States, and that a vigorous system of local government developed. Through these mechanisms, large proportions of the population were embraced by the rituals of electoral campaigns, and shared in the symbolic rewards of the electoral system, while some also shared in the tangible rewards of a relatively freely dispensed government patronage. Beliefs thus nurtured do not erode readily.

Accordingly, one of the first signs of popular discontent in the contemporary United States is usually a sharp shift in traditional voting patterns. In a sense, the electoral system serves to measure and register the extent of the emerging disaffection. Thus, the urban working class reacted to economic catastrophe in the landslide election of 1932 by turning against the Republican Party to which it had given its allegiance more or less since 1896. Similarly, the political impact of the forces of modernization and migration was first evident in the crucial presidential elections of 1956 and 1960. Urban

by contending political leaders to placate the defecting groups, usually at this stage with conciliatory pronouncements. The more serious the electoral defections, or the keener the competition among political elites, the more likely that such symbolic appeasements will be offered. But if the sources of disturbance and anger are severe—and only if they are severe and persistent—conciliations are likely merely to fuel mass arousal, for in effect they imply that some of the highest leaders of the land identify with the indignation of the lowly masses.

Moreover, just as political leaders play an influential role in stimulating mass arousal, so do they play an important role in shaping the demands of the aroused. What are intended to serve as merely symbolic appeasements may instead provide a focus for the still inchoate anxieties and diffuse anger that drive the masses. Thus early rhetorical pronouncements by liberal political leaders, including presidents of the United States, about the “rights” of workers and the “rights” of Blacks not only helped to fuel the discontents of workers and Blacks, but helped to concentrate those discontents on demands articulated by leading officials of the nation.

But when people are thus encouraged in spirit without being appeased in fact, their defiance may escape the boundaries of electoral rituals, and escape the boundaries established by the political norms of the electoral-representative system in general. They may indeed become rebellious, but while their rebellion often appears chaotic from the perspective of conventional American politics, or from the perspective of some organizers, it is not chaotic at all; it is structured political behavior. When people riot in the streets, their behavior is socially patterned, and within those patterns, their actions are to some extent deliberate and purposeful.

SOCIAL LOCATION AND FORMS OF DEFIANCE

In contrast to the effort expended in accounting for the sources of insurgency, relatively little attention has been given to the question of why insurgency, when it does occur, takes one form and not another. Why, in other words, do people sometimes strike and at other times boycott, loot, or burn? Perhaps this question is seldom dealt with because defiant behavior released often appears inchoate to analysts, and therefore not susceptible to explanation, as in the nineteenth-century view of mental illness. . . . Many defiant forms of mass action that fall short of armed uprisings are thus often simply not recognized as intelligent political behavior at all.

The common but false association of lower-class protest with violence may also be a residue of this tradition and its view of the mob as normless and dangerous, the barbarian unchained. Mass violence is, to be sure, one of many forms of defiance, and perhaps a very elemental form, for it violates the very ground rules of civil society. And lower-class groups do on occasion resort to violence—to the destruction of property and persons—and perhaps this is more likely to be the case when they are deprived by their institutional location of the

opportunity to use other forms of defiance. More typically, however, they are not violent, although they may be militant. They are usually not violent simply because the risks are too great; the penalties attached to the use of violence by the poor are too fearsome and too overwhelming. (Of course, defiance by the lower class frequently results in violence when more powerful groups, discomfited or alarmed by the unruliness of the poor, use force to coerce them into docility. The substantial record of violence associated with protest movements in the United States is a record composed overwhelmingly of

best able to join together in collective protest. Thus while many of the southern Blacks who participated in the civil rights movement were poor, recent migrants to the southern cities, or were unemployed, they were also linked together in the southern Black church, which became the mobilizing node of movement actions.

Just as electoral political institutions channel protest into voter activity in the United States, and may even confine it within these spheres if the disturbance is not severe and the electoral system appears responsive, so do other features of institutional

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the casualties suffered by protesters at the hands of public or private armies.)

Such perspectives have left us with images which serve to discredit lower-class movements by denying them meaning and legitimacy, instead of providing explanations. While the weakening of social controls that accompanies ruptures in social life may be an important precondition for popular uprisings, it does not follow either that the infrastructure of social life simply collapses, or that those who react to these disturbances by protesting are those who suffer the sharpest personal disorientation and alienation. To the contrary it may well be those whose lives are rooted in some institutional context, who are in regular relationships with others in similar straits, who are best able to redefine their travails as the fault of their rulers and not of themselves, and are

life determine the forms that protest take when it breaks out of the boundaries of electoral politics. Thus, it is no accident that some people strike, others riot, or loot the granaries, or burn the machines, for just as the patterns of daily life ordinarily assure mass quiescence, so do these same patterns influence the form defiance will take when it erupts.

First, people experience deprivation and oppression within a concrete setting, not as the end product of large and abstract processes, and it is the concrete experience that molds their discontent into specific grievances against specific targets. Workers experience the factory, the speeding rhythm of the assembly line, the foreman, the spies and the guards, the owner and the paycheck. They do not experience "monopoly capitalism." People on relief experience the shabby waiting rooms, the

overseer or the caseworker, and the dole. They do not experience "American social welfare policy." Tenants experience the leaking ceilings and cold radiators, and they recognize the landlord. They do not recognize the banking, real estate, and construction systems. No small wonder, therefore, that when the poor rebel they so often rebel against the overseer of the poor, or the slumlord, or the middling merchant, and not against the banks or the governing elites to whom the overseer, the slumlord, and the merchant also defer. In other words, it is the daily experience of people that shapes their grievances, establishes the measure of their demands, and points out the targets of their anger.

Second, institutional patterns shape mass movements by shaping the collectivity out of which protest can arise. Institutional life aggregates people or disperses them, molds group identities, and draws people into the settings within which collective action can erupt. Thus factory work gathers men and women together, educates them in a common experience, and educates them to the possibilities of cooperation and collective action. Casual laborers or petty entrepreneurs, by contrast, are dispersed by their occupations, and are therefore less likely to perceive their commonalities of position, and less likely to join together in collective action.

Third, and most important, institutional roles determine the strategic opportunities for defiance, for it is typically by rebelling against the rules and authorities associated with their everyday activities that people protest. Thus workers protest by striking. They are able to do so because they are drawn together in the factory setting, and their protests consist mainly in defying the rules and authorities associated with the workplace. The unemployed do not and cannot strike, even when they perceive that those who own the factories and businesses are to blame for their troubles.

Instead, they riot in the streets where they are forced to linger, or storm the relief centers, and it is difficult to imagine them doing otherwise. . . .

It is our second general point, then, that the opportunities for defiance are structured by features of institutional life. Simply put, people cannot defy institutions to which they have no access, and to which they make no contribution.

THE LIMITED IMPACT OF MASS DEFIANCE

If mass defiance is neither freely available nor the forms it takes freely determined, it must also be said that it is generally of limited political impact. Still, some forms of protest appear to have more impact than others, thus posing an analytical question of considerable importance.

It is our judgment that *the most useful way to think about the effectiveness of protest is to examine the disruptive effects on institutions of different forms of mass defiance, and then to examine the political reverberations of those disruptions.* The impact of mass defiance is, in other words, not so much directly as indirectly felt. Protest is more likely to have a seriously disruptive impact when the

that institutional life depends upon conformity with established roles and compliance with established rules. Defiance may thus obstruct the normal operations of institutions. Factories are shut down when workers walk out or sit down; welfare bureaucracies are thrown into chaos when crowds demand relief; landlords may be bankrupted when tenants refuse to pay rent. In each of these cases, *people cease to conform to accustomed institutional roles; they withhold their accustomed cooperation, and by doing so, cause institutional disruptions.*

By our definition, disruption is simply the application of a negative sanction, the withdrawal of a crucial contribution on which others depend, and it is therefore a natural resource for exerting power over others. This form of power is, in fact, regularly employed by individuals and groups linked together in many kinds of cooperative interaction, and particularly by producer groups. Farmers, for example, keep their products off the market in order to force up the price offered by buyers; doctors refuse to provide treatment unless their price is met; oil companies withhold supplies until price concessions are made.

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protesters play a central role in an institution, and it is more likely to evoke wider political reverberations when powerful groups have large stakes in the disrupted institution.

THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONAL DISRUPTION

To refer to an institutional disruption is simply to note the obvious fact

But the amount of leverage that a group gains by applying such negative sanctions is widely variable. Influence depends, first of all, on whether or not the contribution withheld is crucial to others; second, on whether or not those who have been affected by the disruption have resources to be conceded; and third, on whether the obstructionist group

can protect itself adequately from reprisals. Once these criteria are stated, it becomes evident that the poor are usually in the least strategic position to benefit from defiance.

Thus, in comparison with most producer groups, the lower classes are often in weak institutional locations to use disruption as a tactic for influence. Many among the lower class are in locations that make their cooperation less than crucial to the operation of major institutions. Those who work in economically marginal enterprises, or who perform marginally necessary functions in major enterprises, or those who are unemployed, do not perform roles on which major institutions depend. Indeed, some of the poor are sometimes so isolated from significant institutional participation that the only "contribution" they can withhold is that of quiescence in civil life: they can riot.

Moreover, those who manage the institutions in which many of the lower classes find themselves often have little to concede to disruptors. When lower-class groups do play an important role in an institution, as they do in sweatshops or in slum tenements, these institutions—operated as they often are by marginal entrepreneurs—may be incapable of yielding very much in response to disruptive pressure.

Finally, lower-class groups have little ability to protect themselves against reprisals that can be employed by institutional managers. The poor do not have to be historians of the occasions when protesters have been jailed or shot down to understand this point. The lesson of their vulnerability is engraved in everyday life; it is evident in every police beating, in every eviction, in every lost job, in every relief termination. The very labels used to describe defiance by the lower classes—the pejorative labels of illegality and violence—testify to this vulnerability and serve to justify severe reprisals when they are imposed. By

taking such labels for granted, we fail to recognize what these events really represent: a structure of political coercion inherent in the everyday life of the lower classes. . . .

Still, if the lower classes do not ordinarily have great disruptive power, and if the use of even that kind of power is not planned, it is the only power they do have. Their use of that power, the weighing of gains and risks, is not calculated in board rooms; it wells up out of the terrible travails that people experience at times of rupture and stress. And at such times, disruptions by the poor may have reverberations that go beyond the institutions in which the disruption is acted out.

THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL DISRUPTION

It is not the impact of disruptions on particular institutions that finally tests the power of the poor; it is the political impact of these disruptions.

At this level, however, a new set of structuring mechanisms intervenes, for the political impact of institutional disruptions is mediated by the electoral-representative system.

Responses to disruption vary depending on electoral conditions. Ordinarily, during periods of stability, government leaders have three rather obvious options when an institutional disruption occurs. They may ignore it; they may employ punitive measures against the disruptors; or they may attempt to conciliate them. If the disruptive group has little political leverage in its own right, as is true of lower-class groups, it will either be ignored or repressed. It is more likely to be ignored when the disrupted institution is not central to the society as a whole, or to other more important groups. Thus if men and women run amok, disrupting the fabric of their own communities, as in the immigrant slums of the nineteenth century, the spectacle may be frightening, but it can be contained within the slums; it will not necessarily have much impact on the society as a whole, or on the

well-being of other important groups. Similarly, when impoverished mobs demand relief, they may cause havoc in the relief offices, but chaotic relief offices are not a large problem for the society as a whole, or for important groups. Repression is more likely to be employed when central institutions are affected, as when railroad workers struck and rioted in the late nineteenth century, or when the police struck in Boston after the First World War. Either way, to be ignored or punished is what the poor ordinarily expect from government, because these are the responses they ordinarily evoke. But protest movements do not arise during ordinary periods; they arise when large-scale changes undermine political stability. It is this context, as we said earlier, that gives the poor hope and makes insurgency possible in the first place. It is this context that also makes political leaders somewhat vulnerable to protests by the poor.

At times of rapid economic and social change, political leaders are far less free either to ignore disturbances or to employ punitive measures. At such times, the relationship of political leaders to their constituents is likely to become uncertain. This unsettled state of political affairs makes the regime far more sensitive to disturbances, for it is not only more likely that previously uninvolved groups will be activated—the scope of conflict will be widened, in Schattschneider's terminology—but that the scope of conflict will be widened at a time when political alignments have already become unpredictable.

When a political leadership becomes unsure of its support, even disturbances that are isolated within peripheral institutions cannot be so safely ignored, for the mere appearance of trouble and disorder is more threatening when political alignments are unstable. And when the disrupted institutions are central to economic production or to the stability of social life, it becomes imper-

ative that normal operations be restored if the regime is to maintain support among its constituents. Thus when industrial workers joined in massive strikes during the 1930s, they threatened the entire economy of the nation and, given the electoral instability of the times, threatened the future of the nation's political leadership. Under these circumstances, government could hardly ignore the disturbances.

Yet neither could government run the risks entailed by using massive force to subdue the strikers in the 1930s. It could not, in other words, simply avail itself of the option of repression. For one thing the striking workers, like the civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s, had aroused strong sympathy among groups that were crucial supporters of the regime. For another, unless insurgent groups are virtually of outcast status, permitting leaders of the regime to mobilize popular hatred against them, politically unstable conditions make the use of force risky, since the reactions of other aroused groups cannot be safely predicted. When government is unable to ignore the insurgents, and is unwilling to risk the uncertain repercussions of the use of force, it will make efforts to conciliate and disarm the protesters.

These placating efforts will usually take several forms. First and most obviously, political leaders will offer concessions, or press elites in the private sector to offer concessions, to remedy some of the immediate grievances, both symbolic and tangible, of the disruptive group. Thus mobs of unemployed workers were granted relief in the 1930s; striking industrial workers won higher pay and shorter hours; and angry civil rights demonstrators were granted the right to desegregated public accommodations in the 1960s. . . .

Second, political leaders, or elites allied with them, will try to quiet disturbances not only by dealing with immediate grievances, but by making efforts to channel the energies

and angers of the protesters into more legitimate and less disruptive forms of political behavior, in part by offering incentives to movement leaders or, in other words, by co-opting them. Thus relief demonstrators in both the 1930s and the 1960s were encouraged to learn to use administrative grievance procedures as an alternative to "merely" disrupting relief offices, while their leaders were offered positions as advisors to relief administrators. In the 1960s civil rights organizers left the streets to take jobs in the Great Society programs; and as rioting spread in the northern cities, street leaders in the ghettos were encouraged to join in

Efforts to conciliate and disarm usually lead to the demise of the protest movement, partly by transforming the movement itself and partly by transforming the political climate which nourishes protest.

"dialogues" with municipal officials, and some were offered positions in municipal agencies.

Third, the measures promulgated by government at times of disturbance may be designed not to conciliate the protesters, but to undermine whatever sympathy the protesting group has been able to command from a wider public. Usually this is achieved through new programs that appear to meet the moral demands of the movement, and thus rob it of support without actually yielding much by way of tangible gains. A striking example was the passage of the pension provisions of the Social Security Act. The organized aged in the Townsend Movement were demand-

ing pensions of \$200 a month, with no strings attached, and they had managed to induce some 25 million people to sign supporting petitions. As it turned out, the Social Security Act, while it provided a measure of security for many of the future aged, did nothing for the members of the Townsend Movement, none of whom would be covered by a work-related insurance scheme since they were no longer working, and most of whom would in any case be dead when the payments were to begin some seven years later. But the pension provisions of the Social Security Act answered the moral claims of the movement. In principle, government had acted to protect America's aged, thus severing any identification between those who would be old in the future and those who were already old. The Social Security Act effectively dampened public support for the Townsend Plan while yielding the old people nothing. . . .

Finally, these apparently conciliatory measures make it possible for government to safely employ repressive measures as well. Typically, leaders and groups who are more disruptive, or who spurn the concessions offered, are singled out for arbitrary police action or for more formal legal harassment through congressional investigations or through the courts. In the context of much-publicized efforts by government to ease the grievances of disaffected groups, coercive measures of this kind are not likely to arouse indignation among sympathetic publics. Indeed, this dual strategy is useful in another way, for it serves to cast an aura of balance and judiciousness over government action.

The main point, however, is simply that *the political impact of institutional disruptions depends upon electoral conditions*. Even serious disruptions, such as industrial strikes, will force concessions only when the calculus of electoral instability favors the protesters. And even then, when the protesters succeed in forcing gov-

ernment to respond, they do not dictate the content of those responses. As to the variety of specific circum-

stances which determine how much the protesters will gain and how much they will lose, we still have a great deal to learn.

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THE DEMISE OF PROTEST

It is not surprising that, taken together, these efforts to conciliate and disarm usually lead to the demise of the protest movement, partly by transforming the movement itself, and partly by transforming the political climate which nourishes protest. With these changes, the array of institutional controls which ordinarily restrain protest is restored, and political influence is once more denied to the lower class.

We said that one form of government response was to make concessions to the protesters, yielding them something of what they demanded, either symbolic or material. But the mere granting of such concessions is probably not very important in accounting for the demise of a movement. For one thing, whatever is yielded is usually modest if not meager; for another, even modest concessions demonstrate that protest "works," a circumstance that might as easily be expected to fuel a movement as to pacify it.

But concessions are rarely unencumbered. If they are given at all, they are usually part and parcel of measures to re-integrate the movement into normal political channels and to absorb its leaders into stable institutional roles. Thus the right of industrial workers to unionize, won

in response to massive and disruptive strikes in the 1930s, meant that workers were encouraged to use newly established grievance procedures in place of the sit-down or the wildcat strike; and the new union leaders, now absorbed in relations with factory management and in the councils of the Democratic Party, became the ideological proponents and organizational leaders of this strategy of normalcy and moderation. Similarly, when Blacks won the vote in the South and a share of patronage in the municipalities of the North in response to the disturbances of the 1960s, Black leaders were absorbed into electoral and bureaucratic politics and became the ideological proponents of the shift "from protest to politics." . . .

At the same time that government makes an effort to re-integrate disaffected groups, and to guide them into less politically disturbing forms of behavior, it also moves to isolate them from potential supporters and, by doing so, diminishes the morale of the movement. Finally, while the movement is eroding under these influences, its leaders attracted by new opportunities, its followers conciliated, confused, or discouraged, the show of repressive force against recalcitrant elements demolishes the few who are left.

However, the more far-reaching changes do not occur within the movement, but in the political context which nourished the movement in the first place. The agitated and defiant people who compose the movement are but a small proportion of the discontented population on

which it draws. Presumably if some leaders were co-opted, new leaders would arise; if some participants were appeased or discouraged, others would take their place. But this does not happen, because government's responses not only destroy the movement, they also transform the political climate which makes protest possible. The concessions to the protesters, the efforts to "bring them into the system," and in particular the measures aimed at potential supporters, all work to create a powerful image of a benevolent and responsive government that answers grievances and solves problems. As a result, whatever support might have existed among the larger population dwindles. Moreover, the display of government benevolence stimulates antagonist groups, and triggers the antagonistic sentiments of more neutral sectors. The "tide of public opinion" begins to turn—against labor in the late 1930s, against Blacks in the late 1960s. And as it does, the definitions put forward by political leaders also change, particularly when prodded by contenders for political office who sense the shift in popular mood, and the weaknesses it reveals in an incumbent's support. Thus in the late 1960s, Republican leaders took advantage of white resentment against Blacks to attract Democratic voters, raising cries of "law and order" and workfare not welfare"—the code words for racial antagonism. Such a change is ominous. Where once the powerful voices of the land enunciated a rhetoric that gave courage to the poor, they now enunciate a rhetoric that erases hope and implants fear. The point should be evident that, as these various circumstances combine, defiance is no longer possible.

THE RESIDUE OF REFORM

When protest subsides, concessions may be withdrawn. Thus when the unemployed become docile, the relief rolls are cut even though many are still unemployed; when the ghet-

to become quiescent, evictions are resumed. The reason is simple enough. Since the poor no longer pose the threat of disruption, they no longer exert leverage on political leaders; there is no need for conciliation. This is particularly the case in a climate of growing political hostility, for the concessions granted are likely to become the focus of resentment by other groups.

But some concessions are not withdrawn. As the tide of turbulence recedes, major institutional changes sometimes remain. Thus the right of workers to join unions was not rescinded when turmoil subsided (although some of the rights ceded to unions were withdrawn). And it is not likely that the franchise granted to Blacks in the South will be taken back (although just that happened in the post-reconstruction period). Why, then, are some concessions withdrawn while others become permanent institutional reforms?

The answer, perhaps, is that while some of the reforms granted during periods of turmoil are costly or repugnant to various groups in the society, and are therefore suffered only under duress, other innovations turn out to be compatible (or at least not incompatible) with the interests of more powerful groups, most importantly with the interests of dominant economic groups. . . .

Protesters win, if they win at all, what historical circumstances have already made ready to be conceded. Still, as Alan Wolfe has said, governments do not change magically through some "historical radical transformation," but only through the actual struggles of the time.

When people are finally roused to protest against great odds, they take the only options available to them within the limits imposed by their social circumstances. Those who refuse to recognize these limits not only blindly consign lower-class protests to the realm of the semi-rational, but also blindly continue to pretend that other, more regular options for political influence are widely available in the American political system.

IN SUMMARY: A NOTE ON THE ROLE OF PROTEST LEADERSHIP

The main point of this [article] is that both the limitations and opportunities for mass protest are shaped by social conditions. The implications for the role of leadership in protest movements can be briefly summarized.

Protest wells up in response to momentous changes in the institutional order. It is not created by organizers and leaders.


Once protest erupts, the specific forms it takes are largely determined by features of social structure. Organizers and leaders who contrive strategies that ignore the social location of the people they seek to mobilize can only fail.

Elites respond to the institutional disruptions that protest causes, as well as to other powerful institutional imperatives. Elite responses are not significantly shaped by the demands of leaders and organizers. Nor are elite responses significantly shaped by formally structured organizations of the poor. Whatever influence lower-class groups occasionally exert in American politics does not result

from organization, but from mass protest and the disruptive consequences of protest.

Finally, protest in the United States has been episodic and transient, for as it gains momentum, so too do various forms of institutional accommodation and coercion that have the effect of restoring quiescence. Organizers and leaders cannot prevent the ebbing of protest, nor the erosion of whatever influence protest yielded the lower class. They can only try to win whatever can be won while it can be won.

In these major ways protest movements are shaped by institutional conditions, and not by the purposive efforts of leaders and organizers. The limitations are large and unyielding. Yet within the boundaries created by these limitations, some latitude for purposive effort remains. Organizers and leaders choose to do one thing, or they choose to do another, and what they choose to do affects to some degree the course of the protest movement. If the area of latitude is less than leaders and organizers would prefer, it is also not enlarged when they proceed as if institutional limitations did not in fact exist by undertaking strategies which fly in the face of these constraints. The wiser course is to understand these limitations, and to exploit whatever latitude remains to enlarge the potential influence of the lower class. And if our conclusions are correct, what this means is that strategies must be pursued that escalate the momentum and impact of disruptive protest at each stage in its emergence and evolution. ■



**PUBLIC SAFETY AND
THE OAKLAND
POLICE DEPARTMENT**

DANSIEGEL
— FOR MAYOR —

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


DAN SIEGEL
FOR MAYOR OF OAKLAND

PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT

IT IS THE DUTY OF THE CITY OF OAKLAND to provide residents with police services to protect their lives, their property, and their constitutional rights. The mayor of Oakland plays an important role in overseeing the Oakland Police Department and ensuring that residents receive these services.

AS THE CRIME RATE IN CALIFORNIA has decreased steadily, Oakland's crime rate has shown no tendency to diminish over time. Year-to-year increases in the number of officers in the Oakland Police Department have done nothing to slow the crime rate down. Adding more officers to the department will not solve Oakland's crime problem -- we must implement new and more effective methods for reducing violence in Oakland.



SOURCE: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; OAKLAND RESIDENTS FOR PEACEFUL NEIGHBORHOODS.
*VIOLENT CRIMES INCLUDE MURDER, RAPE, AND ASSAULT. VIOLENT CRIMES PER 100,000 INHABITANTS

DAN SIEGEL IS COMMITTED TO A COMPREHENSIVE SAFETY STRATEGY BASED ON THREE KEY PRINCIPLES:

- I. **STRENGTHEN THE OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT'S** ability and commitment to solving the most serious crimes by implementing community policing and reorganizing the department so that more officers are patrolling our streets.
- II. **IMPLEMENT CITYWIDE PROGRAMS** that address the root causes of crime and promote social and economic justice.
- III. **ENSURE THAT THE DEPARTMENT EARNS THE COMMUNITY'S TRUST** with a zero tolerance approach to police officer abuse and misconduct.



I. STRENGTHEN ABILITY AND INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE FORCE

TO MAKE OAKLAND SAFER IN THE NEAR TERM, we must take immediate steps to reduce violent crime. Residents of Oakland have the right to live without the fear of violence.

REORGANIZE THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

SIMPLY INCREASING THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS in the Oakland Police Department will not solve the city's crime problem. Instead, we have to reorganize the department and make more effective use of the officers we have.

IN 2013, POLICE CHIEF SEAN WHENT stated that there were only 35 officers patrolling the entire city at any given time of day.¹ Dan Siegel supports putting more police officers on the street and reducing the number of officers assigned to administrative office work. The increased number of officers on each police beat would allow for improved rapid responses to calls for service and follow-up investigations. Administrative desk jobs within the Oakland Police Department should be civilianized.

UNDER SIEGEL'S PLAN, Oakland would have over 500 officers assigned to our neighborhoods. A majority of officers would be tasked with working in high-need neighborhoods, rather than in inefficient citywide units.

THIS REORGANIZATION CAN BE FULLY implemented without increasing the current number of officers and would maintain necessary leadership positions and specialized investigative units.

IMPROVE CASE CLOSURE RATE

THE OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT MUST IMPROVE the current closure rate. Presently, OPD only solves 30 percent of murder cases, and even fewer robbery and burglary cases. As journalist Ali Winston wrote in the East Bay Express, "The Oakland Police Department can't lower the city's crime rate, because it doesn't catch criminals."

A LARGE PART OF THE PROBLEM, as Winston explains, is the inability of Oakland's crime lab to function as a modern, scientific entity. The Siegel administration would immediately upgrade the lab's capabilities.²

ESTABLISH COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTERS

LASTLY, OAKLAND MUST MAKE A STRONG COMMITMENT TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE. Oakland should create community youth and justice courts that use peer counseling to resolve minor crimes at the neighborhood level, similar to the successful Community Justice Center in San Francisco.³ We should use peer counseling to resolve minor crimes at the neighborhood level in order to reduce the numbers of people—especially young people—entering the criminal justice system and the lifelong stigma that it creates.

Siegel's OPD Reorganization Plan

540

Officers in the streets.

60

Community beats.

9

Officers and
investigators per beat.

¹ KTVU. "OPD to begin reorganization efforts despite shortage of officers." June 6, 2013. Retrieved from: <http://www.ktvu.com/news/news/crime-law/opd-begin-reorganization-efforts-despite-shortage-/nYD7B/>

² Winston, Ali. "Getting Away With Murder." East Bay Express. November 14, 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/getting-away-with-murder/Content?oid=3390191>


³ Knight, Heather. "5 years in, verdict is positive for S.F. community court." San Francisco Chronicle. March 5, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/5-years-in-verdict-is-positive-for-S-F-5289195.php>



II. ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES OF CRIME

POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT, INEQUALITY, AND HOPELESSNESS are the most important factors associated with the rise of crime.⁴ If these issues go ignored, we will continue to make the mistakes of the past 35 years, such as acting on the erroneous belief that sending more criminals to prison will cause less violence.

IN 1980, THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 25,000 STATE PRISONERS IN CALIFORNIA, but as of October 2013, the prison population was around 120,000 - a 500 percent increase.⁵ Despite this increase in the prison population, residents of cities like Oakland continue to experience violent crime. In 2013, the national average for violent crimes was 387 crimes per 100,000 people - in Oakland, the average was five times higher.⁶ Arresting more people and sending them to prison for long periods of time will not make our city safer.



UNEMPLOYMENT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A LEADING CAUSE OF CRIME. For the past few decades, Oakland's unemployment rate has consistently been significantly higher than that of our neighbors across the Bay in San Francisco, and has remained higher than both the national and state averages. Making Oakland a safe and prosperous city over the long term will require our unwavering commitment to dealing with the causes and conditions of crime. As mayor, Dan Siegel will emphasize the following in order to reduce the chances of crime:

- Creating living wage jobs.
- Providing quality education, including pre-school, after-school programs, and vocational education for all youth.
- Implementing programs that strengthen neighborhoods, families, and children.

⁴Patterson, E. Britt. "Poverty, Income Inequality, and Community Crime Rates." *Criminology*. Volume 29, Issue 4, p. 755-776. November, 1991.

⁵"California's Future." Public Policy Institute of California. January 2014. Retrieved from: http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_114RGR.pdf

⁶Kugler, Sara. "Oakland residents suffering from PTSD due to urban violence." MSNBC. December 28, 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-perry/oaklands-urban-violence-causing-ptsd>.



SIEGEL'S PUBLIC SAFETY PLAN calls for community schools that are open afternoons, evenings, and weekends to provide safe study spaces, recreation programs, health initiatives, and adult education. These "after-school" hours will bring Oakland residents together by empowering them to gather with other members of the community to learn and grow while staying healthy and safe.

AS A CITY, WE MUST DEMONSTRATE OUR CARE and concern for all of our children by providing them with the support necessary to develop self-respect and to become productive members of society. This will not only reduce crime by addressing its root causes, but will also improve the lives of Oakland's residents.



III. EARNING THE COMMUNITY'S TRUST

COMMUNITY POLICING

A SUCCESSFUL POLICING STRATEGY REQUIRES overcoming the distrust that so many people—particularly young African Americans and Latinos—have for the police after decades of abuse and racial profiling. Dan Siegel strongly rejects racial profiling and all measures that allow group punishment, such as gang injunctions and curfews. Instead, he will emphasize community involvement in policing.

IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT COMMUNITY POLICING, each police beat must have a community council to create neighborhood strategies, in addition to a neighborhood organizer who brings individuals together. Cooperation between police personnel and the community is critical to building the trust necessary for effective policing.

"The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon the public approval of police actions... Police seek and preserve public favor not by catering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law."

— Sir Robert Peel,
Founder of the London
Metropolitan Police in 1829.



MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Professor Samuel Walker of the University of Nebraska wrote:

"POLICE EXPERTS FROM AROUND THE COUNTRY KNOW that constitutional policing is a necessary element of effective crime control...Trust and cooperation are lost when the police engage in unconstitutional and unprofessional conduct: when they use excessive force; are verbally abusive; stop, question, and frisk people because of their race or ethnicity; and are perceived to go unpunished for their actions."

—Professor Samuel Walker, University of Nebraska

OAKLAND CONTINUES TO BE UNDER THE OVERSIGHT of the federal court because of proven systemic police abuse of members of the African American community.⁸ In 2003, the City of Oakland entered into the federal-court-approved Negotiated Settlement Agreement, which "requires the Oakland Police Department to conduct an in-depth review of its entire operation with the aim of becoming more responsive, effective, and accountable."⁹

NOTHING COULD BE A GREATER INDICTMENT of Oakland's elected and appointed leadership than its failure to meet the terms of the Negotiated Settlement Agreement after 12 years and tens of millions of dollars spent. Until the police department succeeds at protecting people's rights, lives and property, it will be unable to win the community's trust and the cooperation it needs to be effective.

IN ORDER TO END FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, the City of Oakland must meet the requirements of the settlement agreement and demonstrate that the changes required by the court have been in place for a full year. A Siegel administration would immediately take steps to meet the court requirements and adopt a zero-tolerance policy toward police misconduct. We will also transfer the process of investigating complaints against officers outside the police department and demand that the City Administrator take strict action against officers who violate people's rights.

RECRUITING A POLICE CHIEF AND OFFICERS


TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL AND RESPECTFUL POLICING, Oakland needs a strong police chief who holds officers accountable for their behavior and follows the priorities established by Oakland's elected leaders.

SIEGEL WILL WORK HARD TO RECRUIT THE BEST POLICE OFFICER candidates from Oakland and reduce barriers—such as credit score checks—that eliminate significant portions of Oakland's population from consideration. We must improve our screening of applicants for positions in the department to better ensure that only candidates who are mentally healthy and respectful of our community are hired. Effective officers who respect Oakland's residents and improve life in the City should be rewarded. The City should offer incentives, such as housing supplements, to encourage Oakland youth to continue to live in Oakland and join the police department. We aim to make Oakland's police force one that will inspire pride in our young people because it will—at long last—"protect and serve" all of us.

⁸ Walker, Samuel. "The Consent Decree Does Not Hamper Crime Fighting." East Bay Express. September 26, 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/the-consent-decree-does-not-hamper-crime-fighting/Content?oid=3346845>

⁹ DeFao, Janine. "Oakland settles 'Riders' suits / Record \$10.5 million payout - police reforms required." San Francisco Chronicle. February 19, 2003. Retrieved from <http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Oakland-settles-Riders-suits-Record-10-5-2633661.php>

¹⁰ City of Oakland, California. "The Negotiated Settlement Agreement." Retrieved from <http://www2.oaklandnet.com/Government/o/OPD/DOWD004998>



PUBLIC SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS START WITH A STRONG MAYOR

OAKLAND HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BECOME A SAFE AND PROSPEROUS CITY. But current, ineffective policing policies must end and be replaced with policies that will improve public safety by strengthening our police force, implementing programs that address root causes of crime, and gaining the trust of our communities. Change will happen only with strong, bold leadership in the mayor's office. That leadership will come from Dan Siegel.

Organization Is the Weapon of the Oppressed

Ferguson, Mobilization, and Organizing the Resistance!

by Ajamu Nangwaya / August 19th, 2014

Leaders who do not act dialogically, but insist on imposing their decisions, do not organize the people—they manipulate them. They do not liberate, nor are they liberated: they oppress.
— Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*

The rebellion in Ferguson, Missouri, against the killing of unarmed Afrikan American teenager Michael Brown has inspired me to reflect on the question of the organizing model versus mobilizing or mobilization model in the struggle for Afrikan liberation in North America as well as the broader humanistic fight for liberation from various forms of oppression. Organizing the oppressed for emancipation is the preferred approach to engaging them in the fight for their liberation as opposed to merely mobilizing them.

The rapid demise of the Occupy Movement and the scattering of the occupiers should be an objective lesson on the need for freedom seekers to become organizationally affiliated. Where are the tens of thousands of people who participated in the occupations in Canada and the United States? If I had to hazard a guess, I would argue that most of them are not in organizations that are committed to liquidating the various systems of oppression. They have gone back to doing the mundane activities of life that are not connected to movement-building. Essentially, they have been demobilized!

When I raised the issue of organizing the oppressed, this project is centrally focused on building the capacity of the people to become central actors on the stage of history or in the drama of emancipation. The socially marginalized are placed in organizational situations where they are equipped with the knowledge, skills and attitude to work for their own freedom and the construction of a transformed social reality.

Under the organizing model the people are the principal participants and decision-makers in the organizations and movements that are working for social change. The people are not seen as entities who are so ideologically underdeveloped that they need a revolutionary vanguard or dictatorship to lead them to the "New Jerusalem." The supreme organizer and humanist Ella Baker took the position that the masses will figure out the path to freedom in her popular assertion, "Give people light and they will find a way."

<http://dissidentvoice.org/2014/08/organization-is-the-weapon-of-the-oppressed/>

This work of finding 'a way' is done in grassroots, participatory-democratic organizations, which are the principal instruments of self-determination for the oppressed. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a student-based civil rights group during the struggle against apartheid in the America South of the 1960s, employed the organizing model. SNCC focused on building local organizations with indigenous leadership that effected the struggle for freedom by, for, and of the people affected by white supremacy and capitalist exploitation.

These student organizers lived among the people and, in effect, committed 'class suicide' by their existential unity with the people, as called for by the revolutionary Amilcar Cabral. They weren't like Martin Luther King and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference and other major civil rights organizations and their leaders who entered a local community for a march or demonstration with the media in tow. At the end of the event, they leave town with a demobilized population behind them. This is the mobilization model that shall be marked as "Exhibit A."

The mobilizing or mobilization model of struggle seeks to bring the people out to support political actions that are conceived, planned, and executed by organizational or movement elite. The people are, essentially, extras in the drama of liberation with the leaders as the featured actors. The rank and file members or participants are without substantive voice and initiative. In the mainline trade unions of today as well as in much of the activities of other social movements, mobilization is the weapon of choice.

Included in the mobilization model is the spontaneous reaction of the oppressed to acts of state domination or violence from dominant social actors. For example, in some cases of police violence against Afrikans in Canada and the United States, the community is mobilized to march or demonstrate in protest against the incidents of injustice. There will even be the occasional rebellions or uprisings. But the passion for justice will predictably disappear in short order. The people's attention will be distracted by routine, everyday activities until the next killing or episode of police brutality.

When organizations and movements favour mobilization, it is all about bringing the rank and file out to mass actions (the spectacles of resistance) such as rallies, demonstrations, pickets, strikes, and voter registration drives. At the end of the event, the masses are sent back home to assume their stance as passive spectators in this elite management approach to liberation. The people's will is represented by the leaders, because participatory democratic practices are not on the organizational menu.

If the people's bodies are needed, they will be summoned for the next action. The critical knowledge, skills and attitude that are used to effect resistance reside largely within the leadership. Even when the people are members of organizations, it is usually the elected leadership and a few people around it, and the paid staffers who do the bulk of the strategic and operational activities. They are the brain trust of the movement.

In the 1988 summer issue of the publication Breakthrough: Political Journal of Prairie Fire Organizing Committee, the late Kwame Ture (formerly Stokely Carmichael), who served a term

as chairperson of SNCC and a stint as Prime Minister of the Black Panther Party, had this to say about organizing and mobilization:

There's a difference between mobilization and organization and this difference must be properly understood. To be an organizer, one must be a mobilizer, but being a mobilizer doesn't make you an organizer. Martin Luther King was one of the greatest mobilizers this century has seen, but until his death he was short on organizing. He came to double up on it just before his death, but he was very short on organizing. Many today who follow in his footsteps still take this path of mobilization rather than organization. Thus one of the errors of the 60s was the question of mobilization versus the question of organization.

Invariably the mobilizing or mobilization model comes with the reliance on a supreme leader or a few individuals at the top of the organizational or movement leadership food chain. Ella Baker cautioned us about the will toward the preceding state of affairs:

I have always felt it was a handicap for oppressed peoples to depend so largely upon a leader, because unfortunately in our culture, the charismatic leader usually becomes a leader because he has found a spot in the public limelight...

The oppressed and movement organizations cannot keep on executing the same shopworn tactics, while expecting different outcomes.

Many organizations or people are using vigils, marches, rallies and demonstrations as spaces for emotional release. Emotional responses to material forces of oppression are insufficient for the job at hand. We must employ reason and emotion in a methodical, disciplined and planned manner that is backed by a vision in an organizational or social movement context. We need to create or join organizations that are committed to fighting the systems of oppression that are materially impacting our lives. It is impossible to fight capitalist exploitation, police violence, the oppression of women, white supremacy, homophobia and other forms of dehumanization outside of collective action and organized structures – organizations and movements.

The exploitative systems of domination are structured and institutionalized. The masters or exploiters are very much aware of the value of organizations in maintaining the status quo. The oppressors' army, police force, state bureaucracy, schools, media, companies, banks and prisons are organizations that are used to keep us in our place as Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* or *The Damned*.

Kwame Ture often made the following claim in his public education lectures, "Organization is the weapon of the oppressed. Africans are oppressed, because we are disorganized!" Our revolutionary ancestor's assertion ought to be seen as a self-evident truth.

Let's use this moment of grief and resistance in Ferguson to build radical or revolutionary organizations that will organize with the people around all of the issues raised below by comrade El Jones, a poet, organizer and educator, in a Facebook status:

<http://dissidentvoice.org/2014/08/organization-is-the-weapon-of-the-oppressed/>

We will be gathering to show solidarity for Mike Brown's family and the citizens of Ferguson, and to stand against state violence against our communities and people. Stay tuned for details, date and time. We must come together to support each other and our communities against the dehumanization of Black people and the devaluing of our lives. We must stand against the criminalization of our youth, and for our right to exist, to walk on the street, to have futures, to live freely. We must stand against the occupying of our communities, the loss of opportunity, the marginalization and poverty and lack of access that condemn so many to prison, and the suffering of families and communities in a system that does not value Black life. We must organize ourselves in strength, love and solidarity, fight to build strong communities and futures, to support parents, and to protect our children.

If we are not ready to be in organizations, we are just playing with ourselves (certainly a pleasurable act in the right context). However, in the situation of the quest for freedom and self-determination, self-interested pleasure, acts of petty bourgeois self-indulgence, and splendid isolation are liabilities.

The message within this Ethiopian proverb is timeless and accurate, "When spider webs unite, they can tie up a lion." Let our action speak louder than words in the call of the disenfranchised for unity, cooperation, and self-determination. Our solidarity in action will emerge from us getting together in groups with a program of liberation.

Young people tend to be at the forefront of rebellions or uprisings, as we are witnessing in Ferguson, or we have observed in the recent mass protest in Egypt that brought down the Hosni Mubarak-led government. However, young people tend to be marginalized in the strategic leadership in organizations and social movements. It is critically important to systemically prepare younger comrades for the role of agents of revolutionary transformation in society.

Afrikan young people will need to become more than the spark and driving force behind spontaneous and short-lived rebellions. They ought to become permanent organizers among the working-class, women and the racially oppressed so as to advance the social revolution. If the youth and the other alienated people of Ferguson and other cities and towns are committed to changing the status quo, they will need to form or join radical organizations and fully adopt the organizing model of resistance.

Afrikan youth in the United States can draw on the legacy of young people-led organizations such as SNCC and the Black Panther Party, if they believe it is best to create their own autonomous revolutionary organizations. The widespread existence of sellout or compromised leadership among the older established leaders might make independent youth-led organizations a compelling option. The youth-led rebellion in Ferguson is not taking direction from the traditional civic leaders who are not seen as legitimate.

It is high time for the resistance to build effective and efficient organizations that are rooted in the needs and aspirations of the oppressed. Organizers ought to learn from the organizational or movement successes and mistakes of the past and the present in doing the monumental work

<http://dissidentvoice.org/2014/08/organization-is-the-weapon-of-the-oppressed/>

of movement-building and creating the embryonic economic, political and social structures of the free, good, and just society (classless, stateless and self-managed). A prefigurative politics or building the road as we travel needs to be at the centre of social movement organizing in the 21st century.


Ajamu Nangwaya, Ph.D., is an educator and a journalistic activist. He is an organizer with the Network for the Elimination of Police Violence and the Network for Pan-Afrikan Solidarity.

The Black Nation Charges Genocide! Our survival is dependent on Self-Defense!

Posted on Aug 20, 2014

By Sanyika Bryant

The Black Nation Charges Genocide! Our survival is dependant on Self-Defense!



Mike Brown, Ezell Ford and Eric Garner are among the latest victims of the ongoing genocide of Black People in the United States of America. Every 28 hours in the United States law enforcement, vigilantes, or security guards extra-judiciously murder a Black person. It is imperative that we as a people act upon every tragedy and hardship inflicted upon us by the government and the corporations to address the systematic genocide of our people in a protracted, programmatic, and strategic way.

The United States of America, as both a state and a criminal enterprise, has proven time and time again throughout its entire 238-year history that where Black people are concerned, genocide is the order of the day. The mass extrajudicial killings of Blacks aren't just the result of

<http://mxgm.org/the-black-nation-charges-genocide-our-survival-is-dependent-on-self-defense/>

rogue police officers and crazed racist vigilantes; it is a state sponsored program of containment designed to keep the Black nation in a position of subservience and subjugation to the White settler colonial nation.

The United States Government and the vast reactionary sector of the settler colonial nation who's interests it was designed to represent, has been engaged in a war on Afrikan people from the time of its inception to the present day. The United States Government continues to lose legitimacy through its actions against our people. Through its refusal to address the ongoing human rights violations against the Black Nation the United States has shown itself to be the perpetual facilitator of the suffering of the Black Nation.

We cannot and should not count on our enemies – like the courts, and other forces of the US government or transnational corporations – to protect us. We have to protect ourselves. Justice for Mike Brown, Ezell Ford, Eric Garner or any of the hundreds of other Black women, men and children extra-judiciously executed by vigilantes, security guards and police every year will never be found in the courtrooms of the United States. Marissa Alexander is potentially facing decades in prison for firing a warning shot to defend herself and her children against an abusive partner while George Zimmerman is walking free after murdering Trayvon Martin in cold blood. Even in cases where the verdict apparently is in favor of our people, like in the conviction of Theodore Wafer for the murder of Renisha McBride, these sorts of trials uphold the status quo by not addressing the root issues behind the oppression of our people in a systematic way. The United States Government does not even have the right to try these cases because it is the primary architect of the state of emergency and continuous crisis the Black Nation is forced to endure. We cannot afford to be distracted from the work that must be done to insure the survival of our people.

The rebellion our people are waging in Ferguson must be supported. But, spontaneous rebellions are not enough. The only way we are going to successfully defend ourselves from genocide is to build a massive social movement with self-determination and self defense as its central unifying principles. We need a coordinated movement that strategically takes on the systemic oppression and exploitation that prevent Black people from exercising self-determination and human rights. We have to defend ourselves if we want to survive.

We call on people around the country to support The Organization For Black Struggle based out of St. Louis, Missouri in their efforts to secure the resources to hire a full time organizer. They have been working since 1980 to fill the vacuum left by assaults on the Black Power Movement and have been providing critical leadership in support of the people's struggle. To connect with The Organization For Black Struggle visit <http://obs-ontheforce.org/>.

The Malcolm X Grassroots Movement (MXGM) believes that an essential part of our Movement for survival must be Self-Defense Networks.

We think there are two types of Networks that we have to build:

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